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ABSTRACT

This document is a synthesis of the current literature on performance-based incentive systems for teachers and administrators. Section one provides an introduction to the reform movement and to performance-based pay initiatives; a definition of terms; a brief discussion of funding sources; a discussion of compensation strategies; a description of the theoretical basis for conceptions of the work of teaching; and a discussion of the organizational context in which all incentive plans must function. The second section offers a brief historical perspective on the current situation and a discussion of teachers' salaries and the "benefits package" associated with teaching; it also offers a review of the conditions that make a teaching career less attractive to those who have the option to choose another profession. In section three, a discussion is presented on the theoretical and practical issues concerning performance evaluation. The section deals with: product- and prcess-oriented evaluation and the issues of reliability and validity of both; rater bias and the selection and training of evaluators; the use of student-achievement measures; and the effects of performance evaluations on minority teachers. Section four presents problems experienced in previous programs; four major incentive strategies and assumptions on which each is based; a set of steps for planning and implementing a performance-based incentive plan; and a brief review of some of the legal issues involved in such plans. The final section presents a summary of experiences, and the lessons learned from those experiences in a number of districts and states that are involved in the implementation of some form of incentive plan. Eight pages of references are appended. (JD)

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Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans

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Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans

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PREFACE

Responding to Regional Needs

Developing and implementing a performance-based incentive system for teachers and/or administrators requires too much time, effort, and money for a state or a local district to plunge into such a process without, first, having a good idea of what the current thinking is on the subject. There are practical, political, and theoretical considerations that policy makers should be aware of before planning, let alone developing and implementing, effective performance-based incentive systems.

Eighteen-months ago when SEDL was surveying current and future needs of the Southwestern Region, all five states were investigating incentive plans for teachers and/or administrators. Legislation was either in place or under consideration for pilot projects in selected districts in Oklahoma and Arkansas, for the development of local-district plans for career ladders in New Mexico, for a study of a career-ladder system in Louisiana, and for a state-wide program in Texas. Since then, revenue short-falls and/or changes in the political climate in four of the five states have diminished, but not eliminated, the need for in-depth information on performance-based incentive systems.

Recommendations for Restructuring the Teaching Profession

Although the subject may no longer be a top priority with the states served by SEDL, an increase in national attention to performance-based incentive systems may result in a resurgence of regional interest. The report released by the Carnegie Forum on Education (1986), A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century, contains recommendations for restructuring the profession that are especially pertinent to any discussion of teacher incentive systems and are, for the most part, consistent with the recommendations of those who have experience in implementing such systems. The recommendations call for:

I. *Making teachers' salaries and career opportunities competitive with those in other professions.*

The salaries of entering teachers, the average salaries of teachers, and the range of teachers' salaries should be increased to levels adequate to attract and retain teachers of high academic ability.

Continuing education credits should no longer be used as a basis of salary determination. Teacher compensation systems should be based on the following attributes:

- Job function and level of responsibility.
- Competence as determined by level at which the teacher receives Board Certification.
- Experience in the classroom.

- Productivity as demonstrated by contribution to improved student performance.

The teacher's contribution to student performance is the hardest of these attributes to assess. Performance-based compensation systems should be regarded as developmental and teachers should participate actively in their design.

States and districts should move to eliminate the obstacles to career mobility for teachers.

States and localities should use pay incentives to assure an equitable distribution of teachers among high-priority schools and school districts.

II. *Restructuring the teaching force and introducing a new category of "Lead Teachers" with the proven ability to provide active leadership in the redesign of the schools and in helping their colleagues to uphold high standards of learning and teaching.*

Lead Teachers in the future should hold advanced teacher's certificates from a new National Board of Professional Teaching Standards.

III. *Restructuring the schools to provide a professional environment for teaching, thus freeing teachers to decide how best to meet state and local goals for children while holding them accountable for student progress.*

Teachers should be provided with the discretion and autonomy that are the hallmarks of professional work. State and local governments should set clear goals for schools and greatly reduce bureaucratic regulation of school processes. Teachers should participate in the setting of goals for their school and be accountable for achieving agreed upon standards of performance.

Districts should foster collegial styles of decision making and teaching in schools in which "Lead Teachers" play a central role.

Teachers should be provided the support staff they need to be more effective and productive, and should be prepared to take responsibility for overseeing the work of additional staff with a range of skills and experience.

School districts should consider a variety of approaches to school leadership.

IV. *Relating incentives for teachers to school-wide student performance and providing schools with the technology, services, and staff essential to teacher productivity.*

States and school boards, working closely with teachers, should establish incentive systems that link teachers' compensation to school-wide student performance. Both administrative mechanisms and market models ought to be considered and tested.

The federal government and private foundations should develop a substantial program of research, development, and field trials designed to improve the methods and measurement systems available for relating teachers' rewards to student progress.

Current efforts at the federal, state, and local level to assess and compare student progress should pool their resources to develop common yardsticks for use by states, localities, schools, and the public.

School boards and unions should work energetically to develop more collaborative ways of improving local schools. The approaches used should be directed at the search for methods of improving the professional environment for teaching while holding teachers accountable for student progress.

Providing Research- and Experience-Based Information

In anticipation of a renewed regional interest in changes in the organizational structures of the schools and in teacher and administrator incentives systems, SEDL has produced this document in order to provide solid, research- and experience-based information to the states. The document is a synthesis of the current literature on performance-based incentive systems for teachers and administrators. A description of the synthesis is provided in the following paragraphs.

Section I: Perspectives on the Policy Issues Surrounding Performance-Based Incentive Plans provides an introduction to the reform movement and to performance-based pay initiatives; a definition of terms; a brief discussion of funding sources; a discussion of compensation strategies; the theoretical basis for conceptions of the work of teaching; and a discussion of the organizational context in which all incentive plans must function.

Section II: Perspectives on the Problems of Attracting and Retaining Quality Teachers provides a brief historical perspective on the current situation; a discussion of teachers' salaries and the "benefits package" associated with teaching; and inspects the conditions that make a teaching career less attractive to those who have the option to choose another profession.

Section III: Perspectives on Performance Evaluation discusses the theoretical and practical issues concerning performance evaluation. It deals with both product- and process-oriented evaluation, the issues of reliability and validity of both; with rater bias and the selection and training of evaluators; with the use of student-achievement measures; and with the effects of performance evaluations on minority teachers.

Section IV: Perspectives on Planning and Implementing a Performance-Based Incentive Plan presents the problems experienced by previous programs; four major incentive strategies and the assumptions on which each is based; a set of steps, compiled from a number of sources, for planning and implementing a performance-based incentive plan; and a brief review of some of the legal issues involved in such plans.

Section V: Perspectives on the Effects of Implementation presents a summary of the experiences and, where possible, the lessons learned from those experiences of a number of districts and states that are involved in the implementation of some form of incentive plan.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I: PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLANS . . . 1

Educational Reform . . . 1
    Table 1: State Trends in Developing Incentive-Pay Plans . . . 2

Performance-Based Pay Initiatives . . . 4
    Definition of Terms . . . 4
    Similarities and Differences . . . 5

Experience With Previous Programs . . . 5
    The Failure of Differentiated Staffing . . . 6
    Problems With Merit-Pay Programs . . . 6
    Career Ladder Potential . . . 8

Variables Affecting Incentives . . . 9
    Duration of Rewards . . . 9
    Size of Reward . . . 9
    Number of Rewards . . . 9
    Eligibility . . . 9
    Costs . . . 10

Revenue Sources for Incentive Plans . . . 10
    State Revenue Sources . . . 10
    Local Revenue Sources . . . 11

Compensation Strategies and Incentives . . . 11
    Compensation Strategies . . . 12
    Private-Sector Use of Incentives . . . 13

Performance Assessment Concerns . . . 15
    Difficulties in Developing a Fair Evaluation System . . . 15
    Teachers' Concerns About Evaluation . . . 15
    Conclusion . . . 16

SECTION II: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROBLEMS OF ATTRACTING AND RETAINING QUALITY TEACHERS . . . 17

An Historical Perspective . . . 17
    Concerns About the Teacher Workforce . . . 18

Teachers' Salaries . . . 20
    Alternative Economic Rewards . . . 20
    The Benefits "Package" . . . 21
    Incentive Pay as a Motive for Improvement . . . 22

The Organizational Context . . . 23

Organizational Characteristics That Discourage Excellence 23

The Conditions of Teaching 24
    Structure of the Educational System Hinders Effectiveness 24
    The Nature of the Work Itself 25
    The Lack of Support Systems 27
    The Lack of Opportunities for Interaction With Colleagues 28
    The Lack of Opportunities for Professional Growth 28
    Lack of Prestige, Status, or Rewards 30
    Little Input Into Decision Making. 31
    The Lack of a Professional Career System 33

Organizational Changes Needed 34

Recommendations. 35

Conclusion 36

SECTION III: PERSPECTIVES ON PERFORMANCE-BASED EVALUATION . . 37

Theoretical and Practical Issues Concerning Performance-Based Evaluation . . 37
    Rationale for Performance-Based Evaluation 37
    Summative vs. Formative Evaluation 38
    Process- vs. Product-Oriented Evaluation 38
    Technical Requirements of Evaluation 38
    Discriminating Power of Measurement System 38
    Unbiasedness and Fairness of Evaluation 39
    Credibility and Acceptability of Evaluation 39
    Effects of Evaluation on Instruction 39
    Overall Evaluation Climate. 40
    Constraints on Evaluation 40

Use of Classroom Observation Ratings in Process-Oriented Evaluation 40
    Performance Criteria 41
    Use of Checklist and Scale 41
    Systematic Observation Technique 42
    Use of Ratings for Apportioning Rewards 42
    Threats to Validity and Reliability 42
    Selection and Training of Assessors 44
    Recommendations 45

Use of Student-Achievement Measures in Product-Oriented Evaluation 45
    Nonteacher Influences on Achievement 46
    Use of Measures for Apportioning Rewards 46
    Threats to Validity and Reliability 47
    Need for Further Research 48

Effects of Performance-Based Evaluations on Minority Teachers 49
    Factors to Consider 49
    Recommended Strategies 50

Conclusions and General Recommendations . . . 50
    Recommendations . . . 51

SECTION IV: PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING A PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLAN . . . 53

  Target Groups and Assumptions . . . 53

  Conceptions About the Work of Teaching Influence the Development of Incentive Systems . . . 55
    Table 2: Concepts of the Work of Teaching . . . 56
    Figure 1: Influence of Concepts of the Work of Teaching on the Roles of the Principal and Teacher, Evaluation, and Staff Development. . . . 57
    Teaching as Labor . . . 58
    Teaching as a Craft . . . 58
    Teaching as a Profession . . . 58
    Teaching as an Art . . . 59

  Strategies for Planning and Implementation . . . 59
    Questions to Consider When Planning an Incentive System . . . 59

  Steps in the Planning and Implementation Process . . . 60
    Step 1: Involve the Right People . . . 60
    Step 2: Conduct the Right Research . . . 60
    Step 3: Define the Goals of the Incentive Plan . . . 61
    Step 4: Design a Program to Meet Your Goals . . . 61
    Step 5: Establish a Budget and Identify Funding Sources . . . 63
    Step 6: Determine the Legality of Your Program . . . 64
    Step 7: Establish a Process for Communication . . . 64
    Step 8: Put The Plan Into Action . . . 64
    Step 9: Evaluate the Program and Refine It . . . 65

  Legal Issues to Consider During Planning and Implementation . . . 65
    Preventive Law Review . . . 66
    Potential Sources of Legal Liability . . . 66
    Legal Issues and Evaluative Criteria . . . 67

  Recommendations for States That are Considering Performance-Based Incentive Plans . . . 69
    Questions for Planners and Implementors . . . 70

SECTION V: PERSPECTIVES ON THE EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION . . . 73

  Examples of Long-Lasting Incentive Plans . . . 73

  Examples of Newly-Implemented Incentive Plans . . . 74
    Arizona Pilot Career-Ladder Program . . . 74

  Florida Master-Teacher Program . . . 77

Maine Teacher Certification Pilot Project 81
North Carolina Career Development Plan for Teachers 83
North Carolina: The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Career Development Program 85
South Carolina Teacher Incentive Program 87
Tennessee Career Ladder Plan 90
Texas Career Ladder 93
Utah's Incentive Program 102
Virginia Pay for Performance Pilot Projects 104

The Status of Performance-Based Incentive-Pay Plans in the States Served by SEDL 106
Arkansas 106
Louisiana 107
New Mexico 108
Oklahoma 109
Texas 93

REFERENCES 111

Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans

SECTION I
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLANS

Educational Reform

The fiscal and political picture for education looked increasingly bleak from the late 1970s through the beginning years of the 1980s. Falling enrollments and school closings; reduced federal funding for education; a recession that prostrated many of the basic industries in the U.S.; and a decline in public confidence in the public schools, suggested continued lean years for education. Then, this picture changed drastically and unexpectedly (Kirst, 1986).

By 1983, education had become a focus of concern across the nation and the top priority in most states' legislatures. Since then, more than 300 state commissions and many more local groups have pushed for a new agenda for education. Just as in the past when the public schools were seen as a force for assimilating immigrants into American life, for shaping a more efficient work force, for reasserting our technological superiority, and for correcting the injustices of segregation, public education is now presented as a solution to the problems of economic stagnation at home and a shrinking share of markets abroad.

The education reform movement has moved faster than any public policy reform in modern history (Odden, 1986). Several southern states began in the late 1970s and early 1980s to look at education reform. For example, Georgia and Florida instituted beginning-teacher performance appraisal for initial teacher certification and Mississippi passed a comprehensive educational reform act in 1982. By 1981 Oklahoma had passed legislation raising the standards of admission to colleges of education, requiring competency testing for both certification and recertification, and establishing a support system for beginning teachers. And, less than three years after the publication of A Nation at Risk, a number of state legislatures have acted on the basic recommendations of that and similar reports. Legislated reforms designed to raise the quality of public school education have included curriculum revision, student basic-skills competency testing, increased high-school graduation standards, and lower student/teacher ratios.

Most recently, state legislatures have been considering a number of reforms directed primarily at improving the "teacher" and the quality of classroom instruction. There is a consensus that teacher quality is crucial to increasing the academic achievement of students, but the educational leaders in those states seeking to achieve that goal are unsure what mix of reforms will work best. Few states can afford full funding for the entire range of possible reforms and are, therefore, trying various interventions without a clear idea of which approaches will produce the best results (Kirst, 1986).

TABLE 1: STATE TRENDS IN DEVELOPING INCENTIVE-PAY PLANS

STATE	STATE MANDATED PROGRAM	STATE MANDATED PILOTS	STATE APPROVED LOCAL PROGRAMS	LOCALLY DEVELOPED PROGRAMS	UNDER STATE DEVELOP-MENT	UNDER STATE CONSIDER-ATION	ON LEGIS-LATIVE AGENDA	TYPE
ALABAMA	X				X		1986	CL
ALASKA								
ARIZONA		X			X		1986	CL
ARKANSAS		X			X		1987	CD
CALIFORNIA	X							MnT
COLORADO		X			X			CL
CONNECTICUT		X			X		1986	V
DELAWARE					X		1986	CD
DIST. COLUMBIA								Mst/Mnt
FLORIDA	X							Mst
GEORGIA	X				X			CL
HAWAII								
IDAHO			X				1986	CCP
ILLINOIS						X		CL
INDIANA		X			X		1986	CL
IOWA						X		CL
KANSAS		X		X		X		
KENTUCKY					X			CL
LOUISIANA							1986	
MAINE		X					1986	TC
MARYLAND				X				V
MASSACHUSETTS	X			X				JE/PD
MICHIGAN								
MINNESOTA								
MISSISSIPPI	X				X		1986	CL/MP
MISSOURI	X		X		X			CL
MONTANA								

TYPE - Type of Program

CCP - Career Compensation Plan
CD - Career Development
CL - Career Ladder
JE - Job Enlargement
MnT - Mentor Teacher
MP - Merit Pay

MsT - Master Teacher
PD - Professional Development
TC - Teacher Certification
TIP - Teacher Incentive Pay
V - Various Types

TABLE 1: STATE TRENDS IN DEVELOPING INCENTIVE-PAY PLANS (cont'd)

STATE	STATE MANDATED PROGRAM	STATE MANDATED PILOTS	STATE APPROVED LOCAL PROGRAMS	LOCALLY DEVELOPED PROGRAMS	UNDER STATE DEVELOP-MENT	UNDER STATE CONSIDER-ATION	ON LEGIS-LATIVE AGENDA	TYPE
NEBRASKA	X					X		TC
NEVADA							1987	
NEW HAMPSHIRE						X		MnT
NEW JERSEY			X					MsT
NEW MEXICO						X	1986	CL
NEW YORK				X			1986	V
NORTH CAROLINA		X			X		1986	CL
NORTH DAKOTA								
OHIO					X			CL
OKLAHOMA								
OREGON						X		TC
PENNSYLVANIA				X			1986	V
RHODE ISLAND								
SOUTH CAROLINA		X					1986	
SOUTH DAKOTA						X		TC
TENNESSEE	X							CL
TEXAS	X						1986	CL
UTAH			X					CL
VERMONT							1986	
VIRGINIA		X					1986	MP/CL
WASHINGTON		X					1986	MnT
WEST VIRGINIA						X	1986	MP
WISCONSIN			X					CL
WYOMING								

SOURCES

National Conference of State Legislatures. (1986). State legislative priorities for 1986.

Bray, J.L., Flakus-Mosqueda, P., Palaich, R.M., & Wilkins, J.S. (1985, December). New Directions for State Teacher Policies. Denver, CO: Educational Commission of the States.

Cornett, L., & Weeks, K. (1985, July). Career ladder plans: Trends and emerging issues--1985. Career Ladder Clearinghouse. Atlanta, GA: Southern Regional Educational Board.

Performance-Based Pay Initiatives

Three years ago, no state paid teachers or administrators on the basis of performance (Cornett, 1985). By 1986, in spite of little support from research on the effectiveness of performance-based incentive systems, twenty states had placed some form of incentive-pay proposal on their legislative agendas for 1986 or 1987 (Education USA, January 13, 1986). A survey of states' teacher policies (Bray, 1985) showed that 26 states are either establishing statewide career ladders, piloting plans in selected districts, or have legislation that allows districts to develop their own plans (Table 1).

Teacher-incentive proposals are being offered as a response to recently recognized problems in the teaching profession; problems such as current and predicted shortages in the number of qualified teachers and a decline in the academic ability of new entrants to teaching. The premise behind all such proposals is that incentives will attract and retain better qualified persons in teaching and will improve teaching effectiveness.

Performance-based incentive proposals differ, however, in their basic concepts. The basic concept underlying most merit-pay proposals is that teachers can be motivated to perform more effectively if some form of monetary incentive is available for outstanding performance. The concept behind most career-ladder proposals is that compensation and career structures should be re-designed so they provide incentives for professional development much like those of other professional occupations (Darling-Hammond, 1985). Unfortunately, the terms "merit pay" and "career ladder" are often used ambiguously.

Definition of Terms

Because many of the terms involved have been used loosely and interchangeably, they will be defined as follows for the purpose of discussion in this paper:

Incentive Plans: is a generic and inclusive term that covers all such plans.

Career-Ladder Plans: refers to any number of plans or programs where there are levels of responsibility, status, and compensation. These are sometimes referred to as differentiated staffing or mentor/master-teacher programs. In these programs, teachers are assigned to perform specified, usually non-instructional, duties in lieu of all or a portion of the classroom teaching assignment. Career-ladder programs establish a hierarchy of job classifications. Though advancement on the ladder often rests on evaluations of teaching excellence, higher salaries and status are given primarily for increased work and responsibility outside the classroom. It should be noted that some programs are called "career ladders" when, in fact, they are really only pay-for-performance or "merit" programs.

Merit Pay: refers to a compensation system that pays performance bonuses to teachers who, through some system of evaluation, are recognized as being effective at their jobs. Merit pay refers to strategies that provide monetary awards to teachers as a reward for outstanding performance. Those mentor/master teacher programs that do not include additional responsibilities or duties are merit-pay programs.

Bonus Incentives: refer to incentives in the form of salary differentials that are provided for teachers in areas of critical shortage (e.g., mathematics, science, foreign language, special education); or to incentives for working in specific schools or locations (e.g., inner city). These incentive-pay programs reward teachers for helping to meet certain school-district goals or to solve certain problems. They reward teachers for the conditions under which they teach, not for how they teach or the amount of responsibility they have been given.

Similarities and Differences

The principal differences between merit-pay and career-ladder plans (Barro, 1985) are:

First, a career-ladder plan offers professional recognition not offered by a merit-pay plan. Promotion to each successively higher rank is considered an honor and presumably is advertised as such.

Second, the special, non-teaching responsibilities associated with the higher ranks are likely to affect teachers' incentives to attain those ranks; but -- an important point -- it cannot be assumed that the effect would be positive for all teachers.

Third, the promotion and differentiated-staffing elements of a career-ladder plan may add to the acceptability, and hence the effectiveness, of performance incentives.

Fourth, based on the state plans proposed to date, it appears that significant differences in the timing and duration of rewards may be associated with the choice between career ladders and merit pay. Rewards under career-ladder plans are likely to be permanent, but long waits may be required to become eligible for each successive promotion. The rewards under merit-pay plans may be either permanent or temporary but, in either case, are likely to be accessible with less delay. These timing differences may affect the strength of the incentives considerably.

Fifth, under pure merit-pay plans (or those programs labeled "career ladders" that have largely symbolic ranks), high-performing teachers remain in the classroom. In contrast, under "true" career ladders (those with significantly differentiated responsibilities), the best performers -- "master" or "mentor" teachers -- spend significant time in non-teaching roles. Although there is likely to be less of a short-term gain in classroom performance, the mentor/master role constitutes investment in the future -- time spent in evaluating other teachers and helping them to improve. If the plan succeeds, the long-term performance of all teachers may be enhanced.

Experience With Previous Programs

Although several long-standing performance-based incentive programs appear to be successful, reviews of past attempts to implement such plans indicate that this is rare. The reviews suggest two reasons why most of the plans did not work: they were not comprehensive enough to correct all the conditions that affect efforts to produce excellence in schools; and they accepted too much of the status quo about how schools should function.

The Failure of Differentiated Staffing

Differentiated staffing, a predecessor of the career-ladder programs being implemented today, was tried in the 1960s and faded away in the 1970s. The programs appeared at a time of recession and regression; in many places they were run on "play money" -- federal grants that required no local contribution and often little local commitment. There was little political support at either the state or local level. Other problems -- school integration, collective bargaining, budget cutbacks, declining enrollment, and an oversupply of teachers -- overshadowed what was, to many, a radical change in the educational system and contributed to the demise of such programs (Edelfelt, 1985).

There were a variety of reasons for the failure of those earlier programs. Management problems constituted a major source of the failure. The programs were initiated from the top down; the district supervisory staff was often in competition with the master teachers -- no organizational changes had been made to adjust the traditional structure; the roles and responsibilities at each level were hard to distinguish; and school principals and district administrators lost status in a decentralized system.

Lack of planning and preparation also created problems. Teachers had not been adequately prepared for the changes in the work environment. Inservice programs were poorly planned and implemented and suffered from a lack of funds. The systems proved to be more expensive than had been anticipated. And, funding from outside sources helped initiate programs but did not provide funds to sustain them.

There was no systematic program evaluation on which to base modifications or revisions. There was no research on the impact of the programs on teaching effectiveness, improved learning, or the achievement of school and district goals. After a period of time, the systems became fixed -- there were no unfilled positions or opportunities for new (or improved) teachers to move up. Inevitably, the programs became an incentive for very few and a disincentive for many others who could not move up the hierarchy due to financial constraints and quotas (Freiberg, 1985).

Problems With Merit-Pay Programs

While teachers are almost unanimous (approximately 95%) in supporting changes in working conditions and in supporting incentives for attracting and retaining qualified teachers (Harris, 1984), teachers' attitudes toward merit pay may be the biggest hurdle in instituting a merit-pay program. Both teachers (81.6%) and principals (92%) have expressed support for the development of programs that "would pay higher salaries to teachers who assume additional responsibilities" such as supervising and training new teachers or developing curriculum modules (Spectrum, 1985). However, depending on the poll cited, anywhere from 50% to 70% of the responding teachers were opposed to "merit pay" (Gallup, 1984; Mills & Stout, 1985; ERS, 1984; Harris, 1984). They question that merit can be determined fairly and objectively.

When the Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers in America (Harris & Associates, 1985b) asked what reforms could be adopted to attract good people into teaching, the responses of former teachers and current teachers differed with respect to "paying teachers partly according to their performance on evaluation or tests, sometimes called 'merit pay'"(p. 50 & 51). Fifty percent of the current teachers responded that it would not help at all, 36% felt it would help a little, while only 13% felt it would help a lot. Thirty-seven percent of the former teachers felt it would help a lot, 33% felt it would help a little, and 29% felt it would not help at all. Whatever the reasoning behind these differences in responses, it appears that half of the current teachers are not convinced that merit pay will help in attracting good people into teaching.

There is evidence that proposals to provide merit bonuses for outstanding performance may be counterproductive. The small amount of research that exists suggests the competition inherent in merit-pay plans may have undesirable side effects. For example, in-school competition for a limited number of merit-pay bonuses can interfere with the collegiality that is necessary within an effective school (Koehler, 1985). In addition, teachers are aware that much of the pressure for merit pay comes from those who want to get rid of incompetent teachers. The result has been that some forms of merit pay have been instituted that reward superior teachers but virtually ignore the average or less-than-average teacher. According to those who run successful merit-pay programs in their school systems, only disaster can result from the practice of using money to punish some teachers while giving "merit" money to a handful of other teachers selected as superior (Cramer, 1983).

Nor do merit-pay programs generally fulfill the goals for which they were originally instituted. In a study by Cohen and Murnane (1985), merit pay did not appear to have strong effects on improving teachers' classroom performance. Interviews with teachers and administrators suggested that what the merit-pay programs did was to provide the six districts studied with a way (IFG Policy Notes, 1985c):

- to provide opportunities for teachers with greater financial needs to augment their incomes by spending more time on school-related activities;

- to encourage meaningful dialogue between teachers and administrators about difficult issues such as the quality of the evaluation process; and

- to build community support for the public schools. Merit pay plans contribute to the perception that teachers are accountable for their successes and failures.

The Educational Research Service (Robinson, 1983) -- in a study of districts whose attempts to implement merit-pay plans had failed -- developed a list of reasons for those failures. The administrators of those districts attributed the failures to:

- unsatisfactory evaluation procedures

- administrative problems
- staff dissension
- restrictive quotas
- inadequate financial incentives
- lack of teacher consent
- lack of definition of merit
- inability to measure results

Concerns about the weaknesses of merit pay have led many states and local districts to consider, as an alternative, career-ladder plans (Koehler, 1985).

Career Ladder Potential

If the mistakes that plagued the differentiated-staffing programs can be avoided, career ladders have the potential to provide teachers intrinsic rewards in the form of: recognition and status for excellent teachers; options for diverse work responsibilities without leaving the classroom entirely; opportunities for career advancement; career options within teaching and control over these options; opportunities to assist beginning teachers; greater collegial interaction with peers; the chance to use a wider spectrum of abilities; and opportunities for professional growth (Burden, 1985).

In addition, career ladders could provide certain extrinsic rewards: higher pay for teachers as they advance on the career ladder; improved aspects of the work environment, such as more time for preparation and peer counseling; professional development assistance; opportunities for recognition; and more input into decision making, curriculum development, supervision, and administration at the school and district level.

There are also distinct potential advantages to the school district (Burden, 1985). Career ladders could enable the district to use the full potential of teachers; provide exemplary models and assistance for beginning teachers; provide a method for rewarding outstanding teachers; encourage teachers to meet the higher criteria for teaching and other duties in order to move to higher levels on the career ladder; result in more resource people to deal with staff development and other professional responsibilities; provide a framework to assist individual teachers in goal-setting for professional growth; provide the profession and the school district with an avenue to improve their images and gain in prestige; and provide a framework to aid in using teacher expertise and experience in organizational decisions.

Regardless of how they are structured or what goals they are designed to meet, career ladders should have the following components in order to be successful (Palaich & Flannelly, 1984):

1) performance standards and the procedures used to evaluate teachers and administrators,

2) the changes in school organization that accompany the system's implementation, and

3) training for the people who will take on new responsibilities once a new compensation system is in place.

Variables Affecting Incentives

There are a number of variables that affect the effectiveness of the rewards associated with a performance-based incentive system (Barro, 1985). It is important to consider:

Duration of Rewards

How long rewards last is likely to be an important determinant of the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and equity of an incentive system.

- Permanent merit-pay increments and/or promotions are those in which a performance-based increase in pay becomes part of the teacher's regular salary or a performance-based promotion establishes the teacher's new permanent rank.
- Term pay increases or promotions are those pay increments or promotions that are valid for a specified term of years.
- Nonrecurring rewards are usually in the form of one-time performance bonuses.

Size of Reward

One key consideration is how the size of a reward affects the strength of the incentive to perform. It appears that rewards must be at least on the order of 10 to 20 percent of prevailing salary levels to motivate teachers significantly.

Number of Rewards

The more rewards there are, the greater the probability of getting a reward, and the greater the expected value of rewards to the average teacher. If rewards are restricted to a small stratum of outstanding teachers, perhaps only the top 5-10 percent, large numbers of teachers would conclude, correctly, that they had little chance to qualify. Raising that percentage would convince many more teachers they had a chance and hence stimulate them to compete.

Eligibility

Under some recent state proposals, eligibility for rewards, especially promotions, is tightly tied to seniority. Until these seniority requirements are satisfied, teachers may not earn promotions or the accompanying pay increases regardless of the excellence of their teaching.

If career-ladder plans are viewed as leadership systems, there is some rationale for these seniority requirements, but if the plans are viewed as incentives, the effects are questionable. Specifically, it seems clear that any motivation that a performance-contingent reward system might otherwise provide for new or prospective teachers would be attenuated by the long delay before superior performance could earn a substantial reward.

If there are to be career ladders, with eligibility for high rank limited to seasoned, veteran teachers, there should also be short-term, performance-based rewards along the way. Rewards should be performance-contingent for as many teachers as possible, as much of the time as possible, to maximize the incentive to teach well (Barro, 1985).

Costs

As Barro (1985) points out, all the other characteristics of an incentive plan and its performance-assessment system must be balanced against the costs and the time and effort it takes for implementation. Even an otherwise ideal plan would be useless if it were too costly or difficult for a state or school system to operate. The costs that must be considered include, not only the direct expenses of the evaluation process, but also of staff time and energy, instructional time lost by the students, and interference with the instructional process or the curriculum. For instance, systems requiring extensive and repeated classroom observation will require the provision of release time for evaluators, while systems based on student outcomes may require elaborate and specialized testing programs. How to measure performance adequately but at reasonable cost is one of the more difficult problems to be faced in designing a performance-based reward system.

Revenue Sources for Incentive Plans

Providing the funding and assuring its continued flow is a key issue in maintaining the momentum of the reform movement. Improving the quality of education is expensive. Many states have been quite aggressive in finding new sources of revenue for educational reform. Indeed, changes in state taxes have proved to be the major source of funds for expensive education reforms -- both directly, through sales tax increases dedicated to school reform, and indirectly, through tax increases to balance state budgets.

State Revenue Sources

The states that have enacted comprehensive education reforms usually have raised state taxes to finance them. Four states -- Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, and

Texas -- enacted fundamental changes in their school finance formulas as part of their education reform packages. Five states increased the sales tax and devoted nearly all the extra revenue to education. Three states -- California, Missouri, and New York -- seem to be depending on lottery revenues to help finance educational needs (Odden, 1986).

Local Revenue Sources

In addition, local revenues have played an important part in education finance during recent years In Arkansas, Florida, and Texas, modest property tax increases have been required. Missouri has loosened its requirements for local property tax increases. Nevertheless, the property tax is still an unpopular tax, and higher property taxes are unlikely to be a source of new revenues for the schools (Odden, 1986).

Several other sources of local revenue growth -- local option sales and income taxes -- are not widespread today but offer the potential for generating significant revenues. In Tennessee, for example, the local sales tax provides about 40% of local school revenues.

Other sources of local revenues include non-tax income derived from a variety of entrepreneurial activities:

- establishing local education foundations to receive donor funds, direct cash donations, and donations of goods and services;
- enterprise activities such as leasing school services and facilities or charging user fees for school materials and activities; and
- shared or cooperative activities with other educational and governmental agencies (Odden, 1986).

It has been estimated that if a district used every one of the above methods, its budget could possibly be increased by 9%. Although the amount actually raised is not insignificant, the fact is, these methods do not offer much potential for enhancing local district revenues. On the other hand, the impact of well-organized local district educational foundations should be considered in terms beyond the revenues they yield directly. For instance, foundation funds can expand community involvement in the schools, raise the interest of local businesses, and strengthen school/business partnerships. Such activities can help rekindle local support for schools that, over time, can become support for increased local funding and a catalyst for improving the schools (Odden, 1986).

Compensation Strategies and Incentives

It is difficult to discuss the economics of performance-based incentive systems because it is not easy to identify the incentives they provide or to predict how teachers or administrators will respond to those incentives. Those who favor incentive plans for public school teachers and/or administrators cite the use of such plans in the private sector. For this reason, it appears worthwhile to consider the compensation strategies used in business and industry.

Compensation Strategies

Changes in employees' permanent base pay are made in industry for three primary reasons (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984):

1) an increase due to promotion where the job changes and the pay is adjusted for market comparability or internal equity;

2) a cost of living increase; and

3) a merit increase when the individual becomes more proficient at the job.

A consideration of the factors that influence employment contracts will help in understanding the problems involved. Murnane (1985) discusses the efficiency of alternative types of compensation strategies described in the economics literature:

1) compensation based on output,

2) compensation based on supervisors' assessment of workers' productivity, and

3) compensation determined by internal organizational rules.

For the first to be efficient, the worker must be provided with incentives to work to achieve the goals of the employer with relatively low monitoring costs. Paying a worker for the number of shirts sewn, the number of dresses ironed, or the number of bushels of fruit picked are examples of this type of contract.

There are two requirements for the second type of contract to be efficient: (a) the relationship between the worker's actions and the desired output must be clear-cut and agreed upon by supervisors and workers, and (b) the cost of monitoring must be low in relation to the productivity gains associated with using this type of contract rather than another. Under this type of contract, workers may be paid for a specified job, completed within a specified time, and meeting a specified standard.

Contracts that pay workers according to internal organizational rules generally pay the same wage for doing the same job to workers with the same experience and the same qualifications. This type of contract is efficient in situations where (a) individuals acquire specialized experience as a result of their on-the-job experience, and (b) it is very costly for supervisors to assess accurately the performance of individual workers.

Difficulties arise when applying the above factors to teacher compensation. Basing teachers' salaries on their output (student achievement or student-gain scores) requires that, for each teacher, student achievement or student gains in each skill area be measured. But then, how do you compare the output of one teacher against another? What are appropriate rates of gain? How much do we value the achievement gains of slow achievers relative to those of rapid learners? How much do we value reading skills, math skills, social-study skills, music skills?

Will teachers ignore incentives based on increasing students' skill gains and help all children, regardless of ability level, develop to the fullest extent of those abilities? Or will they devote their time and energies to teaching those children who have the greatest chance of increasing their skills? Could the conflict between professional responsibilities and the desire to maximize their compensation produce frustration and reduce teachers' morale to the point that it becomes dysfunctional?

Basing teachers' salaries on the assessment of supervisors creates incentives for teachers to behave in ways that supervisors will view as productive. Unfortunately, there is no blueprint for teaching -- it is not easy to obtain agreement on which teaching behaviors are clearly related to increased student performance. Unless the assessment criteria are clear, supervisors may base their evaluations on such things as the noise level in the classroom, if students' desks are in straight rows, how quietly children pass through the halls or form lines on the playground, the amount of extra-classroom duty a teacher volunteers for, or how "cooperative" the teacher is, rather than on actual classroom performance.

Some teachers may spend time on those aspects of their behavior that will enhance their supervisor's assessment. For others, however, the conflict between the supervisor's and the teacher's definitions of a good learning environment or of professional behavior may reduce the incentives for teachers to strive to improve their classroom performance (Murnane, 1985).

Basing teachers' salaries on internal organizational rules assumes that workers doing the same job have the same competencies, have acquired the same experience, exert the same effort, and perform at the same level of effectiveness. This is, essentially, the present model used for teacher compensation. Teachers are paid for number of years in teaching, for advanced degrees or number of inservice credits, and, occasionally, for extra duties. No distinction is made on the basis of the degree of competency exhibited, knowledge informally acquired, effort expended, or effectiveness.

Murnane did not offer a fourth type of compensation strategy, but one is apparently needed. The search for a solution to the problem of providing incentive compensation to teachers and administrators has led policy makers to examine the private sector's use of incentives.

Private-Sector Use of Incentives

Private-sector use of incentives is often cited as evidence that teacher-incentive systems can work. However, the analysis of current practice and research yields mixed results. Performance-based pay in private-sector organizations seems to be less prevalent than popular belief would suggest. Blue-collar workers are typically paid according to a fixed-rate schedule. And, although managers are ostensibly paid according to some form of performance-based schedule, even at the middle- and top-management levels, compensation may show low correlations with performance evaluations (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984). Most employees do not believe that their pay is based on performance; 73% of the work force states that the quality and amount of effort they put into their work has little to do with how they are paid (Yankelovich & Immerwahr, 1983).

Although private-sector organizations have encountered difficulties in implementing performance-based pay, experience indicates that incentive pay can motivate individual performance if four conditions prevail (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984). First, an adequate base pay is crucial to attract and retain qualified employees. Second, the incentive must represent an appreciable amount of money. Third, employees must believe that their performance actually influences pay. And, finally, employees must value income.

While researchers disagree about which incentives are most effective -- most organizations and professions require a mix -- it appears that a number of successful practices in private-sector organizations do have direct applicability to teacher incentives (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984). Some examples follow.

- Companies make a real effort to ensure parity with comparable positions in other organizations and across positions within the company itself. This is especially true for positions where talent is in short supply.

- Bonuses are used to reward performance for a given period. Bonuses are usually limited to upper- and middle-management and often depend on "how well their company did," and are often paid proportionately to an entire group or division based on overall performance or productivity.

- Supplemental executive benefits and perquisites provide additional incentives to reach the levels at which they are offered.

- Companies also make extensive use of programs that enrich the career of the individual. Selection to such programs is perceived to be prestigious, indicating that those selected have high potential.

- Dual-career-path or multi-ladder systems of career progression are used widely in technologically-oriented firms to attract and retain employees whose value to the organization is likely to be based on expertise. This avoids the problem of convincing strong technical people to take on management responsibilities ill-suited for them. (A clear parallel exists in the teaching profession.)

- Evidence shows that multi-career-ladder programs are essential features of the recruitment packages of most high-tech companies.

- The multi-career-ladder approach provides significant recognition by peers that an individual is successful in his or her career. Peer recognition is a powerful motivator for scientists, engineers, and professionals with advanced degrees.

- In most effective companies, merit increases are due to achievement of specific performance-related goals. The effectiveness of the whole process hinges on the quality of the goal-setting and measurement process. No matter what form is used, the keys to success are regular management-employee dialogue, clear direction and guidance in goal setting, employee ratings, and rewards related to ratings.

Performance Assessment Concerns

Difficulties in Developing a Fair Evaluation System

If the merit bonuses, salaries, or promotions of teachers and administrators are to be based on performance, the accurate measurement of performance and provisions for professional growth are essential. Assuring accuracy and fairness in the assessment of competencies is critical to any system in which individuals hold ranks according to their qualifications. Opportunities for professional growth or the lack of them -- as a component of the incentive plan -- will determine whether or not these new incentive initiatives will, in fact, result in the improvement of teachers' classroom performance.

In many respects, developing the structure of the incentive plan is an easier task than developing an evaluation system that *is* fair and *is perceived as fair* (Weeks, 1985). The difficulties in developing and evaluation system are multiple and complex. Some of the reason for this are:

- the results of learning cumulate over time, therefore, isolating the effects of any one teacher becomes very difficult;
- teacher effectiveness is situational and context bound, it is not amenable to rigid recipes for action;
- teacher effectiveness varies depending on the goals defined for the class or the students;
- teachers vary greatly in the practices that work for them and the problems they confront in their particular classrooms; and
- any given practice may be effective at first but may diminish after prolonged use.

Teachers' Concerns About Evaluation

Teachers are understandably wary about performance-assessment, the criteria that will be used, the processes, and the persons who will be doing the evaluations. Teachers are well aware that the lack of rigorous, comprehensive personnel-evaluation systems in schools makes performance-based incentives extremely difficult to implement (Podemski & Lohr, 1985).

In addition, there is justifiable concern among teachers about the lack of provisions for inservice or staff development to either improve weak performance areas or to acquire skills that are needed for advancement. Policy makers should insure that evaluation systems are developed that incorporate credible, specific feedback on teaching performance and that make suggestions for improvement. This will enable teachers to reflect on their teaching practices, assess their own competence, and take steps to improve (IFG Policy Notes, 1985b). If teachers are to be assigned new roles, they must be given appropriate training in the skills needed to perform those roles (Brandt, 1985).

Effectively changing the behavior of another individual requires enlisting the cooperation of that person, as well as providing opportunities for learning and guidance on the steps needed for improvement. Self-efficacy, a construct in the psychological literature, has profound implications for this aspect of teacher evaluation (Darling-Hammond, Wise, & Pease, 1982).

Self-efficacy -- an individual's perceptions of his or her effectiveness in controlling the actions and events in his or her life -- both affects performance and is affected by others' perceptions of a person's efficacy. Social environments may place constraints on what people do or may provide a context in which they can perform optimally.

A review of the research on the effects of organizational constraints on individual efficacy (Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease, 1982) suggests that increased performance for teachers will result from:

- convergence between teachers and administrators in accepting the goal and means for task performance;
- higher levels of personalized interaction and resource exchange between teachers and administrators;
- lower prescriptiveness of work tasks;
- teachers' perceptions that evaluation is soundly based and that evaluation is linked to rewards or sanctions; and
- teacher input into evaluation criteria, along with diversity of evaluation criteria.

Conclusion

Although past experiences with incentive systems do not provide cause for optimism, the Task Force on Merit Pay (ASCD, 1985), commissioned by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, suggests that performance-based pay plans can work. If policy makers decide upon the goals they want to achieve and design both the incentive plan and the evaluation system to met those goals, there is a greater chance for success than with previous programs. However, incentive programs should be considered in the broader context of human resource development. If the conditions of teaching and the problems that now impede teachers' growth as full professional partners remain uncorrected, any one element of a reform program -- including career ladders or merit pay -- will not produce the desired changes. The following section discusses these conditions and problems.

SECTION II
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROBLEMS OF ATTRACTING AND RETAINING QUALITY TEACHERS

Educational reform with its plans for higher standards, higher salaries, and higher-quality people to enter the teaching profession, is in a race with a growing teacher shortage. The demographic, social, and economic conditions that once provided a ready supply of qualified teachers have changed. Large numbers of teachers are retiring or leaving the profession for other jobs; there are economic and image problems that make teaching an unattractive profession.

The problems of attracting and retaining qualified teachers in the public schools are, in fact, two separate problems. They are, in addition, separate from the problem of improving classroom performance. Unfortunately, educational reforms creating various types of incentive plans appear to be based on the assumption that what will solve one problem will also solve all others. Many of the plans are expected -- all at the same time -- to reward a small percentage of teachers who demonstrate excellence in classroom performance, motivate the large majority of those who do not receive the reward to improve their performance, provide incentives for college graduates to choose teaching, and convince those who are already part of the profession to remain.

States and school districts that wish to improve the recruitment and retention of talented teachers, as opposed to merely providing financial rewards to a select few, must recognize there are no easy solutions. They must address the underlying economic and organizational influences that discourage the brightest students from choosing a career in teaching or, having chosen one, cause them to leave the classroom.

An Historical Perspective

The growth of the public school system between 1840 and 1950 changed the occupation of teaching. What had once been the domain of well-educated white males, soon became a female-dominated occupation characterized by high turnover and low salaries. A steady supply of bright, dedicated teachers was assured by a blocked career path for educated women and minorities. For decades, the only respectable and available occupations for most women were teaching and such other low-paying occupations as nursing and social work. For academically able minorities, teaching was seen as a route from working-class social status to the middle class (Sykes, 1983). With limited access to the higher paying professions open to white males, women and minorities entered the teaching field -- in effect, subsidizing public education by their willingness to work for lower salaries (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983).

In 1870, females comprised about 60% of the teachers nationwide. This percentage peaked in the 1920's with 86% female teachers. The feminization of teaching during this period was partly the result of a steadily increasing demand for teachers, without a parallel expansion of public funding, and a ready reserve of literate, middle-class women willing to teach for low wages. In urban schools, women teachers outnumbered men by about ten to one (IFG Policy Notes, 1985d).

Gender segregation by level was sharp; women taught in the lower grades, while men worked in the higher grades and as managers. It was argued that women should be teachers while men should be principals and superintendents. Women were thought to be more willing to follow the directions of their superiors, and women -- unlike men -- were not expected to work once they married. Hiring a stable cadre of male administrators and high-school teachers solved such potential problems as continuity of control and high training costs. Since men held the better paying administrative positions, the gap in salaries between men and women grew.

Concerns About the Teacher Workforce

Witnesses, testifying before the Merit Pay Task Force of the Committee on Education and Labor of the United States House of Representatives, agreed that this country's educational system is confronting a crisis in the number of high quality teachers entering and remaining in the profession. Within the last two decades, a series of trends has upset the delicate balance that provided a continuing supply of new teachers. These trends -- the decline in purchasing power of teachers' salaries, the increased career mobility for women and minorities, and the loss of occupational prestige -- have made it more likely that those bright, academically able individuals who have the option will choose more lucrative and more prestigious careers -- careers that were denied female and minority prospective teachers until recently (Sykes, 1983).

As a result of these trends, four areas of concern have surfaced in public school education. There is concern about:

1) the failure to attract the more academically able college graduates to a career in teaching;

2) the failure to keep them once they are in the classroom;

3) the continuing gender stratification; and

4) the looming shortage of teachers.

Quality of those who enter teaching. Evidence that the more able college graduates are not entering teaching in large numbers is provided by the fact that academic scores for education majors, measured by college entrance exams and grade-point averages, have shown a marked decline over the last decade (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983). Schlechty and Vance (1982), using data drawn from a national sample, described some characteristics of recent high-school graduates who went on to college, graduated, and entered teaching.

The sample was separated into five ranks -- lowest, second-lowest, middle, second-highest and highest -- according to scores on the SAT math and verbal subtests. The researchers concluded that the data supported the assertion that teaching is more attractive to those individuals with low measures of academic ability than to those persons with high measures of academic ability.

The situation appears to be continuing with the current crop of prospective teachers. The 20th annual survey of entering freshman conducted jointly by the University of California at Los Angeles and the American Council on Education (ACE) asked freshmen to indicate their "probable career occupation." The survey's findings raise some questions about the academic caliber of the young people -- predominantly female -- who identify themselves as prospective elementary and secondary teachers. When the researchers broke down the public and private four-year colleges by levels of selectivity, they uncovered data indicating that, in almost all instances, prospective elementary and secondary teachers are most likely to be found in those institutions with low selectivity (NCEI Reports, March 10, 1986).

Quality of those who remain in teaching. The quality of those who remain in teaching is also a major concern. Schlechty and Vance (1982) found that although education does attract and retain a proportionate share of those individuals in the middle rank of academic ability, it attracts *more than a proportionate share* of those students from the lower two ranks and *less than a proportionate share* from the top two ranks. A comparison of those who indicated they were "committed teachers" and those who were "confirmed defectors" showed that those with high ability who enter teaching are more likely to leave teaching than those with low ability. Another study found that, after six years, only 37% of teachers in the top 10% of measured verbal ability remained in the teacher work force, while more than 60% of those in the lowest 10% were still teaching (Rosenholtz, 1985).

The newly released Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers in America (Teacher Education Reports, 1986), however, found that all kinds of teachers -- from the least to the best qualified -- leave at similar rates. The survey found that those teachers who hold second jobs and secondary school teachers are more likely to leave teaching. The survey also found that 46% of the former teachers had been in the profession less than ten years; that frequent job stress is a key indicator of a teacher who may leave; that former teachers and those most likely to leave often believe the intellectual challenge is greater in other fields; and that expressed dissatisfaction is also a predictor.

Gender stratification. Stratification by gender in the educational system still persists. Elementary school teaching remains predominantly a woman's job. In the 20th annual survey of freshmen, women continued to express more interest in an elementary or secondary teaching career than men -- 9.5% of the women surveyed chose teaching as their career, compared to 2% of the men (Education Daily, January 13, 1986). In addition, the Metropolitan Survey (Teacher Education Reports, 1986) found that male teachers are among those most likely to leave teaching even though men monopolize the most prestigious positions -- as high-school principals, and local and state superintendents (IFG Policy Notes, 1985d). The study found that two-thirds of the former teachers surveyed were men.

Future outlook. The 1985 survey of freshmen produced some encouraging news for education policy makers concerned over the impending teacher shortage. For the third straight year, freshman interest in elementary and secondary school teaching rose -- from 5.5% in the fall of 1984 to 6.2% in the fall of 1985. This represents a significant increase over the recorded low of 4.7% in the 1982 survey, but falls far short of the 20% of entering freshmen who planned on teaching careers in the late 1960's.

Unfortunately, many of the current educational reforms directed at creating higher standards for those entering teacher training and for those being certified as teachers, are considered by some to be screens that will further reduce the available pool of teachers. It has been estimated that 1.1 million teachers will be needed in the next eight years (Pipho, 1986). And, in the words of Alexander Astin, UCLA professor and co-author of the freshmen survey, "While these [survey] trends look promising, we still have a long way to go before our colleges and universities produce enough teachers to meet the nation's current and future needs" (Education Daily, January 13, 1986).

Teachers' Salaries

A report from the Holmes Group Consortium (Report on Education Research, April 23, 1986), which represents nearly 40 research universities offering education doctorates, warned of coming changes in teaching resulting from the education reform movement and said that plans to improve teacher education must be "inextricably" tied to efforts to improve the teaching profession and should include raising teachers' salaries. Low salaries for elementary and secondary school teachers have always been the dominant pattern of compensation in this nation, but the problem is now worsening. The essential ingredients for superior educational opportunity are talented, dedicated teachers. Yet, teachers are paid less than most professionals.

While education expenditures went up in the ten years between 1971 and 1981, the proportion of money spent on teachers' salaries fell, and the proportion earmarked for other services and personnel increased (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983). According to a report issued by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, per-pupil spending in the public schools has risen by 22.5% in the last decade, after accounting for inflation, yet the proportion of those funds used for paying teacher salaries has dropped from 49% to 41%. Average teacher salaries were 12.2% lower in 1982-83, when adjusted for inflation, than they had been in the previous decade (AASA, 1983).

Alternative Economic Rewards

The flow of good teachers out of teaching is attributable partly to the greater economic rewards in other fields. In the Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers in America, 60% of the teachers reported that low pay was their main reason for leaving the profession (Teacher Education Reports, 1986). Other polls have also reported that the most common reason given for leaving teaching is low salary (Gallup, 1984; Mills & Stout, 1985). Half the current teaching force reported dissatisfaction to the point of considering leaving teaching (Harris, 1985).

Supply and demand analyses of the labor market indicate that one part of the strategy to attract and retain talented teachers requires the raising of teachers' salaries. It is unlikely that any other proposed change will be effective unless teacher salaries are competitive with those in alternative occupations. The Metropolitan Life Survey (Education Daily, March 17, 1986) shows that more than 35% of teachers who have left the profession now earn $30,000 a year, while a little more than 10% of current teachers report earnings at that level. It is apparent that it is necessary to raise the base salaries of teachers in order to encourage more highly qualified people to enter and remain in teaching (IFG Policy Notes, 1985a).

In fact, given the reasons for going to college stated by most of the current college freshmen, the outlook for teaching is dismal unless salaries are brought in line with those of other professions. The 20th annual survey of entering freshmen found that 1985 college freshmen agreed with the idea that graduating from a higher education institution moves one up the social and economic ladder; 83% of freshmen said college would help them "get a better job" than if they didn't earn a degree (Education Daily, January 13, 1986). A record high of 69.7% said "to be able to make more money" is a very important reason for attending college, while 71.8% agreed that "the chief benefit of a college education is that it increases one's earning power" (NCEI Reports, January 20, 1986).

Fortunately, raising teacher salaries has been a major priority with many of the states that have enacted educational reform legislation. Many states have coupled increases in the base salary for all teachers with some form of performance-based incentive pay plan. In fact, many governors and legislators have said that salaries for all teachers have to rise before any form of career ladder or merit pay will work Pipho, 1986).

Considering the traditionally low pay received by teachers, it is not surprising that, when questioned, teachers have seldom said they consider salary a rewarding aspect of their career. Teachers have, instead, indicated that the intrinsic aspects of teaching provided their greatest rewards (Rosenholtz, 1984). However, Barro (1985) argues that teachers are not indifferent to economic rewards; that the decline in the numbers of talented college graduates seeking to enter teaching and the flow of good teachers out of teaching is due, in part, to the greater economic rewards in other fields.

The Benefits "Package"

While low salaries undoubtedly keep many talented individuals from entering or remaining in teaching, pay is only one of the many things that a teacher considers before taking another job or that a prospective teacher considers before entering teaching. Each currently employed teacher and each prospective teacher is confronted with a "package" of benefits consisting of both the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and the conditions that comprise the occupation of teaching. The teaching "package" is compared with the "packages" available in alternative occupations. The decision to enter or remain in teaching hinges upon which total package is preferable (Barro, 1985).

The ability to recruit and/or to select teachers from among the academically able depends, in large measure, on the ability of the schools to provide a "package" that includes working environments and career opportunities that are attractive to the academically able in the first place (Schlechty & Vance, 1982). A study by Roueche and Baker (cited in NCEI Reports, March 10, 1986) found that the nation's best teachers and principals are among the most poorly rewarded professionals in the public sector today in terms of both their work environment and job demands.

While many of the former teachers surveyed by the Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers (Education Daily, March 17, 1986) admitted that teaching offers better fringe benefits in terms of vacations and job security than do many professions, the majority believed that salaries, professional prestige, control over one's work, equipment availability, and the chance to be stimulated intellectually are all increased in their new vocations.

Incentive Pay as a Motive for Improvement

In The Logic of Teacher Incentives, a paper prepared for the National Association of State Boards of Education, Barro (1985) argues that pay incentives based on performance would strengthen teachers' motivation to perform well; that improvement is a matter of the individual teacher's choice. He suggests, "What counts is that there are steps that teachers can take that many teachers have not taken in the absence of performance-contingent rewards but that they might conceivably take when such rewards are introduced." (p. II-14)

There is very little agreement with this argument among those who are familiar with teachers or the conditions under which they work. Rosenholtz (1984) deals with the assertion -- or myth, as she calls it -- that teachers will be motivated to teach better simply because there are monetary bonuses available.

> "Underlying this political platitude are several assumptions...that teachers now withhold services from students that they would supply if their salaries were better....[and] the assumption that individual teachers can improve [on their own] if only they are properly motivated." (p. 6)
>
> "The assumption that, given proper motivation, teachers can improve individually is refuted emphatically by research showing how organizational conditions in schools can hinder individual improvement." (p. 7)

Teachers' work consists largely of efforts to help other human beings learn and improve. Teachers cannot succeed unless the people with whom they work try to do well. Money is important to teachers, but money is not the key payoff for success in the classroom. Students hold the keys to teachers' success (Cohen & Murnane, 1985).

The logic of attempting to improve the quality of the teaching force and the quality of classroom instruction by simply applying the proper financial incentives applies only if you subscribe to Barro's assertion that teachers don't teach as well as they can and could improve if offered enough money as an incentive. This is unlikely considering that teachers' greatest rewards are achieved through helping others achieve. And, given the conditions under which most teachers work, offering performance rewards to those teachers who are outstanding is not likely to have much effect on the rest.

The Organizational Context

Those who have given serious attention to the organizational nature of schools and to the structure of the teaching occupation have identified factors that are discouraging to those whose academic qualifications and personal aspirations make them candidates for careers both in education and in fields outside education. Conditions existing in the public schools that are likely to be discouraging to the academically proficient include (Schlechty & Vance, 1982):

- the lack of a clear career ladder and career staging,
- the tendency of school administrators to resist shared decision making and problem-centered analytical discussions among adults, and
- the tendency of the informal culture of schools to be dominated by a management structure that is punishment centered and bureaucratic.

The purpose of most of the recent state initiatives has been to strengthen the teaching profession. However, if education reform is to produce genuine improvement in teaching and learning, states need to move from policies designed simply to make more and better teachers to policies that shape how the schools operate (Martin, Green, & Palaich, 1986).

Organization Characteristics That Discourage Excellence

Too many of the recent efforts to implement incentive pay plans overlook a crucial factor -- management that promotes success. Schools are not currently organized in ways that promote excellence. Tye and Tye (1984) predict that currently proposed educational reforms will be no more successful than were those of an earlier time unless policy makers face the realities of what it takes to change such complex social/political institutions as schools. Any new career programs, incentive plans, or adjustments in evaluation or compensation practices will not be fully effective unless faulty organizational characteristics are also corrected (ASCD, 1985).

Some of the organization characteristics that discourage excellence that are presently found in most public schools include the following (ASCD, 1985):

- Peer-support systems that encourage excellence in other professions are absent in most public schools.
- Teachers are expected to *act* like professionals but are not *treated* like professionals.
- Teachers are rarely involved in meaningful discussions and decisions on matters that directly affect their classroom work.
- Instruction time is reduced because of poor school administration, too many interruptions, too much paper work, and bureaucratic requirements.

- Teachers have little control over staff development programs.

- School organization discourages collaboration -- there are no processes for self-directed review and revision.

The Conditions of Teaching

It is important for policy makers to understand that the reasons schools have difficulty in recruiting academically able persons to teach are the same reasons the schools have difficulty retaining the services of these people once they are in the classroom. The academic character of the education required to prepare for teaching and the intellectual nature of the task is contradicted by the isolated, non-scholarly, and non-self-renewing character of the setting in which teaching takes place (Burden, 1985). In general, the practicing teacher functions in a context where the beliefs and expectations are those of a profession but where the realities in actual practice compare more to a trade (Goodlad, 1984). It is unrealistic to expect even the most altruistic individual to choose, when choices are available, a career that offers no opportunity for advancement, where time and activities are so circumscribed and regulated that there is little opportunity for collegial exchange or professional growth, and where the individual has little input into or control over the policies that govern the conduct of his or her professional life.

Structure of the Educational System Hinders Effectiveness

In fundamental ways, the U.S. educational system is structured to guarantee the failure of teachers. Even though a teacher can experience personal success, in terms of fostering student learning, there is often a profound sense of professional failure because the process of teaching is frustrating, unrewarding, and intolerably difficult (McLaughlin, et al., 1986).

A broad range of organizational features combine to minimize teachers' professional satisfaction and effectiveness. There are abundant examples of school conditions that prevent teachers from obtaining those rewards that initially drew them to teaching (McLaughlin, et al., 1986). A study of California's schools (Commons, 1985) identified problems that have eroded the attractiveness and contribution of the teaching profession. Among them were:

- low salaries and subordinate status within the schools;

- loss of public esteem for the work and those who perform it;

- inadequate facilities, supplies, and support materials;

- isolation in the classroom, with rare opportunities or incentives for collegiality;

- increased conflict between teachers and administrators, inhibiting cooperation in school improvement;

- o deficiencies in professional training and support; and
- o the lack of career choices within the profession.

The difficulties teachers encounter and are expected to cope with can be summarized under the following headings: the nature of the work itself; the lack of support systems; the lack of opportunities for interaction with colleagues; the lack of opportunities for professional growth; the lack of prestige, status, or rewards; little input into decision making; and the lack of a professional career system. These are discussed below.

The Nature of the Work Itself

Although the overwhelming majority of the teachers polled by the National Education Association (NEA, 1983) were pleased with the flexibility they had in deciding how to teach (88%) and felt personally fulfilled in the use of their talents (83%), about half of the teachers claimed that if they had it to do over again, they would not enter teaching (NEA, 1983; Fiske, 1982; Mills & Stout, 1985). This is a five-fold increase over those who responded similarly in 1966. Along with low pay, problems such as student discipline, the low status of teaching, and unmotivated students figure prominently in the decision to leave teaching (Gallup, 1984; Harris, 1985).

Teaching is time-intensive; requiring a great deal of time to properly prepare lessons and materials and to assess the performance of students. Teaching is emotionally demanding, requiring constant interaction with students and alertness to their responses. There is considerable stress in trying to deal with 25 to 35 students at any given time, to diagnose each student's needs, and to provide instruction to help the individual student learn. There is considerable difficulty in dealing with classes composed of students with a wide range of ability levels and, often, with special needs (McLaughlin et al., 1986). And, unfortunately, this is expected of teachers under less-than-ideal conditions.

The Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers (Education Daily, March 17, 1986) found that the amount of stress teachers experience once they leave the profession drops dramatically. Fifty-seven percent of former teachers said they felt "great" stress in the classroom, but only 22% said they experience that kind of pressure in their current jobs. In examining what career change has meant to former teachers, the survey found that along with reduced stress, higher pay and sharply increased job satisfaction make it highly unlikely that those individuals would return to the classroom (Teacher Education Reports, 1986).

When another survey asked what it is about teaching that negatively affects job satisfaction, 41% of the teachers cited working conditions such as long hours, overcrowded classrooms, too much paperwork, and too many non-teaching duties; 31% cited student-related factors such as discipline and motivational problems; and roughly a quarter of the teachers reported boredom, frustration, burnout and stress, lack of respect, and lack of administrative support as additional sources of job dissatisfaction (IFG Policy Notes, 1985a).

In a study on the sources of teacher stress, Blase (1986) reports that there are certain aspects of the teaching environment that direct teachers' time and energy away from instructional activities. These aspects are identified as "stressors." Stressors in the teaching environment include student discipline problems, student absences, inappropriate scheduling, large classes, administrative interruptions, problems with equipment and the physical plant, meetings that are disorganized, unclear expectations, administrative inconsistency and indecisiveness, lack of preparation time, and lack of materials.

Blase found that teachers cope with these demands on their time and energy in a variety of ways. In order to free up time for planning or correcting papers, teachers often resort to "busy" seat work. Lacking the time to research and develop new materials, teachers use old materials and techniques over and over again. This affects teachers' intellectual curiosity and enthusiasm for teaching. Under stress, teachers behave differently toward students. Day-to-day problems seem to affect teachers' abilities to relate to students in a personal, caring manner. They become less tolerant, less patient, and overall, less involved. In order to forestall discipline problems, teachers exercise greater control over instruction by using rote learning, recitation, direct questioning requiring brief answers, and allowing little student-student interaction.

Blase suggests that the positive attitudes and behaviors essential to good teaching seem to be difficult to maintain over the long run. In their place, maladaptive behaviors develop as a result of work stress. He concludes that those committed to improving schools should focus more attention on the complex nature of the organizational aspects of schools that prevent productive teaching and learning.

Blaze found that lack of time is a "stressor." A study conducted by the Newark, New Jersey, school system designed to identify the types of rewards and incentives valued by the teachers in the system (Azumi & Lerman, 1986) found that "time" can be used as a reward. The study found that the highest ranked rewards/incentives were:

1) having input into policy making, participating in educational decision making;

2) participating in curriculum development, working with other teachers, developing and presenting workshops; and

3) having more preparation time, more flexible scheduling, top priority for summer work.

When the teachers were asked to rate (as opposed to rank) a list of reward/incentives on a six-point scale, the resulting factor analysis of the data uncovered five clusters. The first factor, Material Rewards, included receiving increased preparation time; having a more flexible schedule; receiving release time for training, conferences, and workshops; and receiving a higher salary. It appears that this group of teachers felt as strongly about more time for professional preparation, development, and scheduling as it did about salary increases.

Time is a factor that has not received the attention it should. State legislatures and district school boards need to investigate the possibilities for *decreasing* the amount of time that teachers are expected to spend in active engagement with students and those for *increasing* the amount of time available for preparation, professional growth, and collegial exchange.

The Lack of Support Systems

Unlike other professions, teaching does not provide for a shared culture based on the movement from knowledge to experience in the company of one's peers. Once graduated from a preparation program, teachers find themselves alone in the classroom with a group of students with no support from a peer or supervisor (Lieberman & Miller, 1984).

While most experienced teachers have developed coping skills and learned to survive, beginning teachers are adversely affected by the lack of support -- 15% nationwide do not last a full year (Education USA, January 20, 1986). The first year sink-or-swim syndrome is a common experience that almost all teachers believe should be corrected -- 96% of the teachers polled in California believe the school administration should establish a formal system of help and support for new teachers, but only 15% claim this type of system already exists (Koppich, et al., 1985).

Experienced teachers feel they, also, do not receive sufficient support and assistance from school administrators. Poor or inconsistent administrator support is one of the most pressing concerns teachers face, making them generally more favorably disposed toward their schools than toward the people who run them (Gallup, 1984). While 72% of the teachers gave their own school a grade of either an A or B, when asked what grade they would give administrators in the local public schools, 54% of the teachers responded with a grade of C or below; only 44% indicated they would give the administrators an A or B. Local school boards fared even worse with their teachers -- with 68% of the teachers giving them a C or less (Gallup, 1984).

Teachers' poor opinions of local school boards may stem from the fact that it is the local board's responsibility to supply the funds that provide the textbooks, instructional materials, equipment, desks, and classrooms that make up the tools and environment of teaching. All too often, teachers are faced with shortages in textbooks, required to make do with limited amounts of instructional materials and equipment, and cope with over-crowded classrooms. While most professionals take clerical help for granted, it is rarely provided to assist teachers who develop their own instructional materials or who face increasing "paperwork" demands from the local district or state. Teachers spend from 10% to 50% of their time on mundane tasks that have nothing to do with instruction, and, while well-paid professionals in other fields have support staff, for teachers, copying machines and secretaries are rare luxuries (Education Daily, April 16, 1986).

A study from Stanford University (Pfeifer, 1986) on the sources of teacher effectiveness and job satisfaction suggests that organizational conditions, more than any lack of expertise on the part of teachers, impede effective teaching and that the effective principal provides support by "enabling" teachers to perform effectively in the classroom. The glamourous roles for principals such as "instructional leader" or "gatekeeper of change" are not universally seen as necessary by teachers in schools that are striving to improve. In this study, principals seen as effective by teachers first attended to the everyday realities of the organizational life in schools -- by minimizing interruptions and excessive paperwork; insuring the availability of adequate instructional materials; enforcing clear, simple policies; providing opportunities for training; and fostering positive, supportive human relationships.

The Lack of Opportunities for Interaction With Colleagues

In his study of schooling, Goodlad (1984) found that inside schools, teacher-to-teacher links for mutual assistance in teaching or collaborative school improvement were weak or nonexistent, especially in the senior high schools. There are no infrastructures designed to encourage or support teachers either in communicating among themselves to improve their teaching or to collaborate in attacking school-wide problems.

There was little in Goodlad's data to suggest active, ongoing exchanges of ideas and practices across schools, between groups of teachers, or between individuals even in the same schools. Teachers rarely worked together on school-wide problems; rarely came together in their schools to discuss curricular or instructional changes. The study of schooling found little evidence that principals were exercising instructional leadership; rather, their behaviors seemed generally to reinforce the isolation and autonomy of teachers (Tye & Tye, 1984).

Research suggests that the most effective schools -- where student learning gains are greatest -- are those where professional dialogue and collaboration are encouraged; where teaching is seen as a collective, rather than an individual, enterprise; where analysis, evaluation, and experimentation with one's colleagues set the conditions under which teachers improve (Rosenholtz, 1985).

The Lack of Opportunities for Professional Growth

The teachers Goodlad (1984) studied appeared, in general, to function quite autonomously in a context of isolation -- not only from other teachers but also from sources of ideas beyond their own experience. More than 75%, regardless of subject area taught or level of schooling, indicated that they were greatly influenced in what they taught by two sources -- their own background, interests, and experiences, and students' interests and experiences.

Isolation is perhaps the greatest impediment to the professional development of teachers -- to their continued learning or to their improving existing skills -- because most of such learning must occur through trial and error. One alarming consequence of trial-and-error learning is that teachers' professional growth depends solely on their own ability to detect problems and discern solutions. As a result, teachers have no opportunity to benefit from the advice, experience, or expertise of their colleagues; have few models of teaching excellence to emulate; have no standards against which to judge their own teaching behaviors (Rosenholtz, 1985).

A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that teachers often respond positively to alternative methods of teaching when they are given support, encouragement, and protection (Goodlad, 1983). Although teachers feel confidence in the abilities of their fellow teachers -- approximately 90% feel that their colleagues are good teachers (Harris, 1984) -- few teachers have the opportunity to take advantage of other teachers' experience, educational practices, and professional advice.

A survey of California teachers (Koppich et al., 1985) found that:

- while 87% of the teachers believe they would learn from observing other teachers, only 6% regularly do so;
- while 77% feel they would benefit from being observed by other teachers, only 3% have had that experience;
- while 92% would like assistance from fellow teachers to solve teaching and disciplinary problems, only 33% receive it; and
- while 93% would like to be allotted time on the job for consulting with other teachers about professional matters, only 14% have the time to consult.

Without encouragement for new learning, the classroom experience tends to become boring and routine. At the same time, the research indicates that if teachers are challenged by new ideas or do find ways of offering leadership, those accomplishments are strongly related to career satisfaction (Chapman & Lowther, 1982).

Research on educational change, conducted in the 60's and 70's, found that:

1) schools, if they are to improve or be improved, must somehow be connected to new knowledge from the outside, and
2) conditions within the schools have to be such that staff members can share this new knowledge among themselves (Tye & Tye, 1984).

Peer review has been suggested as a strategy for improving teachers' classroom performance by using teachers to evaluate and provide professional development for other teachers. Peer review, as discussed by Darling-Hammond (1985), includes the various means by which professionals determine the content and structure of their work as well as the qualifications necessary for individuals to claim membership in the profession. It includes peer control over decisions that define acceptable practice as well as peer assessment of individual practitioners. In fact, after graduation from a professional school, individual practitioner's performances are evaluated by how closely they conform to these peer-determined standards of practice. Without professional control over technical decision making, the concept of peer evaluation lacks a substantive base and becomes merely a procedural issue.

There are several reasons for the current interest in peer review. Current evaluation practices in most school districts are sorely inadequate for making important personnel decisions; peer involvement is seen as a way of expanding the staff and expertise available for evaluation. Peer review is seen as part of a larger agenda for professionalizing teaching, for ensuring that teachers have both the autonomy and responsibility needed to increase their voice in decision making and their effectiveness in the classroom.

Lack of Prestige, Status, or Rewards

The Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers found that a factor contributing significantly to former teachers' job-change decisions was the discovery (by 64%) that their professional prestige was worse than they had expected it to be when they began teaching (Teacher Education Reports, 1986). Half the teachers polled by Harris (1984) felt that students, parents, and the society at large no longer respected them. When teachers surveyed by the Gallup poll in 1985 were asked to compare teaching to 12 other professions, more than half ranked teaching first in terms of the profession's contribution to society, but only 1% ranked teaching first in terms of "the amount of prestige people in the profession have in their communities."

When polled on the source of the rewards they get from teaching, 66% of the teachers said their professional rewards came mainly from students and helping them learn (Fiske, 1982). When Murnane and Cohen (1985, p. 29) asked teachers what motivated them to do good work, they received such responses as:

- "every once in a while the light bulb goes on in a kid's head;"
- "when I hit, it feels good ... they either make or break you;" and
- "student support is the biggest motivation. The harder they try, the harder I try."

It is fortunate that teachers feel rewarded by their students since, isolated in their own classrooms, students are generally the only source of rewards for most teachers. Unlike other professionals who look to colleagues and supervisors for feedback, teachers can only turn to their students (Lieberman & Miller, 1984).

It is apparent that the reward structure associated with a teaching career is out of line with the source of a teacher's own sense of satisfaction and accomplishment (Chapman & Lowther, 1982). As most schools are presently structured, the relationship of teacher to principal is one of gaining access to privilege. Since almost all privileges are arbitrarily in the hands of the principal, the principal has the power to make working in a school pleasant or unbearable (Lieberman & Miller, 1984).

Principals also have within their power a number of ways of providing rewards. In addition to verbal praise, they can reward certain teachers with assignments to prestigious activities and task forces; they can make timing or scheduling of work more compatible for some teachers; and they can make classroom location more desirable for others (Koehler, 1985). Wise principals use the power of their positions to provide positive rewards and encouragement to teachers. All too often, however, teachers receive few rewards in any form.

Teachers have little motivation to make a career of teaching. There are few rewards available to the experienced teacher that are not available to the inexperienced. Most of the psychic rewards of teaching are as accessible to the relatively inexperienced teacher as to the experienced one. Neither are experienced teachers likely to realize meaningful increases in responsibility even though research shows that these can be powerful motivators.

Little Input Into Decision Making

According to the effective schools research, schools that engage teachers in job-related discussions and have them share in decisions about instructional programs are more effective than schools in which decisions are made by rule-bound, bureaucratic procedures (Burden, 1985). Testimony before the California Commission on the Teaching Profession (Commons, 1985) indicated that "old fashioned bureaucracy is poorly suited for the management of trained professionals" (p. 33). The Commission concluded that teachers must participate in the task of managing and reforming their schools.

The research characterizes "effective" schools as those where the principals have established a shared decision-making partnership with their staffs. Principals of effective schools use a participatory style of leadership; respect teachers and collaborate in making rules; facilitate collegiality among teachers; encourage in their staffs a strong sense of participation and control over important educational decisions and activities in the school; and exhibit an open, professional, and collegial style that fosters joint discussion, evaluation, and improvement (Duttweiler, 1986).

Darling-Hammond (1985) points out that teacher involvement in school decision making is a relatively haphazard occurrence. While in some school districts, teachers participate in decisions concerning textbook selection, curriculum development, staff development and other important teaching matters, in others these decisions are made primarily by administrators or school board members. In only a very few schools or districts do teachers have an effective voice in decisions that structure teaching work: decisions about class scheduling, course requirements, student placements, program development, or teacher assignments. In even fewer schools do teachers have any input into personnel decisions concerning the hiring, evaluation, and tenure of either teachers or administrators.

The reasons for involving teachers in "management jobs" and decision making are simple according to Darling-Hammond (1985):

> *First*, the span of control in schools is extremely wide. Both because of limited time for supervision and limited expertise in teaching specialties, the typical principal cannot do a very good job of evaluation and staff development. The time and expertise of principals are often inadequate to the task of critiquing, assisting, and monitoring the performance of teachers in a serious, concerted fashion.
>
> *Second*, the professional growth of teachers is not particularly central to the concerns of administrators. The professional life of teachers may be central to teaching, to teacher efficacy, and job satisfaction, but it is peripheral to the day-to-day tasks of administrators.
>
> *Finally*, the designation of some decisions and tasks as those of management and others as those of teachers is, in part, arbitrary. To the extent that any policy or practice impacts on the quality of instruction delivered to students, it is a concern of teachers. If teaching is to be considered not only a job but also a profession, then teachers must be concerned about not only salaries and working conditions but also the interests of students.

Unfortunately, teaching has not yet achieved true professional status. Even though most teachers are as well educated as most school administrators, teachers do not have decision-making power. And, control over decisions affecting the standards and responsibilities of its members are characteristics of a "profession." Teaching does not qualify as a profession because:

1) Teachers do not have decision-making power -- it is precluded by the traditional organization of the schools -- by the external authority of administrators, the school board, and the state.

2) Teachers neither individually nor collectively regulate and police themselves.

3) Teachers are reluctant to accept total responsibility for making decisions because they do not have control over the factors affecting those decisions (Podemski, 1985).

Lacking a voice in these matters, teachers are often expected to practice under conditions that may be administratively convenient but not conducive to effective teaching. Where learning suffers, teachers are often blamed for failure although they are not empowered to make the changes that would create a better environment for teaching and learning.

Part of the dissatisfaction teachers feel in their jobs can be traced to this lack of input -- they feel impotent to affect school-wide decisions (Tye & Tye, 1984). According to a California survey (Koppich, et al., 1985):

- while 90% of the California teachers polled thought they should have the right to participate in decisions about what should be taught in their schools, only 41% actually had the opportunity to do so;

- although 98% felt that teachers should work with administrators in setting the school's discipline policy, only 42% reported being involved;

- where 98% would like a voice in making teaching assignments, less than half (42%) said this was true in their districts;

- even though 84% believed teachers should have some say in assigning students to classes, only 28% did; and

- while 78% thought teachers should be included in the selection of new teachers to their schools, just 15% had the opportunity to do so.

Teachers at the recent National Teachers' Forum sponsored by the Education Commission of the States (reported in Education USA, March 17, 1986) insisted that if school-level reform is to be achieved, teachers must be given both the power and the time to take part in key decisions. The teachers at the Forum believed they could lead a "renaissance" in the profession by providing career information to prospective teachers, acting as liaisons or advocates for school improvement, initiating comprehensive staff development, making decisions about curriculum and textbook selection, serving on local and state committees, and delivering positive messages about the profession.

A major problem with giving teachers any part in the school decision-making process is the resistance of school administrators. Dal Lawrence (1985), President of the Toledo Federation of Teachers, pointed out that the Toledo teacher intervention and intern programs were met with apprehension by many school principals and supervisors. The programs launched a reform of teacher evaluation and professional development that altered the accepted and jealously guarded assumptions about how teachers should relate to school management within the traditional public school structure. Responsibilities were realigned -- a realignment fought by principals and supervisors for eight years.

Now in its fourth year, the overall Toledo Plan enjoys the staunch support of 99% of its administrators, according to Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Ruth L. Scott. Administrators are convinced that it is a success with teachers. As a result, leaders of the principals' union are working with top Toledo administrators to develop a similar program for building-level managers (McCormick, 1985).

The Lack of a Professional Career System

Job challenges for teachers are usually quite constrained by the structure of the schools. Leadership and new learning bring few external rewards within the school and are not particularly effective ways for teachers to advance their careers. In fact, a teacher's advances in these areas may not even be noticed by others in the school. When they are noticed, leadership activities may lead to conflict with school officials who may see them as a threat to their own leadership and career advancement (Chapman & Lowther, 1982).

The notion of "career" invariably includes moving upward in one's chosen profession. As responsibilities increase, more money, more authority, and usually greater prestige are also acquired. Ironically, the career path of teachers in recent years has been closest to the pattern of blue collar workers having little formal education. Their initial work stage is marked by moving from job to job, until they achieve a stable work situation. Thereafter, they maintain one job until retirement (Bornfriend, 1985).

An examination of the teaching career shows that, by the time a teacher has reached the highest salary level and is perhaps at the peak of professional competence, there are limited possibilities for salary advancement. Unlike business organizations where low-level managers can aspire to middle- or top-level management, the longer one teaches, the less rewarding teaching is in comparison to other careers (Schlechty & Vance, 1982). Presently, teachers who seek higher salaries must leave the classroom and stop teaching; either to become school administrators or to change careers.

Recognizing this, the Holmes Group Consortium (Report on Education Research, April 23, 1986) stated their belief that teaching must make room for top practitioners who can lead the teaching field to improvement. The group recommended that a differentiated structure be developed in the teaching ranks, led by "career professionals," highly competent teachers who have demonstrated a commitment to teaching. Those teachers would be followed by "professional teachers," those capable of assuming responsibility in the classroom and in school administration. Teachers in those two categories would be granted tenure in much the same way college faculty now are.

Finally, the group recommended forming an "instructor" category of temporary teachers -- experts in a field such as mathematics -- who would teach under the supervision of a certified professional. Instructors would receive a non-renewable five-year teaching certificate and would be required to pass a general writing and reading test.

Without such differentiation within the ranks of teachers, teachers' opportunities for recognition and status are limited. In order to have opportunities for increased status, teachers must leave the classroom for full-time administration, supervision, or curriculum development (Burden, 1985). Classroom teachers who do not choose to become administrators or counselors will fulfill the same job description the day before retirement as they did on their initial day of employment.

In addition to being blocked from moving up, teachers have limited opportunities for growing professionally. Teaching roles are so circumscribed that they do not generally allow teachers to consult with other teachers and administrators, inquire systematically about teaching, create instructional materials, aid other teachers' improvement, write about teaching, administer special programs, or develop special projects. All too often, when teachers do assume additional responsibilities, there is no money in the district budget to pay an additional stipend for their time, creativity, or initiative (ASCD, 1985).

Organizational Changes Needed

An incentive system that rewards teachers for performance should represent a major change in the work environment of the organization. It should increase the sense of the school as a community, building shared values and a shared culture by rewarding activities that promote organizational goals as well as rewarding individual effort. Since teachers are clearly the best source of advice on eliminating obstacles to effective teaching, the system should provide for involving them in school-wide planning and decision making. Changes in school leadership; changes in patterns of relationships among teachers, administrators, staff, and students; and changes in working conditions may, therefore, be essential to the success of any new incentive system (Palaich & Flannelly, 1984).

In California, where a "mentor teacher" program was adopted by the legislature in 1982 to develop an elite teaching corps to help and guide new teachers, the problem in many districts has been with administrators and teachers learning how to make such an unprecedented program work. "There's never been a leadership position of this kind for teachers. It calls for basic reforms in the teaching occupation and school organization," according to Tom Bird co-author of a study by the Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development (Education USA, January 20, 1986).

Organizational researchers have found that people improve when they are encouraged to participate fully in the decision-making processes within an organization. Peters and Waterman (1982) found that corporate excellence results from the attitudes and enthusiasms of the workers; from unusual efforts on the part of apparently ordinary employees. Staff members close to the operating line of an organization are likely to recognize and have solutions for operating problems.

Further, people who solve problems build a sense of commitment to and concern for the organization. If people have invested in decisions, they have a stake in seeing solutions work; conversely, uninvolved people may have a stake in seeing solutions fail. Participatory management patterns -- talking to, listening to, and involving people -- not only tap the resources of personnel to solve specific problems, but engage their willing cooperation and commitment (ASCD, 1985).

Contemporary organizational theorists, in attempting to delineate the strategies that separate effective from less effective organizations, have found that distinctions between the two are usually based on how they treat people. Organizations that become obsessed with inadequate performance have a tendency to focus on enforcing rules and regulations to insure minimal standards of productivity. The real challenge of leadership in an organization lies in discovering what people do well and reinforcing that behavior (ASCD, 1985).

Recommendations

What changes in schools are needed, then, to attract and keep the best teachers in the classroom? The linch-pin and, indeed, the prerequisite for new teacher recruitment and the retention of talented teachers is higher teacher salaries. Once salaries are competitive with other occupations that attract potential teachers, the following changes are essential:

1) Teachers should have the tools of their trade -- sufficient textbooks, materials, equipment, and classrooms -- and the time necessary to plan adequately for classroom teaching.

2) Teachers are entitled to safe working environments that are free from vandalism and severe disciplinary problems.

3) The school climate should encourage teacher autonomy in the classroom, good collegial relations among teachers, and a strong sense of shared values among school staff, students, and parents.

4) There should be an established process for recognition by administrators, parents, and community leaders of the importance of teachers and teaching.

5) Career-ladder programs should be initiated that vertically restructure the occupation to create a hierarchy of positions in teaching that provide for enlarged responsibilities and for promotion within teaching as opposed to promotion to administrative ranks.

6) The talents of outstanding teachers should be used to create a support system for both beginning teachers and career teachers who wish to expand their skills and knowledge.

7) The job descriptions of teachers should be rewritten (and the necessary budget provided) to allow time for observing other teachers, for collegial exchange, and for inservice to develop new skills.

8) The decision-making structure of the school system should be redesigned. Teachers have knowledge and expertise that should be called upon when considering many of the decisions made at the school and district levels.

9) Improvements in the training, selection, and performance of administrators, as well as in the procedures by which they manage the school and judge the performance of others, must become a top priority.

Conclusion

National opinion polls show that teachers are ready for a change and would accept responsibility for improving their own performance. People improve when they see a reason to do so if they are given the responsibility and the opportunity for improving. Academically able college graduates are not going to be attracted to an occupation in which factory-like supervision and working conditions prevail; where opportunities for rewards, status, and increased responsibilities are lacking; and where they have little say in decisions that affect the students they teach, the school in which they work, and their own professional behavior.

Although it would appear that merit-pay or career-ladder initiatives have the *potential* to address the problems that affect the quality of classroom instruction, there is little reason to hope that the initiatives, *as currently proposed*, will promote significant improvement. Few reform efforts will achieve that goal as long as they overlook the incentives necessary for professional growth and neglect the organizational context -- such as, little teacher input into decision making, lack of time for adequate preparation, teacher isolation, inadequate apprenticeship, lack of performance feedback, and lack of differentiated career possibilities -- in which the improved teaching practices are supposed to occur (IFG Policy Notes, 1985b).

The strategies needed to accomplish the goals of increased excellence in teaching include institutional reforms that make substantial changes in the teaching workplace -- comprehensive changes in the functioning of the school system. The strategies must identify ways to make the daily work of teaching more satisfying, challenging, and stimulating; ways to use the professional talents of teachers in assisting their peers -- where colleagues can be mutually engaged in the identification and support of effective practices; and ways to apply the experience and insight of teachers in the problems-solving and decision-making processes in the schools (IFG Policy Notes, 1985b).

SECTION III
PERSPECTIVES ON PERFORMANCE-BASED EVALUATION

Current education reform initiatives have drawn attention to the practice of performance-based evaluation. Assessment of teacher and administrator performance is viewed as crucial to quality education. Furthermore, as more states and districts consider incentive plans for teachers and administrators, performance-based evaluation becomes even more important. Performance-based evaluation as used here refers to evaluation that focuses on the assessment of on-the-job performance rather than on the assessment of attributes or characteristics believed to predict this performance.

Theoretical and Practical Issues Concerning Performance-Based Evaluation

Interest in performance-based evaluation is not new. It existed long before the current furor over incentive plans. There have been many reasons unrelated to incentives that have led states and school districts to develop and use performance-based evaluation systems. Thus, numerous methods for assessing performance are already available. However, not all of these methods may be suitable or appropriate for use in the evaluation of teachers and administrators for reward purposes. In order to determine which methods will help to meet the goals of the incentive plans, the theoretical basis of evaluation needs to be examined within the context of incentives. Also, the experiences of researchers and practitioners in developing and using performance-based evaluation systems, in general, need to be considered.

Rationale for Performance-Based Evaluation

Using performance-based evaluation as a basis for apportioning rewards presupposes a rationale for why awards are being made and why they are linked to performance-based evaluation. The main goal of most incentive plans is to recognize teachers by rewarding them for outstanding performance. Thus, performance-based evaluation is needed for determining who is eligible for the rewards. Effective incentive plans depend on performance-based evaluation in the following ways (Barro, 1985):

- Valid, reliable, and fair measures of teacher performance are needed to guarantee that the "right" teachers are rewarded.
- Accurate measurement of teacher performance is essential to ensure that effective teaching behaviors will be encouraged, and undesirable behaviors discouraged, by the incentive system.
- The quality of the measurement method determines, in many respects, how the rest of the incentive system can be structured.

Summative vs. Formative Evaluation

In the context of incentives, educators are more concerned with summative evaluation rather than formative evaluation. The main purpose of incentive-related evaluation is to determine how well teachers are performing rather than to diagnose teaching problems. Thus, incentive-related evaluation must be capable of yielding objective, standardized, and externally defensible information about teacher performance, as opposed to improvement-related evaluation which must be capable of yielding descriptive information that illuminates sources of difficulty and viable courses for change (Wise, Darling-Hammond, McLaughlin & Bernstein, 1984).

Process- vs. Product-Oriented Evaluation

Performance-based evaluation may focus on assessing actual performance -- that is, what teachers actually do, or it may focus on assessing the effects of this performance. The former evaluation approach is generally referred to as process-oriented and the latter as product- or outcome-oriented. In process-oriented evaluation, teachers are judged by what they do, whereas in product- or outcome-oriented evaluation, teachers are judged by the effects of what they do. Process-oriented evaluation generally relies on teacher performance measures while product-oriented evaluation generally relies on student-achievement measures. Whether to evaluate teachers by what they do, by the effects of what they do, or by a mixture of the two, is considered the main design issue concerning teacher evaluation (Barro, 1985). The specifics of the assessment instruments, procedures, standards, etc. will depend on which approach is selected.

Technical Requirements of Evaluation

Performance-based evaluations are expected to meet certain technical requirements. They are expected to provide evaluation results that are valid and reliable. However, the level of technical quality can vary depending upon the purposes of evaluation. For example, reliability should be higher in summative evaluations than in formative evaluations (Braskamp, 1980).

The validity and reliability of the evaluation results depend on the instruments and procedures used to assess performance. The results are considered valid if they were obtained with instruments and procedures that actually and adequately measure the particular performance domains (behaviors or outcomes) that they were supposed to measure. The results are considered reliable if they were obtained with instruments and procedures that are consistent in their measurements -- that is, they always produce the same results. Both properties, that of being valid and reliable, are important in the defensibility of performance-based evaluations.

Discriminating Power of Measurement System

In the context of incentives, methods for differentiating superior or excellent performance from average performance is required. It is not sufficient to merely determine whether teachers are minimally competent. The measurement system should be able to distinguish gradations of performance and, therefore, be able to discriminate between teachers relatively close together on the performance continuum. An example of a system with too low discriminating power to be useful for apportioning rewards is one that can distinguish reliably only between "unsatisfactory," and "satisfactory" performance (Barro, 1985). A system with higher power might classify teachers into four, five, or more performance strata, each of which could then be associated with a different level of reward.

Unbiasedness and Fairness of Evaluation

Performance-based evaluations are expected to be unbiased and fair. To be unbiased, evaluations should be unaffected by relationships between assessors and assessee, and should give no undue advantage to teachers by virtue of sex, age, race, ethnicity or other personal characteristics. Also, to be unbiased, the evaluations should be minimally dependent on the subjective judgment of any individual. Where subjective judgment is unavoidable, as in the case of evaluations that rely on classroom observations, performance should be judged by multiple evaluators (Barro, 1985).

Fairness involves the sensitivity of the evaluation toward differences among people and situations. For example, identical procedures and standards cannot be applied mechanically to both beginning teachers and experienced teachers. Fairness also involves recognizing the complexity of teaching and the possibility that different interpretations of teaching may be the result of using different methods of evaluation (Braskamp, 1980).

Credibility and Acceptability of Evaluation

Credibility involves mutual trust between those being evaluated and those using the evaluative information. Since credibility is assessed from the perspective of the evaluator, the external constraints under which the evaluation is to be implemented become important (Braskamp, 1980). If the information is not viewed as credible, it will not be highly regarded or accepted by the user even if the information is technically sound. Therefore, the evaluation system must ensure credibility as it addresses the concerns of teachers.

Effects of Evaluation on Instruction

Performance-based evaluation may have both positive and negative effects on the instructional process and the condition of the schools (Barro, 1985). Possible beneficial effects include reinforcement of state or district educational priorities and direct stimulation of improved teacher performance. For example, if teacher rewards depend on student achievement in specific areas, this may help to enforce compliance with the curriculum and with the priorities officially assigned to different subjects of instruction. Furthermore, measuring and comparing teacher performance might induce teachers to do better even in the absence of performance-contingent rewards.

Possible adverse effects include rigidifying teaching methods and inhibiting innovative practices. Also, heavy reliance on achievement testing could distort the content of teaching. Teachers might be motivated to emphasize unduly those areas of the curriculum that count toward evaluations. There is also likely to be extensive "teaching to the test" -- a phenomenon that could be either desirable or undesirable depending on how well the tests reflect the full range of instructional goals (Barro, 1985).

Overall Evaluation Climate

The assessment of job performance, particularly of teachers, is often surrounded by a threatening climate. Performance assessment touches on an emotionally charged activity -- the assessment of a person's contribution. The signals that the person receives about this assessment may have a strong impact on his or her self esteem (Thompson and Dalton, 1970). It needs to be recognized that although some anxiety might be needed for progress, too much anxiety may be destructive to both the school system and the evaluatee as a person. This problem can be further complicated in situations where rewards are linked to evaluation. The fact that rewards might be given to a very limited number of teachers may cause unwanted levels of competition that could lead to anger and resentment. Therefore, ways of creating a more positive measurement climate and of reducing the possibility of unwanted levels of competition and anxiety need to be considered in incentive-related evaluations.

Constraints on Evaluation

A comprehensive evaluation process that meets all the technical, institutional, and personal requirements may be difficult or impossible to obtain because of time and financial constraints. The demand for evaluation is a demand for time expenditure (Gephart, 1980). This is particularly so in the case of process-oriented evaluations where performance assessment tends to rely on classroom observation. Evaluations that require extensive and repeated classroom observations are likely to be very demanding of the time of evaluators (Barro, 1985). On the other hand, product-oriented evaluations that rely on student achievement measures may require elaborate and specialized testing programs. These programs can be very costly. How to assess performance adequately but at a reasonable cost and with a reasonable amount of time investment is one of the most difficult problems in designing a performance-based evaluation system.

Use of Classroom Observation Ratings in Process-Oriented Evaluation

Process-oriented evaluation focuses on assessing actual performance -- that is, what teachers and administrators actually do. Efforts to assess teachers' actual performance generally rely on performance ratings based on classroom observations. In the long history of evaluating teachers through classroom observation, different observation approaches have been used. Emphasis is currently being given, however, to the more formal, systematic observation technique.

The rating procedure can be structured or unstructured. The *unstructured* procedure generally requires a high level of inference on the rater's part. The rater observes the teacher and notes those behaviors that seem relevant. The rater combines his or her impressions into a composite picture which is then compared to the rater's personal standards of effective performance. This comparison leads to a specific rating for the teacher. There are no records of the behaviors or the standards; therefore, sources of rating problems cannot be identified.

The *structured* procedure generally requires a lower level of inference. It is preferred over the unstructured procedure because it tends to be more objective (Soar, 1983-84). The rater uses a checklist or a scale to guide the observation. Both the checklist and the scale contain a set of items that define specific behaviors (or categories of behaviors). These specific behaviors constitute the performance criteria on which the observation and consequent rating will be based.

Performance Criteria

Performance criteria currently in use are generally developed from a "consensus" model, from a research perspective, or from a combination of both. Performance criteria developed from a "consensus" model uses conventional wisdom. Behaviors that practitioners believe to be associated with effective practice are assembled and used as a standard against which the behaviors to be assessed are compared. However, studies have shown that what is thought to be characteristically effective practice may not be the case when the behaviors are correlated to student achievements (Coker, Medley, and Soar, 1980).

Performance criteria developed from a research perspective use the current research base that links particular behaviors with student outcomes. This approach is preferred to that of the "consensus" model. However, since most of the research in this area has focused on teacher behaviors in elementary schools with low socioeconomic students, the generic character of the performance criteria for teachers has been questioned. Teacher behaviors linked to the achievement of this specific target population may not be the same as behaviors linked to achievement of secondary or high achieving students (Cornett, 1984).

Use of Checklist and Scale

The checklist allows the rater to indicate whether the target behaviors have occurred. However, the rater cannot make qualitative judgments about the behaviors, at least not without additional data. Thus, rating is based exclusively on the presence or absence of these behaviors (Ingle, 1980).

The scale allows the rater not only to indicate whether the behaviors occurred but also to make qualitative judgments about these behaviors (Ingle, 1980). The judgments that lead to a specific rating have been made beforehand and incorporated into a public, agreed-upon rating key that is then applied to the behaviors. These judgments can appear in the form of category responses which are provided for each item. Category responses may be evaluative adjectives (e.g. excellent, good, average, poor, unsatisfactory), frequency adverbs (e.g. usually, sometimes, rarely, never), or verb phrases indicating assent to the statement presented in the item (e.g. strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). They may also be phrases that describe or modify the statement presented in the item. Other response modes have been used, however, the category response mode is the most common (Rumery, 1985).

Systematic Observation Technique

Systematic observation differs from the less formal administrator and peer visits that have long been the principal means for evaluating teachers. Systematic observation requires the following (Peterson & Kauchak, 1983):

1) trained and monitored observers;

2) a reliable and representative number of observation visits;

3) demonstrable fair sampling of behavior;

4) limited observational categories;

5) systematic data recording and analysis procedures; and

6) a conceptually coherent framework for the interpretation of the data.

Use of Ratings for Apportioning Rewards

Whether the ratings can be used as a basis for apportioning rewards depends on the degree to which the rating system is able to distinguish gradations of performance. The power of the rating system to discriminate among degrees of above-average performance is unclear. This discriminating power is believed to derive, ultimately, from the reliability of the rating procedure; thus, if its reliability is low, its ability to discriminate is also low (Barro, 1985). But in addition, the discriminating power of some rating systems is limited by design, as, for example, where the system allows only "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" ratings to be assigned to teachers.

Threats to Validity and Reliability

There are several problems associated with the use of the observation/rating procedure which may threaten the validity and reliability of the performance-based teacher evaluations. These problems have important implications for systems that reward teachers for what they do in the classroom.

Validity. The following are some of the problems centering on the validity of the observation/rating procedure.

- The two, three, or four observation visits typically performed during a year for each teacher may not be sufficient to sample teaching in all major subject areas taught by one teacher or to sample teaching in different situations and with different classes (Barro, 1985). Also, this small number of visits does not allow for sampling variations.

- The presence of any observer, but especially an evaluator, changes classroom activity (Barro, 1985). Intentional, even rehearsed, artificial behaviors may be elicited if the observation is expected.

However, unexpected observation also disrupts the classroom environment, leading to unnatural behaviors from both teachers and students.

- The content or format of the rating instruments may not allow raters to translate readily the job-related behaviors they observe to a specific level on a specified dimension (Borman, 1978). Rating scales with insufficiently concrete items or response categories may force raters to lump vaguely related observations together, thus producing performance measures that do not reflect "true" job-related behaviors.

- Raters' opportunities to observe relevant job-related behaviors are an obvious prerequisite for obtaining satisfactory performance ratings. Yet, when supervisors are asked to rate subordinates, they often lack the opportunity to observe. They are likely to comply with this requirement on the basis of presumed covariation between observed dimensions and unobserved dimensions, or between general impressions and unobserved dimensions (Borman, 1978).

- Raters' knowledge of common rating errors and of methods for reducing them are important ingredients for obtaining high-quality ratings. Yet, ratings are often required of raters who are inexperienced in performance appraisal and ignorant of common sources of error or of ways to reduce them (Borman, 1978).

- The rater may have a general tendency to make an overall judgment about the person being rated and to record consistently favorable or unfavorable positions on a number of items intended to describe specific aspects of performance. The rater fails to discriminate among conceptually distinct and potentially independent aspects of a ratee's behavior (Saal, Downey, and Lahey, 1980).

- Some raters may have a general tendency to assign a higher or lower rating than is justified by a ratee's performance. Other raters may have a general tendency to cluster the ratings around the midpoint of a rating scale, avoiding extreme categories; or to cluster the ratings around any point on a rating scale, high, low or midpoint (Saal, Downey, and Lahey, 1980).

- The likelihood of relationship biases is especially great when the evaluator is the building principal or another teacher from the same school. Both principals and peers may have interests unrelated to teaching performance in whether the evaluatee succeeds or fails, advances or falls behind, or remains in or leaves the school (Barro, 1985).

- The rater may have some biases related to teaching styles. These biases can be particularly insidious because the rater may believe that his or her personal preferences among teaching approaches reflect valid distinctions among more and less effective modes of teaching (Scriven, 1981). In some respects, these generic biases are more troubling than the relationship ones, because while the latter can be avoided by selecting the raters appropriately, the former are much more difficult to weed out (Barro, 1985).

- Organizational constraints may cause ratings to reflect organizational demands rather than true levels of performance exhibited by ratees. A supervisor might hesitate to provide a deserved low rating to an employee in order to avoid confrontation with a disgruntled employee, or avoid the burden of replacement (Borman, 1978).

Reliability. Doubts about the reliability of the teacher evaluations reinforce the doubts about their validity. Vaguely defined performance criteria, poorly constructed rating scales, and problems related to the observation procedure work to ensure that inter-rater reliability will not be high. These problems are aggravated by the small number of observations allowed for "under typical" evaluation schemes (Barro, 1985). Given the great variability of classroom activity from day to day and hour to hour, even the same rater's assessments of performance on different occasions are likely to conflict.

Selection and Training of Assessors

The qualifications of the assessors are critical in the assessment of teacher and administrator performance. Effective assessment, for example, requires that assessors be appropriately selected and trained. This is particularly true in assessment situations where observation and rating are involved. Here the assessors assume an instrumental role in the measurement of performance. Thus, the selection of assessors and their training are of approximately equal importance with scale development (Rumery, 1985). However, it has been noted that administrators responsible for assessing the performance of their employees generally have little or no formal training in evaluation and tend to lack the necessary skills and knowledge to apply effectively the performance measuring instruments and procedures (Wood and Green, 1985).

In elementary and secondary education, the observation and rating activities are usually performed by immediate supervisors or other staff members in higher positions than that of assessee; only in a few cases have peers been involved. There are advantages and disadvantages in the use of either group (Rumery, 1985). Generally, peers have more opportunities to observe job-relevant behaviors than supervisors do. However, against this advantage is poised the disadvantage that peers might be subject to leniency errors. Supervisors, on the other hand, might be better informed than peers about critical job requirements. Also, evaluation of employees is likely to be a prescribed part of their jobs. However, since supervisors usually have far less opportunity to observe job-relevant behaviors than peers, their ratings are more likely to be subject to halo.

Personal characteristics of the assessors may also influence the rating process. For example, it has been noted that assessors of different ethnicity and gender give different ratings to their staff (Holley, 1983-84).

To overcome these rating problems, extensive training and practice have been suggested in addition to the use of multiple observers/raters. Research on rater training shows that extensive training and practice may be effective in reducing rating errors, with "frame-of-reference" training apparently being more effective than "rater-error" training (Rumery, 1985). In frame-of-reference training, the raters are provided with information describing the performance to be assessed, the scale to be used, and the dimensions represented by the items on the scale. In rater-error training, common rating errors are described and illustrated and the raters are encouraged to try to avoid them.

Recommendations

Some recommendations for improving the quality of the performance rating are listed below. These recommendations are based on the experiences of researchers and practitioners in developing and using performance-based evaluation systems that rely on classroom observation ratings. They were extracted from different sources (Holley & Field, 1977; Shannon, 1983-84).

- The content of the performance rating instruments should be developed from a thorough job analysis.
- The performance rating instruments should be shown to be job-related through content and/or empirical validation procedures.
- The language, including directions for use, on rating instruments should be precise and uniform.
- Individuals rating job performance should frequently observe employees at work.
- Behaviors should be observed and rated under standardized conditions.
- Several raters should be used, and their observations/ratings should be conducted independently.
- Each observation and assessment should be preceded and followed by a consultation between the staff member and the assessor.
- Assessors should be made aware of the issues and concerns involved in the rating of performance.
- Assessors should be trained in how to apply the rating instruments and procedures.

Use of Student-Achievement Measures in Product-Oriented Evaluation

Product-oriented evaluation focuses on assessing the effects of performance. Efforts to assess the effects of teacher performance, using student-achievement measures, is currently gaining much attention. It is easy to understand why it would be desirable to evaluate teachers explicitly on the basis of their contributions to student achievement. However, it is not easy to separate teacher contributions from other influences on what students learn. This problem needs to be considered in incentive-related evaluations, and ways of dealing with it need to be examined.

Within the context of teacher evaluation, the term "student achievement" is used to refer to whatever a student knows and can do in a specified subject area as a consequence of instruction. It is distinguished from the term "student competency" which has been generally used to refer to whatever a student knows and can do in a subject area independently of how the knowledge and skill are acquired, whether through instruction, experience or any other means (Messick, 1984). Student competency may influence student achievement, and both are continuous variables reflecting various degrees of proficiency.

Nonteacher Influences on Achievement

The following are examples of nonteacher factors that may influence student achievement:

1) the characteristics of the students themselves (e.g., their abilities, prior educational experiences, economic circumstances, home environments, interests, attitudes, learning styles and prior knowledge);

2) the resources available to the teacher (e.g., materials and supporting staff); and

3) school circumstances which are external to the classroom and are not under the control of the teacher.

If student-achievement measures are to be used as indicators of teacher performance, methods of controlling for nonteacher factors need to be examined. Specific statistical methods that yield adjusted achievement-gain scores have been suggested. These adjusted achievement-gain scores are, in essence, statistically based predictions of the gains each teacher would have produced with a "typical" class in a "typical" teaching situation (Barro, 1985). The adjusted scores, rather than the original raw scores, would then be used to determine which teachers deserve performance-based rewards.

Non-statistical methods have also been suggested. One method, for example, is assessing teachers according to the actual achievement gains made by students during the period in question relative to the initial achievement levels or prior rates of gains of these same students (Barro, 1985). The initial achievement level or prior rates of gains would serve as proxies for expected gains by the same students. Thus, comparing actual gain against expected gain measures the amount by which a teacher exceeds or falls short of expected performance.

Use of Measures for Apportioning Rewards

Whether the achievement measures can be used as a basis for apportioning rewards depends on the degree to which the measurement system can differentiate among multiple levels of student achievement. The power of the measurement system to discriminate among degrees of above-average levels of achievement depends ultimately on the reliability of the measurement procedure. It is believed that the adjusted student-achievement data would almost certainly support more detailed distinctions than could be made on the basis of observations of classroom teaching.

Threats to Validity and Reliability

There are several problems associated with the use of student-achievement measures that may threaten the validity and reliability of the performance-based teacher evaluations. These problems have important implications for systems that reward teachers for what students learn.

Validity.

- The most practical tools for quantifying student achievement objectively are written examinations (Haertel, 1986). Thus, it is not achievement itself but student performance on achievement tests that must be linked to teacher performance. Therefore, measurement effects on test performance must be taken into account in designing teacher evaluation systems that rely on student-achievement measures (Haertel, 1986).

- Standardized tests tend not to measure educational achievement as distinct from student competence. Standardized tests sample broad subject domains and are unlikely to match closely the curriculum in particular classrooms at particular times (Haertel, 1986).

- Well-established, broadly applicable, and accepted achievement measures do not span all the relevant areas of learning but are concentrated mainly in such basic skills areas as reading, language, and mathematics. Even at the elementary level, one cannot judge teachers fairly by students' progress in basic skills alone, and at the secondary level, teaching basic skills is peripheral to most teacher's assignments. Consequently, teacher evaluation based on the outcomes of teaching would require much broader-ranging achievement testing than is now the practice in most states and school systems (Barro, 1985).

- Standard achievement tests are unlikely to reflect the full range of instructional goals in their subject areas. In particular, they are likely to slight the learning of higher-order skills that presumably follows from superior teaching. Thus, even where the relevant subject areas appear to be "covered" by existing tests, it cannot be taken for granted that the products of teaching are being adequately or completely measured (Barro, 1985).

- It is difficult to link the student-achievement measures to teacher performance since much of the variance in student achievement among classrooms is due to factors other than the quality of teaching. What the student brings to the classroom in terms of ability, previous knowledge, home and peer influence, motivation, and other influences is very powerful in determining academic standing at the end of the year (Iwanicki, 1986).

- Taking student standing at year-end as an indicator of teaching effectiveness frequently does not recognize standing at the beginning of the year; in addition, the problems of adjusting for prior standing are extremely serious and rarely recognized (Iwanicki, 1986).

- The statistical methods used to control for nonteacher factors cannot take into account the full array of relevant factors. Moreover, these methods may be incomprehensible to most of those affected and difficult to justify or defend in public (Barro, 1985).

- Although the nonstatistical methods used to control for nonteacher factors may be more comprehensible to those affected, they cannot by themselves take into account the special circumstances that can render performance gains noncomparable across classes (Barro, 1985).

Reliability. The main threats to the reliability of teacher evaluations based on student-achievement measures are those stemming from the following sources:

- the reliability of the student-achievement measures themselves, and

- the adjustment methods used to control for nonteacher factors.

Threats stemming from the reliability of the student-achievement measures are likely to be minor because the achievement measures in question are class averages rather than measures of individual pupils. Threats stemming from the adjustment methods could be more serious because of the difficulty of taking adequate account of variations in conditions among classes; but, replication and reliance on averages over multiple classes and time periods can mitigate the problem (Barro, 1985).

Need for Further Research

Further research is needed to determine exactly how student achievement measures will be used in the assessment of teacher performance. There are two main questions that this research should address (Iwanicki, 1986). These are the following:

- what do different types of achievement results tell us about teacher performance, and

- what do achievement results tell us which is not provided by other measures of teacher performance.

To initiate studies of this nature, it is important to begin by using the information currently available within the school system, rather than to introduce a series of new measures. Generally, teachers know and are comfortable with existing measures, but would tend to be suspect of new assessment techniques. Initially the measures available must be reviewed to determine the extent to which they are valid and credible. Once it is concluded that valid and credible data are available to initiate research regarding measures of teacher performance, the next step is to address the questions (Iwanicki, 1986).

Effects of Performance-Based Evaluations on Minority Teachers

Minority representation in the teaching profession, already low, may become even smaller as states increase their reliance on standardized tests to screen candidates for teacher-training programs. Minority candidates are failing these tests at a disproportionately high rate (Gifford, 1985). This problem can become further complicated if performance-based evaluations of currently employed teachers produce similar results -- that is, if minority teachers also fail these evaluations at a disproportionately high rate.

Educators have expressed concerns about minority groups getting lower performance ratings than the majority population in performance-based evaluations that rely on observational rating procedures (Wicker & Doss, 1984). Where either observational rating procedures or paper-and-pencil tests are used the fairness and unbiasedness of the evaluation system has been questioned.

The large and increasing number of minority students in the public schools (Gifford, 1985) and the small and declining number of prospective minority teachers makes even low minority failing rates on performance-based teacher evaluations a very serious problem. As the number of minority students continues to increase, so does the need for specialized programs and competent minority teachers to help these students reach their potential and to provide access to exemplars of success, especially for those students who need to see successful role models.

Factors to Consider

Several factors need to be considered when trying to determine if an evaluation system is unbiased and fair with respect to minority teachers. Some of the factors that may account for evaluation results that are linked to ethnicity and race as well as to gender are related to the evaluation system; others are related to the evaluatees themselves. The following are examples of some of these factors:

Observational rating procedure. It has been noted that in classroom observation situations there is a general tendency for raters to make an overall judgment about the person being rated and to record favorable or unfavorable ratings which are consistent to this overall judgment (Saal, Downey, and Lahey, 1980). The biases that observers bring to the classroom can influence heavily this overall judgment. Although, in general, rater biases can be avoided by selecting and training evaluators appropriately, rater biases related to teacher characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, and gender) present problems because they are difficult to weed out (Barro, 1985).

Evaluatee's background and experience. Another reason why minority teachers may get low ratings in performance-based evaluations is that they may, in fact, be unable to meet the teaching standards currently being established by school systems. Some minority teachers may have been hired on the basis of minimum teaching requirements or through affirmative action plans that gave emphasis to minority hiring quotas. Now, these teachers are expected to compete for rewards on the basis of above-average teaching standards. Minority teachers hired by school systems as a result of affirmative action efforts may view as unfair the use of such standards to determine eligibility for incentives.

Recommended Strategies

Designing an unbiased and fair evaluation system for both minority and nonminority teachers is an important element in defending the legality of the evaluations and in creating a positive evaluation climate. The following strategies should be considered in trying to develop a fair and unbiased evaluation system:

- Ensure that highly qualified minority teachers participate in designing and implementing the evaluation systems and in establishing the performance criteria or standards.
- Select both minority and nonminority evaluators carefully and provide them with intensive training.
- Develop and vigorously monitor teaching improvement programs designed to help minority teachers acquire those effective-teaching behaviors that are highly regarded in U. S. school systems, while allowing them at the same time to maintain those behaviors that have proven to be helpful in teaching minority students.
- Recognize the value of those teaching behaviors that may be helpful in teaching minority students.

Conclusions and General Recommendations

Although much has been written about performance assessment, many people are still uncomfortable about it, both those who are being evaluated and those who are doing the evaluations (Gephart, 1980). There is still some uncertainty about how teacher performance can be best assessed and on whether the existing instruments and procedures are suitable or appropriate for use in evaluations that are linked to rewards. In order to determine which methods, instruments and procedures will help to meet the goals of the incentive plans, the theoretical basis of evaluation needs to be examined within the context of incentives. Also, the experiences of researchers and practitioners in developing and using performance-based evaluation systems, in general, need to be considered.

The main concern about using either process or product-oriented evaluations is that the evaluation results may not be valid due to measurement problems. In the case of process-oriented teacher evaluations that rely on observation ratings, the teachers may be judged for behaviors unrelated or only weakly related to teaching practices which are linked to student outcome. In the case of product-oriented evaluations, student achievement may not be measured well and/or nonteacher factors may not be adequately taken into account or controlled. The consequences of error are quite different in the two cases (Barro, 1985). Faulty measurement or inadequate control of nonteacher factors under the product-based approach would result in unfair and inconsistent treatment of some teachers. On the other hand, failure to identify outcome-related classroom behaviors under the process-based approach could lead to inappropriate rewards, and thus, encourage mediocre or even counter-productive modes of teaching.

Concerns about reliability, bias, and discriminating power are more serious in process-oriented evaluations than in product-oriented evaluations. The problems of measuring reliably teachers' contributions to outcomes are considerable, but those of obtaining reliable ratings from classroom observation are more severe. Impersonal ratings based on student test scores avoid the dangers of bias and subjectivity inherent in any system that relies on evaluators' judgments. This fact tends to favor product-oriented evaluations. However, opportunities for near-term implementation of product-oriented evaluations are limited mainly because the procedures for adjusting test scores and for establishing performance norms have not been worked out in detail (Barro, 1985).

It is evident that substantial work is required on the development of both evaluation approaches if they are to be used to influence decisions about teacher rewards. Both process- and product-oriented evaluations are expected, not only to meet the technical requirements of validity and reliability, but also to be fair, credible, practical, and cost effective. Several recommendations that can serve as general guidelines for ensuring the successful attainment of these requirements have been offered. These recommendations are based on the experiences of researchers and practitioners in developing and using performance-based evaluation systems in and outside the educational milieu, and are not necessarily related to incentive-based plans. Some of these recommendations are listed here. They were extracted from different sources (e.g., Braskamp, 1980; Holley and Field, 1977; Holley, 1983-84; Wise, Darling-Hammond, McLaughlin, and Bernstein, 1984). These recommendations should be considered as heuristics or starting strategies to be modified on the basis of local experience and needs.

Recommendations

- The purpose of the evaluation system should be clear, and the evaluation procedures should be in line with this purpose.
- Instruments and procedures used to measure teacher performance must meet technical standards.
- Where possible, evaluations should be based on observable job-related behaviors.
- Evaluations should be supported by objective evidence of performance results.
- The evaluation system must focus on behaviors that truly matter in teaching and learning.
- Top management must give the evaluation system its full support.
- School systems should develop policies pertaining to the use of performance-based evaluation, procedures for administration, rules governing decisions, etc.

- In selecting factors to be used in conducting evaluations, inputs should be solicited from various groups, for example, faculty members, parents, and administrators.

- Performance must be assessed before any personnel decisions are made which are said to be contingent on performance-based evaluation.

- Evaluations should not be discriminatory in intent, application, or results.

- The evaluation system should include a variety of techniques for assessing performance.

- The evaluation system should encourage and facilitate self-evaluation and self-improvement in job performance, even if the emphasis is on summative evaluation.

- The evaluative process should be carried out on a regular, continuing basis and include opportunities for both formal and informal evaluations.

- The evaluation process must complement, not usurp, the existing organization and flow of decision-making within the institution.

- In developing and implementing the evaluation system, the constraints of time, money, and institutional needs should be considered.

- Evaluative information must be accessible and understandable to those involved in the decision-making process.

- The school district should regularly assess the quality of evaluation, including individual and collective evaluator competence. The assessments should provide feedback to individual evaluators and input into the continuing evaluator training process.

- The persons evaluated should be informed of the results of their evaluation as soon as possible.

- Policies pertaining to the use of performance-based evaluations should be communicated to the persons who will be evaluated.

- Criteria and procedures to be used in the evaluations should be communicated to the persons being evaluated.

- Staff members should be made aware of their right to appeal unfavorable evaluations through channels to the superintendent and, ultimately, to the Board.

SECTION IV
PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING A PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLAN

States and districts that are in the process of planning or implementing performance-based incentive systems usually preface any discussions with a statement of the goals the system is expected to accomplish. The goals identified for such systems generally fall into four discrete categories (Palaich & Flannelly, 1984):

- improving teaching and learning;
- improving schools as organizations in order to make schools more effective places to teach and to learn;
- changing the composition of the teacher work force by attracting more outstanding teachers and/or retaining talented teachers; and
- strengthening community confidence in the schools.

Most incentive systems are expected to achieve all four goals. The assumption is that incentives will motivate teachers to improve, thereby increasing learning, improving schools, and strengthening community confidence. It is rare, however, for anyone to deliberately give thought to developing a cohesive philosophy on which to base a system designed to achieve those goals. In order to develop such a cohesive philosophy, thought should be given to the assumptions upon which incentive strategies are based, the target groups that those strategies are designed to affect, the nature of the work that teachers do in the schools, and the interaction between evaluation and staff development. Without such a philosophical foundation there is little hope that any new system will accomplish the goals for which it was established.

Target Groups and Assumptions

When considering incentive strategies to meet specific goals, policy makers should identify the assumptions on which those strategies are based to determine whether or not they are appropriate for accomplishing the desired goals in relation to a specific target group (Barro, 1985). Incentives could improve the teacher work force by either eliciting better performance from existing teachers or by altering the membership of the teaching force so that the average quality rises. Strategies designed to influence prospective teachers may have little or no effect on those already teaching. Unfortunately, evidence concerning the effectiveness of any of the strategies is fragmentary, at best.

There are four major incentive strategies to alter the teacher work force currently being considered by states and districts. The strategies and the assumptions upon which they are based are:

Strategy 1: *Influencing teacher turnover rates so that "good" teachers remain in the profession longer, and "poor" teachers leave teaching sooner.*

Assumptions:

a. Teachers' desires to remain in or leave teaching are determined, in part, by the relative rewards available to them in teaching and in other occupations.

b. Under the present economic conditions, significant numbers of teachers have viable options outside the teaching field.

c. The "benefits package" and working conditions can be improved and incentives can be identified that will influence "good" teachers to remain in the classroom.

d. Methods can be identified for inducing "poor" teachers to leave teaching sooner.

Strategy 2: *Attracting "higher-quality" entrants into teaching from the ranks of talented new college graduates and from the pool of talented persons in other jobs.*

Assumptions:

a. Higher teacher-pay scales will help make teaching a more attractive occupation.

b. The "benefits package" and working conditions of teachers can be made attractive to the "higher-quality" college graduates.

c. School districts are able to discriminate between the large numbers of "mediocre" applicants and the "more-talented" applicants and will hire the "more talented" applicants.

Strategy 3: *Raising the average performance of already-employed teachers by inducing them to upgrade or use their capabilities more effectively by providing incentive pay.*

Assumptions:

a. Most currently-employed teachers are capable of teaching better than they teach now.

b. Teachers have the capacity and the freedom to improve on their own.

c. Teachers can be induced to make these performance-enhancing changes by the offer of performance-contingent rewards.

Strategy 4: *Raising the average performance of already-employed teachers by providing both the inducement and the structured opportunities for them to upgrade their capabilities.*

Assumptions:

a. Most currently-employed teachers are capable of teaching better than they teach now.

b. Teachers want to improve their skills and capabilities but do not have the time or the opportunities to do so.

c. Teachers can be assisted in making performance-enhancing changes by a variety of structured staff development experiences.

Conceptions About the Work of Teaching Influence the Development of Incentive Systems

Every performance-based incentive system rests upon assumptions (explicit or implicit) about the work of teaching and the teacher's relationship to the administrative structure of the school. These assumptions become manifested in the teacher evaluation system, which defines both the teaching task and the mechanisms by which the teacher is evaluated. These evaluation processes, in turn, influence the design of staff development programs.

Different conceptions of what is involved in the work of teaching will result in different ways of structuring the role of the principal, collecting information about teaching effectiveness, making judgments about the worth of the teacher, and designing professional growth experiences. Much of the literature on performance-based incentive systems examines evaluation instruments and techniques without considering their theoretical bases or the organizational contexts in which they are to be used. Without such consideration, potential users cannot accurately determine whether a particular approach will help to meet their goals, is congruent with their conceptions of education, or is appropriate for the organizational characteristics of their schools. Nor can they evaluate the implementation processes necessary to successfully use a given instrument or technique (Darling-Hammond, Wise, & Pease, 1982).

Teachers have been compared to craftspersons and professionals; to laborers and artists (Table 2). The following discussion is based on the Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease (1982) framework for analyzing the processes of teacher evaluation. Figure 2 illustrates the influence of concepts of the work of teaching on the roles of the principal and teacher, and on evaluation and staff development.

TABLE 2: CONCEPTS OF THE WORK OF TEACHING

	LABOR	CRAFT	PROFESSION	ART
Criteria for Teacher Competency	Following established procedures; student outcomes	Presence of specific competencies	Degree of skill in performance of specific competencies, problem solving, and judgment	Creative approach to teaching; ability to motivate students
Role of Principal	Supervisor	Manager	Administrator	Leader
Purpose of Evaluation	To assess if teacher conforms to policy and follows procedures	To determine if teacher can demonstrate the specific competencies	To evaluate strengths and weaknesses in applying skills in order to plan for professional improvement	To assess teacher's approach to teaching
Who Evaluates Teachers	Principal	Principal	Peers, Principal, and Self	Self, Peer critique
Goal of Staff Development	Provides training to ensure teacher is proficient in the prescribed techniques and knows the rules and regulations	To train teacher in performing the specific competencies	To improve teacher's skills and knowledge and develop ability to apply appropriately	Moves teacher to higher developmental stage; enlarges perspectives and understanding

FIGURE 1: INFLUENCE OF CONCEPTS OF THE WORK OF TEACHING ON THE ROLES OF THE PRINCIPAL AND TEACHER, EVALUATION, AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT


CONCEPT OF WORK OF TEACHING
DEFINES ROLES OF BOTH PRINCIPAL AND TEACHER
DETERMINES CRITERIA FOR COMPETENCY
DEFINES PURPOSE OF EVALUATION
DETERMINES THE GOAL OF STAFF DEVELOPMENT
DETERMINES WHO EVALUATES

Teaching as Labor

Under the concept of teaching as labor, teaching activities are rationally planned, programmatically organized, and routinized in the form of standard operating procedures by administrators. The teacher is responsible for executing the plans, implementing the instructional program, and adhering to routines and procedures. The evaluation system involves direct inspection of the teacher's work; the school administrator is seen as the teacher's *supervisor*.

Students' learning, as measured by their test performance, is seen as a direct function of teaching ability. Student learning is used to assess teacher performance. The worth of teachers is measured through the product or output of their work. Teachers are also assessed on how diligently they follow established procedure, their attitude, and the careful attention they pay to administrative expectations. This view sees the teacher as a laborer and the student as raw material.

The evaluation of teaching as labor seeks to assure that tasks are completed and rules followed. The principal becomes a line supervisor who gives direct guidance to the teacher on how to implement the prescribed curriculum. In this view, the purpose of staff development is to train teachers as technicians to implement policies developed by someone else.

Teaching as a Craft

Under the concept of teaching as a craft, teaching requires a repertoire of specialized skills. Once the teaching assignment has been made, the teacher is expected to carry it out without detailed instructions or close supervision. Evaluation is indirect and involves assuring that the teacher demonstrates the requisite skills. The school administrator is seen as a *manager* whose job it is to hold teachers to specified performance standards.

In this view of teaching, the particular skills, competencies, or behaviors of teaching are seen as directly linked to student learning and can be specified and evaluated to determine the worth of a teacher. The evaluation of teaching as a craft seeks to determine -- through observation, testing, or other means -- whether or not the teacher possesses a repertoire of teaching skills that have been identified as characteristic of a competent teacher. In evaluating teaching as a craft, the principal becomes a manager who helps the teacher to upgrade his or her skills.

The purpose of staff development is to instruct the teacher in the proper behavior exhibited by a competent teacher. Demonstration of the skill is the major goal of the staff development.

Teaching as a Profession

Under the concept of teaching as a profession, teaching not only requires a repertoire of specialized skills, but also requires the exercise of judgment about when those skills should be applied. The teacher is expected to exercise sound professional judgment. The school principal is seen as an *administrator* who ensures that teachers have the resources necessary to carry out their work.

Evaluation is through peer review and focuses on the degree to which teachers are competent at professional problem-solving. The evaluation of teaching as a profession -- through observation, testing, or other means -- also determines that the teacher possesses a repertoire of teaching skills that have been identified as characteristic of a competent teacher. However, evaluation of teaching as a profession seeks to determine whether or not the teacher applies these skills in an appropriate way, after analyzing the problem and exercising sound judgment in determining which skills to use.

In the concept of teaching as a profession, the principal is an administrator who creates a situation in which teachers work with each other to critique each other's skills and to develop and implement plans for professional growth. In this view, teachers are given responsibility for analyzing how students learn and for developing appropriate techniques and curriculum.

Staff development is a cooperative effort among teachers for the purpose of increasing knowledge, better understanding the learning needs of students, and developing the skills most likely to facilitate student learning.

(It should be noted here that the use of the terms "professional" or "profession" when discussing teachers or teaching does not necessarily indicate the adoption of the concept.)

Teaching as an Art

Under the concept of teaching as an art, teaching is seen as requiring the application of novel, unconventional, or unexpected techniques. The teacher is expected to exercise autonomy in the performance of his or her work. Evaluation involves self-assessment and giving and taking criticism. The school administrator is seen as a *leader* who encourages the teacher's efforts.

In evaluating teaching as art, the purpose is to assess if the teacher is engaging, exciting, and/or "creative." The principal is a leader who inspires dedication and effort through constructive criticism. Staff development helps the teacher move to higher developmental stages in order to enlarge his or her perspectives, to develop a greater rapport with the students, and to gain greater insight into ways of motivating students to learn.

Strategies for Planning and Implementation

Questions to Consider When Planning an Incentive System

When planning a performance-based incentive system the following questions should be considered (Flannelly, & Palaich, 1985):

> *EFFECTIVENESS* -- How likely is it that the proposed system will achieve the states' or school districts' goals?

ACCEPTABILITY -- Does the plan allow for meaningful teacher participation? Is the plan acceptable to parents and the community?

LEGAL DEFENSIBILITY -- Do the procedures for judging and rewarding teachers meet required standards of fairness?

MANAGEABILITY -- Is the effort to evaluate, train, reward, keep records, and design new jobs reasonable? Are state and school district staff capable of handling this effort?

AFFORDABILITY -- Can states and districts pay for the developmental costs, the administrative costs, the rewards, and for the additional efforts needed to implement the system properly? Can they continue to pay the costs in the future?

FLEXIBILITY -- Can the plan be modified to suit individual school needs? Can it be changed if it is not working?

EVALUATION -- How can the effectiveness of the plan be assessed?

Steps in the Planning and Implementation Process

The following suggestions have been compiled from a number of sources and are based on the experiences of those who have studied and been involved in planning and implementing performance-based incentive systems (AASA, 1983; The American School Board Journal, 1983; Bednar, 1985; Brandt, 1985; Burden, 1985; Edelfelt, 1985; Education USA, 1986; IFG Policy Notes, 1985; Kohut & Wright, 1984; Rosenholtz, 1985; Shaw, 1985; Weeks, 1985).

Step 1: Involve the Right People

- Involve those who may participate in and benefit from the plan; those who will implement and operate the plan; and those who will financially and politically support the plan -- the school board, parents, and other community members.

- Adoption and successful implementation of incentive plans require the active participation and support of teachers, administrators, school boards, parents, and community leaders. Involvement of unions or professional teachers' associations should be sought to avoid conflict over negotiated issues.

Step 2: Conduct the Right Research

- Investigate the various kinds of programs that have been tried.

- Discover what has and what hasn't worked.

- Survey teachers and administrators to discover what they will support.

Step 3: Define the Goals of the Incentive Plan

- The underlying principle of any incentive plan should be the ultimate improvement of classroom instruction. Such a plan should be viewed as a way to reward quality teaching and not as a punitive measure to punish inferior teaching.

- Define your purpose and goals for establishing a program -- what should it accomplish for the state/district?

Goal Check List

___ To provide the staff with the means of achieving instructional improvement and professional development

___ To provide an incentive for professional growth

___ To provide a means for recognizing and rewarding teacher performance

___ To attract to the community teachers whose knowledge, skills, and professional dedication are markedly above average

___ To provide an incentive for talented teachers to remain in teaching in the district

___ To raise student achievement scores

___ To attract teachers with instructional specialties to teach in the district

___ To provide an incentive for teachers to teach in particular areas of the district or with special student groups

___ To provide an incentive for teachers to perform duties in addition to their regular classroom duties

___ To develop a cadre of professionally outstanding teachers who, while spending the majority of their time in the classroom, will be a part of the instructional-leadership and decision-making structure of the school and district.

Step 4: Design a Program to Meet Your Goals

Once the goals are determined, they provide a guide for designing the kind of program that will most likely accomplish those goals.

Decide on Type and Amount of Incentives

- The amount of the incentive should reflect the value placed on superior service and should be perceived as generous by the recipients.

- Incentives can include such non-monetary rewards as additional time for planning, preparation, and peer interaction; opportunities for professional growth; and recognition for achievement.

- Make sure the plan isn't designed to penalize some teachers. The idea is to *reward* excellence in *all* teachers who meet the criteria.

- In a merit-pay plan, selection should not be subject to a quota system. The incentive-based pay should be available to all who qualify.

- Promotions should carry increases in authority and responsibility.

Establish New Role Definitions for Teachers and Administrators When Developing Career-Ladder Plans

- Re-define administrators' roles as a result of teachers having the option of assuming some supervisory and administrative duties.

- Job descriptions that accompany promotions should contain specific responsibilities for the professional development of all teachers within the school.

- Requirements for tenure and certification and the relationship between the stages in a career ladder should be clearly defined.

Restructure the Organization of the School and District in Order to Accommodate the New Role Definitions in a Career-Ladder Plan

- Examine the nature of school management and decision making -- with teachers making decisions about staff development, curriculum development, and assisting in instructional leadership. Appropriate systems of school management and participatory decision making need to be examined.

- Criteria for advancement should include collegial leadership. Teachers who advance to higher positions should excel both at the classroom level and at the school level with colleagues.

- Release time or limited classroom-teaching time for teachers in the higher stages of the career ladder will need to be arranged so they can complete their professional assignments.

Develop and Test the Performance-Evaluation System

- A fair and effective evaluation system requires time to develop and time to administer. It requires the commitment of financial resources for development, putting the system into place, and the continuation of the system.

- Evaluation criteria and procedures should be tested for validity and reliability and should be clearly described.

- All personnel should be evaluated, including administrators, counselors, and supervisors.

- Teachers should be involved in the development of any teacher performance-evaluation system.

- Administrators should be involved in the development of any administrator performance-evaluation system.

- Standards of evaluation should be well-defined and agreed upon by those being evaluated.

- Selection should be based solely on predetermined criteria.

- A procedure should be established for providing feedback to those being evaluated on their strengths and weaknesses.

- Persons should have the right to appeal merit decisions.

Include a Strong Staff Development and Inservice Component

- Continued training should be provided for teachers and administrators. The personnel, time, money, and resources needed to ensure continued professional growth for teachers should be considered when planning a budget.

- Train administrators, principals, teachers, and other evaluators to measure performance effectiveness on the basis of agreed-upon criteria.

Develop a Management System

- Design a program so that the effort to evaluate, train, reward, keep records, and, in the case of a career ladder, design new jobs is reasonable.

- Sufficient funds and personnel should be available to administer the program adequately.

- Performance-accountability procedures need to be in place to assure quality professional behavior by those at various stages of any career ladder.

Include a Process for Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Program

- Develop a procedure to determine how well the proposed program achieves the state's or school district's goals.

Include a Process for Revising the System Based on the Results of the Evaluation and Experience

- As development and implementation proceed, there should be enough flexibility built into the plan to meet unanticipated problems and to make appropriate changes. Can the plan be modified to suit individual school needs? Can it be changed if it is not working?

Step 5: Establish a Budget and Identify Funding Sources

- Decide what is financially feasible.

- The amount of any merit incentive should reflect the value placed on superior service and should be perceived as generous by the recipients -- 10 - 20% of teachers' base pay has been suggested as appropriate.

- Categories for funding considerations:

  - developing the plan and the evaluation system
  - the evaluation process
  - the incentives themselves
  - training and staff development
  - administering the plan

- Can states and districts pay for the developmental costs, the administrative costs, the rewards, and for the additional efforts needed to implement the system properly?

- Adequate budgetary safeguards should be established that ensure continued operation of the program from year to year.

Step 6: Determine the Legality of Your Program

- Legal issues, such as conflict over existing state laws or school district policy, should be resolved, especially in regard to teacher evaluation.

- State tenure laws and base-pay schedules may need to be changed in order to implement a career ladder in which teachers are "certified" at different levels.

Step 7: Establish a Process for Communication

- Frequent and direct communication with teachers, principals, and superintendents is essential. Participants must be kept informed about the developmental process. Prompt and accurate information will reduce anxiety, rumors, and misunderstandings.

- Put all the final decisions in writing so they can be communicated to the appropriate groups.

- Procedures should be developed for informing parents and new school district personnel about the plan's philosophy and operation.

Step 8: Put The Plan Into Action

You will need:

- A timeline that provides sufficient time for involving as many as possible in every step of the planning and implementation, for communicating the purpose, and for training both teachers and administrators.

- A process by which new responsibilities are assigned and old ones are realigned to fit the new organizational structure.

- A method for communicating effectively about the plan and a method by which questions and rumors can be answered quickly and accurately.

- Adequate planning time for the implementation of the career ladder plans in order to minimize implementation problems. Time and staff should be allocated to the development and field testing of an evaluation system prior to the implementation of the career ladder plan.

Step 9: Evaluate the Program and Refine It

- Evaluate the plan so that modifications and adjustments can be made as the need becomes apparent.

- Program evaluation should include investigations of:

  - what components of the plan were actually implemented;
  - how the processes worked;
  - was the performance-assessment system valid and reliable;
  - did the performance-assessment system differentiate between teachers;
  - what were the actual costs;
  - what were the outcomes (were district goals realized);
  - what were the un-intended outcomes; and
  - what were the attitudes of teachers and administrators.

Legal Issues to Consider During Planning and Implementation

Education programs initiated at the school-district level should be submitted to preventive legal analysis before school-board policies are finally formulated and placed into operation.

There are four reasons that make this a desirable precaution (Bednar, 1985):

1) Statutes and judicial decisions, both state and federal, now erect a complex legal framework within which local school bodies and administrators must carry out their educational duties. More often than not, there are specific legal rules with which school board policy must comply.

2) Local school board policies and their implementation have become more subject to hostile legal scrutiny from networks of advocacy

groups, legal-services attorneys, public-sector trade unions, and other associations and interest groups that are actively concerned about the legal rights of students, parents, teachers, and employees.

3) Preventive legal review serves to minimize a district's infringement of the law.

4) Preventive legal review of school board policies may go far toward preventing the time, expense, inconvenience, polarization, and loss of control that invariably accompany litigation.

Preventive Law Review

What are the elements of preventive law review? Bednar (1985) identifies five essential elements of preventive-law review.

Identify the legal risks. The objective is to determine whether the proposed policy, or the program it is intended to further, is likely to cause injury or damage to educational, economic, or social interests; or have disparate impact among protected minority groups.

Evaluate the legal issues. The tasks in this step are to perform the necessary research and analysis, and to draft legal opinions. Since this calls for the professional judgment of an attorney, the involvement of the school attorney is mandatory at this step.

Analyze the proposed policy to reduce the risk of legal challenge. There will be certain policy options that will be precluded by legal constraints while others may be relatively free of them. A large number of options will fall somewhere in between where careful drafting may promote standards of fair play and avoid potential legal challenges. Preventive legal analysis is most valuable in developing policies and procedures to achieve the educational objectives of the school district while at the same time recognizing and accommodating the legitimate interests of those affected by the policy.

Modify the proposed policy. According to Bednar, an Austin attorney, "we all would have benefited if the Texas legislature had employed some sort of preventive law analysis before deciding to set local communities adrift without adequate funds or uniform, objective standards."

Potential Sources of Legal Liability

In merit-pay or career-ladder situations, there are several sources of potential legal liability for school districts as entities as well as for individual members of Boards of Education and administrators. It is now clear that a school district can be held liable in a merit-pay situation under certain circumstances. The following discussion is summarized from Smith's discussion (1985) at the SEDL Preventive Law Institute on Career Ladder/Merit Pay.

Although prior law generally held that a school board was not a "person" under applicable civil-rights statutes, in 1978, the Supreme Court held that a governmental entity such as a school district is, in fact, a "person" and can be held responsible for damages in a civil-rights case. The test of liability required a determination whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that he or she was injured by an unlawful act under "official policy." It has also been held that even when members of a school board act in good faith, if the acts are subsequently held to be unconstitutional, the governing entity is liable.

There are a variety of legal issues that might arise in the context of merit-pay or career-ladder proposals. Some of those issues are:

1) Whether the basis for differential treatment of teachers is clearly stated and supported by a rational basis. Does criteria incorporated into an evaluation system meet the same standards?

2) Whether the criteria for selection of persons or groups who will receive different treatment is arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in a rational basis.

3) Whether, in the event that subjective evaluation criteria are used, the courts will view such criteria with skepticism -- the problem being that subjective criteria allow bias to creep into the decision-making process.

4) Whether the district or state has provided individuals who are to be adversely affected by a decision the chance to be heard prior to such a decision and, where appropriate, given individuals the opportunity to correct the problems that are prompting the adverse decision.

5) Whether tests that might be used for merit-pay or career-ladder decisions are free from cultural and other biases and have been validated to demonstrate that they actually measure what they purport to measure.

6) Other areas of concern are assuring that due process procedures are followed in cases of demotions or dismissals; that decisions are not made as reprisals against particular employees because of their exercise of free speech, their race, sex, or religion; and that the systems are compatible with state law in the areas of teachers' bargaining rights, the extent to which a school board may delegate authority to make personnel decisions, and any teacher dismissal procedures and reduction-in-force legislation.

Legal Issues and Evaluative Criteria

Shaw (1985) suggests that the applications of the Fourteenth Amendment to the educational setting suggest at the outset that the evaluations of teachers for merit-salary increases must be conducted in a manner that provides due process. This means that:

1) Evaluation procedures should include provision for giving teachers notice of what is expected in advance of any unfavorable action against them in terms of reduction of salary or status, a notice of intended action, and an opportunity to challenge the evaluation.

2) Evaluative criteria must be reasonably related to legitimate educational goals and objective enough for a court to determine whether or not there is evidence to support the conclusions drawn from the evaluation.

3) All teachers meeting the same required evaluation criteria must be classified and treated the same way regarding merit-pay increases.

The legal issues raised regarding public school teachers' rights to academic freedom can be divided into three categories: freedom of association outside the teaching environment, freedom of expression outside the classroom, and freedom to control class discussion and to select appropriate teaching methods. The legal developments in this area suggest a number of implications for the development of evaluative criteria for merit-pay programs (Shaw, 1985).

Evaluations should not be based on the associations of teachers outside the teaching environment. Criteria that interfere with teachers' rights to comment on matters of public concern (and this includes education) should be avoided when possible, and very narrowly defined otherwise, giving the teachers clear, prior notice of what types of speech will not be tolerated. In drafting such criteria, it should be kept in mind that, unless the comments are made recklessly (with knowledge of falsity) or the comments impede school operations, teachers' comments constitute protected speech and cannot be the basis for unfavorable evaluations (Shaw, 1985).

Evaluative criteria based on the choice of materials and methods should have a rational basis. Teachers using inappropriate or ineffective methods or materials should be given notice and an opportunity to correct the deficiency. Mere differences of opinion regarding appropriateness should be decided in favor of the teacher for purposes of evaluation (Shaw, 1985).

Tort law relating to defamation of character, and the right to privacy as well, has implications for the types of data on which evaluations can be based and how evaluations can be recorded and used (Shaw, 1985). First, the evaluative criteria should be specific. Many of the defamation suits brought by educators stem from the use of vague and overly broad terms such as "incompetent" or "inefficient." Evaluation statements should refer to specific behaviors. Second, the evaluation statement should be based, to the extent possible, on observable data rather than the evaluator's personal feelings.

Finally, evaluations should be kept strictly confidential, with access limited to only those persons directly involved in the evaluation process. The qualified privilege enjoyed by those sharing a common interest in the evaluations would be lost by allowing too general access. In addition, the extent to which evaluations can be subpoenaed and used as evidence in educational malpractice litigation should be a concern when formulating merit evaluation systems.

The case law regarding educational malpractice supports the notion that parents have no right to demand that their children be taught by specific teachers, and, therefore, are not entitled to access to the evaluations. The potential for liability, however, could have a chilling effect on the evaluation process for merit pay for teachers if the evaluation documents generated could be used as evidence in a later law suit against the district, principal, or teacher. The uncertainty inherent in the courts disposition of this issue should be eliminated by the legislation of a statutory privilege (Shaw, 1985).

Recommendations for States That are Considering Performance-Based Incentive Plans

State-level decision makers should realize that although merit pay and career ladders can be mandated, the ideal level for implementation is at the local-district level. When the state exerts control, it adopts a compliance model of implementation in which a complex set of procedures are superimposed and only passive compliance is made in most districts. A better strategy is what is called the "deregulated control model" in which the program is conceived and carried out with energy by local-district administrators (Koehler, 1985).

The following are suggested procedures for states that are considering legislation for a performance-based incentive program (Frels, 1985; Koehler, 1985). The procedures are supported by research and experience. By following these guidelines, a state may be able to mitigate or avoid many of the problems experienced by states that have already adopted plans for career ladders or merit pay.

- The state should identify the problems it hopes to correct, then seek to determine if these are problems for all or only some of the school districts in the state. If the problems are evident in some districts and not in others, the state should try to determine why some districts do *not* have the problem.
- Once the problems are identified, the state can study what type of incentive program is likely to address the problems.
- If career-ladder or merit-pay programs appear promising, a limited number of pilot projects should be set up. The pilots will provide information on the costs, the best assessment procedures, the unintended effects, and so forth.
- States should not take all the control away from the local districts -- district flexibility must be maintained in order to meet local needs.
- The legislature should restrict itself to making policy -- procedures should be developed by the State Board of Education, the SEA, or the local districts.
- The incentive system should be based on what experience shows is most likely to work.

- Develop the assessment policy in advance of implementation. There should be more than one form for the entire state -- one that can be amended by districts.

- Statewide systems should be funded by the state -- local districts should not be expected to provide for shortfalls in state funding.

- The state should provide staff-development programs.

- Above all, the state must get commitment from the leading actors. When a state continues without this commitment from educational leaders, the results will be a paper exercise or legal actions, or both.

Questions for Planners and Implementors

The following are questions for those who are developing a performance-based incentive system. They are reminders of some of the more critical points that experience suggests should be considered (adapted from Edelfelt, 1985).

1) Has the research and literature on such plans been reviewed?

2) Is the incentive plan consistent with other school goals?

3) Is the financial support adequate and stable enough to sustain the program?

4) Have all the stakeholders been involved in the development? Is there sufficient ownership of the plan?

5) Are there too many simultaneous changes? Is there an orderly progression to change so that the participants will feel comfortable and secure?

6) Has the program been pilot tested?

7) Have the people involved received adequate training or preparation to carry out the planned change?

8) Is supervision, support, and guidance available to assist those making the changes?

9) Are the incentives and rewards adequate?

10) Have all those who will be affected by the program been involved in developing the assessment system?

11) Is there a system of communication that keeps everyone informed -- teachers, administrators, school board members, parents, students, and the community?

12) Is professional growth and learning given a prominent place in the plan?

13) Has the plan been examined for its legal implications?

14) Has sufficient time been allowed to develop the plan, train personnel, field-test the assessment system, implement the plan on a pilot basis, revise, institutionalize, and evaluate the effects of the plan?

15) Is there a mechanism to document and evaluate the effects of the plan and to revise or modify as indicated?

SECTION V
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Examples of Long-Lasting Incentive Plans

Those incentive plans that have survived have used strategies that consist of varying combinations of four themes: allocating extra pay for extra work, making everyone feel special, making the program inconspicuous, and legitimizing the program by having everyone participate in its design (IFG Policy Notes, 1985c). Most observers agree that merit pay works best in school systems where (1) the amount of money offered provides a real incentive to improve performance, (2) all teachers in the system are evaluated on the basis of agreed-upon criteria, and (3) evaluation is conducted with fairness (Cramer, 1983).

Dalton, Georgia. The Dalton, GA, school district has had a merit-pay plan in operation for more than 20 years. Each teacher is placed on the state pay grid depending on level of education and years of experience. Each of these levels has locally developed, specific performance criteria for measuring merit, and these criteria become more challenging as teachers' levels of education and experience increase. Over the years, teachers in Dalton have had a major voice in determining the performance criteria.

All evaluations are conducted by the teachers' principals and reviewed by the superintendent. All of the system's administrators are required to attend training on performance evaluation and be certified by the state as evaluators.

A unique aspect of the Dalton program is that the merit-pay decisions can be appealed by teachers. These teachers meet with the superintendent and principal and work out a plan. They are re-evaluated in December of the next year. If the teacher meets the agreed upon goals -- and almost all the teachers do -- their merit pay raise is retroactively worked into their salary schedule. The major strength of the Dalton program, according to Assistant Superintendent Frank Thomason, is that all teachers who are performing up to expectations receive merit awards -- a crucial condition that unsuccessful merit pay programs often lack (Cramer, 1983).

Ladue, Missouri. Merit pay has worked in the Ladue, MO, school district for more than 30 years. In Ladue, teachers are awarded points based on performance. Ladue teachers who are in the higher-pay grades are expected to perform at a higher level to meet their goals. Superintendent Charles McKenna says the program has provided stability in the professional staff. One of the biggest problems in most school systems is that the very bright teachers get stale after a few years and leave for other professions. A merit plan gives teachers a chance to shoot for higher goals and to be rewarded for their performance (Cramer, 1983).

Examples of Newly-Implemented Incentive Plans

Arizona Pilot Career-Ladder Program

Background

In 1984 the Arizona Legislature provided funding for 16 school districts to develop career-ladder plans. In 1985 S.B. 1336 was passed to allow the implementation of some or all of these plans.

The program currently consists of nine school districts that are implementing career-ladder plans after receiving approval for funding by the Joint Legislative Committee on Career Ladders. All of the districts in the pilot project will be placing teachers on the career ladder for the 1986-87 school year, although some are implementing only part of their full ladder in the first year.

The Legislature believed that a pilot project with a few districts was needed before a decision could be made about legislation encouraging the implementation of career-ladder programs statewide. By funding a few districts to implement career-ladder programs and studying the success of those programs, the Legislature will be better able to make decisions about possible statewide career-ladder legislation, and the programs developed by the pilot districts could serve as models for other districts who wished to develop career-ladder programs.

Summary of Provisions

The bill established a five-year pilot project in which selected school districts would receive funding to implement career-ladder programs.

1. Eligibility

   A school district was eligible to apply for career-ladder funding if it received a grant to develop a career-ladder plan or if it had submitted a career-ladder plan to the Legislature by November 15, 1984.

2. Selection Process

   School districts receiving funding were selected by a joint legislative committee.

3. Requirements for the Career-Ladder Plan

   To receive funding to implement a career-ladder program, a district's plan had to include the following:

   a. Evidence that the plan was developed in consultation with the district's teachers.

   b. An explanation of how the plan would improve student academic achievement.

c. A career ladder that provides opportunities to teachers for continued professional advancement based primarily on teaching skills and in which each higher level requires either advanced skills or advanced skills and additional responsibilities.

d. The criteria for each level in the career ladder.

e. Evaluation procedures that included at least the following:

  1) More than one measure of teacher performance, including performance in relation to student academic progress.

  2) An explanation of the procedures used to determine that the measures of teacher performance were fair and objective.

  3) Opportunities for improvement of teacher performance.

f. A compensation system that is based on a completely restructured salary schedule in which a salary range is set for each level on the career ladder and the salary for a teacher within the range is based on objective performance evaluation or other objective factors.

g. Evidence of the extent of support for the plan by the teachers in the school district.

4. Funding Amount

The selected districts will receive an increase in their base level to implement their program as follows:

a) For fiscal year 1985-86 (a year for training and evaluation), 0.5%.

b) For fiscal year 1986-87, 2.5%

c) For fiscal year 1987-88, 3.7%

d) For fiscal year 1988-89 and 1989-90, 5.0%.

(In 1985-86 dollars, these amounts are approximately equivalent to $10, $50, $75, and $100 per weighted student count, respectively.)

5. Evaluation of Career-Ladder Programs

The Center of Excellence in Education at Northern Arizona University will conduct a study of the career-ladder programs implemented by the districts selected and will submit a report on the success of the programs to the joint legislative committee by October 1, 1989. The committee will review the report to determine whether the districts should continue to receive funding for career ladders and whether the opportunity to receive such funding should be extended to all school districts in the state.

Guidelines for a Successful Proposal

The following guidelines were developed by the Joint Legislative Committee on Career Ladders as a result of the Committee's discussions of, and decisions regarding, the career-ladder plans submitted to the committee in June, 1985.

1. Design or Basic Concept of the Ladder

   The vertical structure of the ladder should be emphasized. Additional responsibilities should be different for the different levels, with the highest level responsibilities available to those at the highest level of the ladder.

2. Criteria for Advancement

   a. The criteria for advancement will not be considered challenging enough if the system fails to discriminate between acceptable performance and exemplary performance. The level of performance on the district's evaluation instrument required for advancement should be higher than the level of performance required to avoid receiving a notice of inadequacy of performance.

   b. The criteria for advancement must include some actual measure of student progress.

   c. The Committee has consistently asked districts to remove education (in the form of degrees or a certain number of credits) as a criteria for advancement.

3. Downward Movement

   Downward movement should be possible, even if it is considered unlikely. If the criteria for advancement are higher than the criteria for minimally acceptable performance, then there ought to be a provision for the person who no longer performs at the higher level, but still meets minimum standards.

4. Compensation System

   The purpose of the restructured salary system is to avoid basing compensation on experience and education.

5. Transition

   Current teachers must be placed on the career ladder based on performance, not current salary. Teachers who are earning a salary higher than the range for the appropriate level should continue to receive the same salary until they advance to a higher level or until the range for their level is raised higher than their salary.

6. Evidence of Teacher Support

   The preferred evidence of teacher support is the response of the district's teachers as a whole to the version of the plan that is being submitted. All teachers should have been informed about the program and been given the opportunity to respond anonymously, preferably by ballot or questionnaire.

In order to be approved, the plan was required to have sufficient detail so that it could be judged against the requirements. Sufficient detail was also required to assure the Committee that the District would be ready to implement the program in 1986-87. It was not enough to say that a given level would have additional responsibilities; those responsibilities were to be listed. It was not enough to say that there would be measures of student academic progress; the measures were to be identified. The 1985-86 school year was to be used for preparation for implementation, such as training, evaluation, and the refining of details.

Source:

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Florida Master-Teacher Program

> Tallahassee, FL, June 9, 1986 (ED-LINE) -- *The Florida legislature adjourned its 1986 session Saturday after approving a $16.3-billion budget that included $62 million in new school property taxes, a new teacher certification bill, and a "career ladder" plan. The new career-ladder plan was pushed during the last weeks of the session by a coalition of business leaders, teachers' unions, and educators. Beginning in 1987, it will replace the much-criticized "master teacher" program, and commits next year's legislature to spending at least $90 million for pay raises. The state will pay a token $500 bonus during 1986-87 for those teachers who were awarded "associate master teacher" status under the former program, which was legislatively discontinued.*

It comes as no surprise that Florida has passed legislation to replace the state's master-teacher program with a "career-ladder", considering the severe criticism that had been leveled at the program. The following review of the history of the master-teacher program illustrates the difficulties encountered by the program from its inception.

The Florida legislature passed the final version of a master-teacher program in June of 1984, with rewards and recognitions scheduled to be given to successful candidates by June of 1985. The state had seven months to develop 15 subject-area tests to assess the knowledge of prospective master teachers. Recent evaluations have questioned the reliability and validity of some of those exams. A Tallahassee-based consulting firm that recently evaluated the program reported that only 36% of the teachers surveyed agreed that the performance evaluation was appropriate for assessing classroom performance in most instructional methods and settings used by the teachers.

The Florida Master-Teacher Program, which in reality was a "merit-pay" program, was established to identify 6,000 of the state's top teachers and reward them with $3,000 stipends. To be eligible, teachers had to score above 75% on two performance measures: classroom observations conducted by their principals and written subject-area tests. There were 35,000 applicants in 1984; 24,000 performance evaluations were performed. The state trained and certified 9,000 evaluators -- many of them teachers.

The state set aside a pool of money and specified that only a fixed percentage of teachers could qualify for a reward. Nevertheless, instead of 6,000 awards, only 3,200 teachers received awards. There were 15,000 new applicants in 1985 while the state had funds to award no more than a small percentage of them.

There have been two court challenges. The evaluation process was the chief culprit. Evaluators used low-inference observation instruments to assess teachers' classroom performances. The evaluation forms were scored at the State Department of Education. The result was that many teachers who had been deemed superior by their colleagues, their principals, and their students' parents, did not make it. But even before the test results were reported, demoralized teachers -- and perplexed principals who believed they had given their teachers good evaluations -- began besieging the Florida legislature for changes in the selection process.

A report for the Florida Senate and House Education Appropriations Subcommittees prepared in conjunction with the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 1986) on the implementation of the Master-Teacher Program found the following:

Overall Impact

The Master-Teacher Program received an overwhelmingly negative reception by superintendents, administrators, and teachers. Of the 58 districts responding to the legislative survey, 96.6% said that the program should not be continued as it was structured. Thirty-eight of the school districts identified the major impact of the Master-Teacher program to be "low morale of teachers."

The Master-Teacher Program was designed to reward the best teachers in Florida. In each district visited, numerous examples were given of outstanding teachers who were not selected. These included Florida's Teacher of the Year; the three-time winner of Broward County's Teacher-of-the-Year award; and a kindergarten teacher with twenty years' experience in the classroom who served as mentor for two teachers who were selected as Master Teachers.

The Performance Evaluation

The instrument for all school districts except Dade County was the Florida Performance Measurement System (FPMS). Teachers and administrators in Dade County generally accepted the use of the TADS instrument which was jointly developed by teachers and administrators. In contrast, the use of the FPMS in the Master-Teacher program was the subject of frequent criticism by administrators and teachers. Problems with the performance evaluation fell into four main categories: the appropriateness of the instrument for identifying master teachers, the administration of the instrument, the scoring of the instrument and the amount of time involved in administering the instrument.

Appropriateness of FPMS for identifying Master Teachers. The FPMS was developed for use with beginning teachers, and most administrators said they found the instrument useful for that purpose. However, the vast majority indicated that they did not believe it was appropriate for identifying superior teachers in the Master-Teacher program. Several administrators pointed out that the instrument was directed more toward assessing elementary teaching and was less appropriate, for example, for teachers of high-school chemistry labs, foreign languages, or highly individualized alternative education programs.

Administration of the FPMS. Of the districts responding to the survey, sixty-seven percent said there was no district procedure for awarding additional points. Some principals awarded no extra points, while others allowed teachers to prepare their own additional point forms. This inconsistency in awarding additional points gave some teachers considerable advantage over others. Some teachers were told the exact time at which they would be observed and others were not told when the observation would occur. Some candidates for the Master-Teacher program were trained as observers for the performance evaluation, and this gave them an advantage as candidates. For example, in one school eleven candidates applied for the program; of these, the five who were trained as observers were the only ones who were designated as Master Teachers.

Scoring of the FPMS. Scoring of the performance measurement instrument was the most significant problem. School personnel in the districts complained that they did not know how the instrument was scored. Principals frequently reported that they were surprised by the disparity between how they thought they evaluated a teacher and the score the teacher received. When teachers received scores, they did not receive an explanation of their scores.

Amount of time involved in administering the FPMS. Another significant problem cited by district administrators was the amount of time consumed by principals and teachers in training sessions and conducting evaluations. The time involved in evaluation was excessive, especially when results could not be used to improve teacher performance.

Reliability and validity of subject-area tests. The study reported that six of the fifteen tests developed for the Master-Teacher program could not be considered reliable.

Content of subject-area tests. In a review of subject-area tests it became evident that on a number of tests there was considerable focus on pedagogical facts and theories. Special education teachers reported that their test was more related to college courses where historical dates and theoretical material was more highly valued than classroom experience. Many teachers viewed the tests as detrimental to experienced teachers because more recent graduates could recall this material more readily. During field interviews, teachers frequently reported that in a number of subject areas, tests were broader and more expansive than the subject the teacher was teaching.

Subject-area test administration. The assignment to test sites was reported as being unfair. Some candidates were assigned to sites where the equipment need for the test was either not available or not functioning.

Implementation Concerns

A fundamental difficulty with the implementation of the Master-Teacher program was the very short time-frame allowed for such a major undertaking. Districts were asked to implement a program that had not been piloted, and procedures were not worked out in advance. The Department was given the major task of trying to develop and implement procedures simultaneously.

Superintendents, district administrators, and teachers frequently reported that communications from the Department of Education were inadequate and, at times, confusing. The respondents' overall perception of the Master-Teacher program was that it was conceptually flawed in several ways. They pointed out that while the program was designed to be a means for improving education, there was no strategy for improvement. The absence of specific feedback to teachers regarding their performance and knowledge of subject matter prohibited the process from providing an opportunity for improvement.

Another frequently reported conceptual problem was that the program violated the managerial principle of teamwork that should be supported in the schools. Teachers were quick to point out that this competition "destroys information channels. Teachers are already too isolated from their peers." The intense competition among teachers which resulted from implementing the Master-Teacher program guaranteed that a large proportion of teachers would be losers, and that they were, by implication, inferior teachers. This perception, more than anything else, accounted for the low teacher morale reported by so many districts.

Teachers often cited the narrow focus of the performance evaluation as a conceptual problem. The designation of a Master Teacher without assignment of further responsibility did not permit the school or the public to derive further benefit from the teacher's skill. Finally, as a number of administrators pointed out, the Master-Teacher program did nothing to weed out bad teachers. The attention and focus on good teachers demoralized those who did not make it into the top four percent. Very little time and energy was focused on assisting or removing poor teachers.

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Maine Teacher Certification Pilot Project

Maine's 1984 teacher certification law evolved from a report prepared at the request of the State Board of Education. The legislation:

1) provided an opportunity for the development of local career-ladder programs;

2) gave local school teachers a larger participatory role in the certification process;

3) mandated the establishment of "support systems" for providing assistance in professional development for beginning teachers and experienced teachers, and for recommending teachers for "Temporary Master-Teacher Certification";

4) required "teacher action plans" to establish professional growth objectives for all candidates seeking professional and masters level certification;

5) provided for provisional, professional, and masters levels of certification;

6) established pilot projects through 1987 that are designed to test all the components of the law, develop processes and procedures for staff development, generate a variety of program models, and provide recommendations to the legislature in 1988.

Twenty sites are piloting certification/career-ladder projects -- 13 are receiving state funds.

The provisional certificate is the initial, non-renewable certificate issued for two years to beginning teachers. The provisional teacher has a "support system" team assigned to assist the teacher in planning a "teacher action plan" (TAP) for professional growth to develop the competencies needed to become a professional-level teacher. A provisional teacher who meets the established criteria may be issued a professional certificate.

Professional certificates are issued for a five-year period and are renewable. Teachers with two years teaching experience and who hold five- or ten-year teaching certificates are eligible to apply for the "temporary master-teacher certification". In order to obtain temporary master-teacher certification, a teacher must demonstrate exemplary professional skills in the classroom and knowledge of subject matter as defined by the piloting site.

Each candidate must also be recommended by a school "support system". The support-system team observes the teacher's classroom performance and helps the teacher develop a "teacher action plan" for professional growth. An appropriate staff development program is outlined to correct deficiencies or to help the teacher acquire the skills and knowledge necessary for recommendation for master-teacher certification. A positive recommendation from the support system is necessary for a candidate to be considered for temporary master-teacher certification. The recommendation is included in a written report from the support system to the Maine Commissioner of Education.

The legislation requires that the pilot school develop the process and procedures for establishing the "support systems." A support system must include a majority of classroom teachers, but administrators and persons outside the school or district may be included on the support-system team. The plan for appointing the support system must be approved by the Commissioner of Education.

The teacher action plan describes the basis on which the support system's recommendations are made. The plan must include a description of the candidate's teaching and professional skills and subject-matter knowledge at the start of the review period, and the identification and description of the skills, knowledge, or experiences that must be developed, improved, and/or achieved in order for the candidate to receive a positive recommendation.

Implications of the Legislation

The legislation creating the Maine Master-Teacher Certification Pilot Project has set the stage for substantial changes in the management of the schools and the conditions under which teachers work. The support systems (with teachers having majority representation) required for beginning teachers and for those teachers applying for advanced career status will reduce teacher isolation and teachers' reliance on their own experience and initiative to improve their classroom performances.

The requirement for the development of "teacher action plans" to provide professional growth shifts the focus of evaluation to improving skills rather than just cataloguing competencies. Those teachers serving on the support-system team will benefit as much as those being observed and assisted.

One Maine administrator indicated that the districts anticipate a changing role for administrators and teachers. The fact that evaluations are to be carried out by the support-system teams and that recommendations for advanced certification are made by the support system, indicates that teachers will become a part of the decision-making process in personnel matters. A developing cadre of career-level teachers also suggests that teachers' expertise will be used in other decision-making capacities.

Source:

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North Carolina Career Development Plan for Teachers

Levels

The plan includes five levels of differentiation: initial status, provisional status, career status I, career status II and career status III. Each level requires demonstrated competence in specific areas before advancement can occur. Furthermore, teachers in career status levels are expected to assume leadership roles and engage in additional duties and responsibilities.

Initial status is assigned to beginning teachers during their first and second years of employment. The teachers hold a non-renewable, two-year initial certificate, are employed under a non-continuing contract, and are paid according to the State base-salary schedule. They are expected to demonstrate progressive improvement of teaching skills as evidenced by "at standard" evaluations on performance criteria and to demonstrate continued professional growth as evidenced by the completion of a professional improvement program. Teachers who fulfill these requirements qualify for a renewable continuing certificate that makes them fully certified. This continuing certificate must be renewed every five years.

Provisional status is assigned during the third year of employment to teachers who have become fully certified by receiving the renewable Continuing Certificate. The teachers are paid on the State base-salary schedule and are expected to complete at least 30 hours of effective teacher training designed by the State Board. A one-time stipend of $500 is awarded to those teachers who successfully complete the training.

Career status I is assigned to teachers who are reemployed by the Local Board of Education for a fourth year and who have been recommended for promotion to that level. The teachers receive a salary of one step over the State base salary that otherwise would have applied. All teachers must reach this level in order to continue employment in the position.

Movement to career status II is optional and teachers must initiate application for consideration. Teachers may apply anytime after their second year in career status I. The teachers may be recommended for career status II if during the year in which they apply their evaluations are "well above standard" or "superior" as defined in the Performance Appraisal System. If the teachers do not maintain the required performance level once career status II is granted, the principal will recommend that the teachers be reclassified to career status I again. In career status II, teachers receive a salary of two steps over the base salary that would otherwise have applied.

Process for Advancement

The training and evaluation process through which each teacher moves from one step to another has two balanced parts. One part involves the use of a monitor/support team and a professional development plan. The other part involves observations/evaluations of teacher performance.

Professional Development Component

A mentor and/or support team is assigned to each teacher during the initial status level for assistance and professional development. The team helps the teacher develop a professional growth plan which outlines the teacher's short- and long-range professional goals, indicates the expected activities to undertake in order to accomplish those goals, and establishes time lines and measures to assess completion. A professional career portfolio is used as repository of the plan.

After the five-year continuing certificate is granted, it is the responsibility of the teachers to engage in a program of renewal activities so that a minimum of 15 renewal credits are accumulated in each five-year period. In order for these credits to be accepted for renewal of the certificate, they must be relevant and applicable to the teacher's major job responsibilities. To assure that this occurs, each teacher must create a professional development plan that specifies the short- and long-range goals to be accomplished, the specific objectives, and the evaluation strategies which will be utilized to assure their accomplishment.

Observation/Evaluation Component

Observations/evaluations are conducted at all the levels. During the initial status and provisional status levels, teachers are observed at least twice a year by the principal or the principal's designee and at least twice a year by a trained evaluator. While in career status I, teachers are formally observed at least once a year by the principal or the principal's designee and may also be observed by a trained evaluator if the principal deems appropriate and if a trained evaluator is available. When the teachers apply for career status II, they are observed during that year at least twice by a trained evaluator. If career status II is granted, teachers are formally observed at least once during the first year by the principal or the principal's designee. Subsequently, they are formally observed once every two years by the principal or the principal's designee and may be evaluated more frequently, at the discretion of the principal. Career status II teachers whose evaluations indicate that the teachers are not maintaining "well above standard" or "superior" performance will be formally observed at least twice by the principal or the principal's designee and at least twice by a trained evaluator during the next year.

Source:North Carolina Career Development Plan: Guide for Pilot/Field Implementation, 1985-1986. North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, Personnel Services Area, Raleigh, NC 27611.

North Carolina: The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Career Development Program

This program was first implemented in 1984 after a four-year planning process which began in 1980. The heart of the program is staff development. All new teachers engage in training and practice over a four-to-six year period divided into four steps: provisional teacher, career nominee, career candidate, and career level teacher. Each step requires demonstrated performance of specific competencies or expectations before advancement can occur. Also, as teachers move from one step to the next they must be willing to assume added responsibilities.

Provisional teachers concentrate on classroom instruction and participate in training programs designed for novice teachers. They are carefully supervised in those teaching activities that research has shown most likely to produce learning in students. Career nominees continue to perform the functions of the provisional teachers but also participate on task or study committees within the school. They study the philosophical and theoretical bases on which effective teaching practices are based in order to become informed decision makers concerning teaching strategies. Career candidates engage in the development of professional skills beyond the classroom. They become involved in school or system-wide activities, curriculum development, action research activities, and the like. Career-level teachers assume leadership in areas such as serving as mentors for beginning teachers and participating in program evaluation, staff development, diagnosis, and remediation of instructional problems, development of curriculum materials, and the design and implementation of action oriented classroom research.

The career-level teacher step consists of three levels. The system's primary professional position is career level I. Teachers are awarded tenure at the end of their fourth, fifth, or sixth year when they achieve level I. They may choose not to go beyond this level even though the administration may be willing to advance them.

The training and evaluation process through which each teacher moves from one step to another has two balanced parts. The first involves the use of an assessment-advisory team and an action-growth plan. The second part involves independent observations of teachers' performance by peer observers called observer/evaluators.

In the Charlotte-Mecklenburg program, new teachers are evaluated to affirm that they possess the competencies (knowledge and skills) assumed to be necessary to meet expectations the system holds for experienced teachers. Once the necessary competencies are deemed present, the focus shifts to the expectations.

Each new teacher has an assigned advisory/assessment team composed of the building principal, the assistant principal for instruction, and a teacher mentor. The first task of the advisory/assessment team is to review with the new teacher the competencies expected at the end of the two year provisional teacher training period. The team's role is to help the teacher achieve those competencies through direct observation and feedback and the use of an action-growth plan that focuses on the performance standards to be reviewed later by the observer/evaluators. The action-growth plan concentrates on skills necessary for successful classroom performance, such as management of instructional time and student behavior, instructional presentation, instructional monitoring and feedback, and effective communication skills. As the teacher demonstrates mastery of these skills, the plan begins to focus on areas beyond immediate classroom performance, such as the design of tests.

For the career candidate, the action-growth plan takes on added importance. At this point, the action-growth plan, rather than requiring that the individual undertake training to develop particular competencies, emphasizes the attainment of performance goals or expectations. With the advisory/assessment team, the teacher defines goals, identifies activities, and lists evidence that can be expected along an appropriate timeline. Combined with observer/evaluator reports and ratings, the action-growth plan provides most of the documentation used to determine whether the teacher should advance to career level I.

For the career-level teacher, the action-growth plan focuses on the attainment of performance goals or expectations rather than on competencies. Career-level-I teachers are expected to produce convincing evidence that they are meeting classroom performance expectations and at least some evidence of meeting performance expectations that concern work-related activity outside the classroom (e.g. identifying and resolving school problems, serving as mentor) as well as those that bear on enhancing the state of the art (e.g. engaging in action-oriented research). Career-level-II teachers are expected to produce convincing evidence that they are meeting classroom and "outside the classroom" performance expectations and at least some evidence that they are meeting performance expectations that bear on enhancing the state of the art. Career-level-III teachers are expected to produce convincing evidence in all these areas. The advisory/assessment teams, chosen by the career level teachers in consultation with the principal, provide the teachers with a source of direction and support as they develop the action-growth plans. The teams also assess the observation reports, summarize the data at the appropriate time, and recommend advancing the teacher's career level or salary.

Lessons Learned

o The Charlotte-Mecklenburg experience shows that the establishment of a "hotline" to answer questions and to squelch rumors is an important step in establishing a successful program.

o They found it was possible to reduce the number of post-observation conferences "required." However, a teacher can request additional post-conferences.

o It turned out that whether or not an observation was announced or unannounced did not make a great deal of difference. Previously, out of nine visits, six were announced and three unannounced. There are fewer announced visits and more unannounced visits now.

o There are 30 hours of inservice required each year. The district pays the tuition to the University of North Carolina for required courses.

o The evaluation system was changed for teachers of the Behaviorally Disturbed classes. The district found that those teachers could not be fairly evaluated with the instrument used for regular classroom teachers.

o Using a computerized evaluation form cuts down on paper work.

- Monitoring the program and keeping track of evaluations is a necessity.

- A child-care program was added to the staff-development program to make it easier for teachers with young children.

- They found that the greatest weakness in the teaching profession was teachers' inability to accept an honest evaluation of their classroom performance.

- The link with higher education was weak at the beginning. Universities were more critical than helpful. They wanted to provide the "same old thing" in terms of staff development or courses for teachers.

- No quotas have been placed on career level I. There are quotas on career level II and III because the system will not need as many at those levels for the duties assigned. Summer work will be a requirement of level II and III teachers.

- The system sponsors a scholarship program that will provide a $5,000 per year scholarship to students in the top 25% of their class if they teach 5 years in the system.

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South Carolina Teacher Incentive Program

The program includes three incentive models which were developed by the State Department of Education. These are the following: (1) Bonus Model, (2) Career-Ladder Model, and (3) Campus/Individual Model.

Bonus Model

Teachers wishing to be considered for this program model must submit application materials at the beginning of the school year. All candidates must fulfill the following conditions:

1. be full-time classroom teachers who have attained continuing contract status;

2. express the intent to miss no more than five workdays (out of the 190-day contract year); and

3. request a performance evaluation to be conducted during the year. (The evaluation is conducted with a district instrument which meets the criteria established by the State Board of Education for instruments used to evaluate annual and continuing contract teachers. Successful completion of this requirement must be validated at the end of the school year.)

Following the verification of eligibility requirements, all approved candidates must follow procedures developed by the Bonus Incentive Committee to create a plan of incentive-related activities for the year designed to qualify the individual for an award. This plan must contain three components: (1) self-improvement, (2) extended service, and (3) student achievement.

Self-Improvement Component. Candidates are required to select options for the year from a list of approved self-improvement activities that directly relate to the enhancement of teaching effectiveness. Depending on the number and nature of alternatives chosen, from 20 to 25 points can be earned towards a composite total of 100 points.

Extended-Service Component. Candidates are required to select a number of options for the year from a list of approved extended-service activities. Value is assigned to supplemental services that promote cooperation among colleagues and the collective good of the school or district. Depending on the number and nature of alternatives chosen, from 20 to 25 points can be earned towards the composite total of 100 points.

Student-Achievement Component. Candidates are required to develop a portfolio of materials that demonstrates superior student achievement during the year. This portfolio is to include teacher-assembled, achievement-related measures that document student growth. Methods that may be used to identify achievement gains are suggested.

Depending on teacher preference, from 50 to 60 points may be assigned toward the composite total of 100 points. When assessing this area, the Bonus Incentive Committee or its representatives will assume that candidates assigning 60 points to the student achievement component plan a stronger emphasis on demonstrating student achievement while a 50 point designation would reflect a more moderate emphasis. However, as the point range indicates, the teacher portfolio must represent at least one half of the consideration applied during incentive award decisions.

Award Process. Awards are given to those teachers who meet the requirements of the plan components, earning the required composite total of 100 points; this is in addition to successfully fulfilling the attendance and evaluation requirements. A stipend range of $2,000 to $3,000 is recommended. Districts are expected to supplement monetary awards with recognition programs.

Career-Ladder Model

The career-ladder model uses similar qualification criteria as the bonus model. However, it provides for three career levels, with supplements ranging from $1,000 to $3,000.

At the first level on the career ladder, teachers are expected to: (1) be full-time classroom teachers who have attained continuing contract status, (2) miss no more than six workdays (out of 190-day contract year), and (3) be evaluated with the district instrument. At the second level on the career ladder, teachers are expected to: (1) have at least one year of successful experience at career level I and at least eighteen graduate credit hours with no less than six of those hours in the area of certification (or comparable units of staff development), (2) miss no more than five workdays (out of 190-day contract year), and (3) be evaluated with the district instrument. At the third level on the career ladder, teachers are expected to: (1) have at least two years of successful experience at career level II, (2) miss no more than four workdays (out of 190-day contract year), and (3) be evaluated with the district instrument.

As in the case of the Bonus Model, teachers are expected to meet certain requirements for each of three plan components: (1) self-improvement, (2) extended service, and (3) student achievement.

Self-Improvement Component. Candidates are encouraged to participate in self-improvement activities which directly relate to the enhancement of teaching effectiveness. Career-level-I participants must attain at least four points from a list of enrichment activities. Compensated activities are optional at the discretion of the district. Career-level-II participants must attain at least six points from the list of enrichment activities. Career-level-III participants must attain at least seven points from the list of enrichment activities.

Extended-Service Component. Candidates are encouraged to provide supplemental services which promote cooperation among colleagues and the collective good of the school or district. Career-level-I participants must attain at least six points from a list of leadership activities. Compensated activities are optional at the discretion of the district. Career-level-II participants must attain at least eight points from the list of leadership activities. Career-level-III participants must attain at least nine points from the list of leadership activities.

Student-Achievement Component. Participants in all three levels are required to develop a portfolio of materials which demonstrates student achievement during the year. This portfolio is to include teacher-assembled, achievement-related measures which document student growth.

Award Process. As in the Bonus Model, awards are given to those teachers who meet the requirements of the plan components in addition to successfully fulfilling the attendance and evaluation requirements. Career level qualifications are expected to be validated and approved annually. Career-level-I awards consist of district salary schedule plus a supplement which would range from $1,000 to $1,500, depending on the amount of available funds. Career-level-II awards consist of district salary schedule plus a supplement which would range from $1,500 to $2,500, depending on the amount of available funds. Career-level-III awards consist of district salary schedule plus a supplement which would range from $2,500 to $3,000, depending on the amount of available funds. Districts are expected to supplement monetary awards with recognition programs.

Campus/Individual Model

Two-thirds of the incentive money is to be paid to teachers qualifying under the individual plan, the other third is for the school plan. Under the individual plan, teachers qualify on criteria similar to those of the other plans. Awards under this program will not be less than $2,000. The campus plan rewards staff members (all certificate holders with the exception of administrators) in schools that show the greatest gain in student achievement. Schools that meet or exceed projected student achievement, as measured by a regression formula, will be merit schools. Districts are expected to supplement monetary awards with recognition programs.

Source: Three Program Models for the Teacher Incentive Program as Required by the Education Improvement Act of 1984. South Carolina Department of Education, Columbia, SC.

Tennessee Career Ladder Plan

The Tennessee Career Ladder Plan evolved out of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Education created by the Ninety-third General Assembly in 1983. The plan, approved by the legislature in March 1984, is a performance-based career ladder for teachers that has five tiers: Probationary, Apprentice, and Career Levels I, II, and III. There is also an administrators program for principals, assistant principals, and instructional supervisors. The program is optional for teachers who were certified and teaching prior to July 1, 1984. During its first year in operation, the 1984-85 school year, there were 600 applications for the 100 evaluator positions. Out of 41,000 teachers eligible for the career ladder, 39,000 applied.

To obtain a probationary certificate, graduates from an approved teacher-training program must receive a minimum qualifying score on the Core Battery of the National Teacher Examination. Probationary teachers are supervised by two tenured teachers from their local school and are evaluated by the school system and recommended for an apprentice certificate. The local evaluation systems are based on state guidelines and are submitted to the State Department of Education for review.

When moving to career level I, personnel from the State Department of Education review the teacher's evaluation with the teacher and the principal. If the State Department of Education staff disagree with the local evaluation, a state evaluation team conducts a full evaluation. The state evaluates all applicants for career level II, for renewal of the career-level-II certificates, and for movement to Career level III.

The state-developed evaluation system contains criteria in six major domains: prepares instruction effectively; uses teaching strategies and procedures appropriate to the content, objectives, and learners; uses evaluation to improve instruction; manages classroom activities effectively; establishes and maintains a professional leadership role; and communicates effectively.

The 1984-85 Tennessee evaluation system used multiple data sources. These included classroom observation, a portfolio created by the teacher, an interview with the teacher, a peer questionnaire, a student questionnaire, a superordinate questionnaire, and a written test. The legislation states that the peer evaluators must be career-level-III teachers or professionally qualified evaluators. Since there were no career-level-III teachers to begin with, outstanding teachers were identified and trained as evaluators for the implementation stage.

In the first year, more than 90% of the state's teachers qualified for Level I and a $1,000 raise through a one-time, "fast-track" process. This approach was intended to involve a large number of teachers in the career ladder. Unfortunately, it also caused some morale problems. When teachers looked around at the large number of career-level-I teachers and saw some were less experienced or less skilled, they decided the system was meaningless. A Tennessee Education Association survey released in January 1986 found that only 5.7% of the teachers believed the career ladder "will work effectively and fairly" -- down from 13.9% in the spring of 1985.

Changes as a result of first-year implementation. As a result of the first-year implementation experience, several changes were instituted for the 1985-86 school year. An orientation manual was developed for distribution to teachers so that they would know what the evaluation criteria were. Files and questionnaires were made available to teachers who wished to see them. The evaluation system was "opened" and the principal's questionnaire scale was less strictly quantitative and somewhat more qualitative. Efforts were made to increase the effectiveness of communications between the State Department of Education and the local school districts. Handbooks, workshops, letters mailed directly to the candidates, and information sent by electronic mail to the superintendents were all instituted.

The State Department reviewed the evaluation instrument in terms of scoring, increasing observations, rating leadership characteristics, maintaining difficulty as the career level increased, and assuring fairness. A dialogue between the teacher and the evaluator replaced the portfolio/interview format. The dialogue format consists of a 30-minute session of structured questions to get at *why* the teacher is doing what he or she is doing in the classroom, and an unstructured 30-minute session in which the teacher shares information with the evaluator. The Tennessee Legislature is being asked to consider eliminating the requirement for peer evaluators at career level I and below (Education Week, March 12, 1986).

Problems with the principal's questionnaire were uncovered. The mean of the principals' ratings of teachers on a 5-point scale was 4.8. Principals are now being asked to rate teachers according to where the teachers' performances would place them on the career ladder -- at level I, II, III-, III, or III +. There will be a possible 800 point-total. Teachers will need to score 700 to be promoted to career level III, 600 to be named to career level II.

Issues under consideration. Several other issues are under consideration:

1) Determining how to evaluate and reward several of the groups that the legislation included in the program -- psychologists, social workers, special education teachers, librarians, etc.

2) Postponing changes for one year.

3) How to handle extended contracts -- 10 month, 11 month, 12 month contracts: What types of activities are appropriate?

4) Tennessee is examining reducing the time it takes to move up the career ladder. Presently, it takes nine years of experience to apply for career level II and fourteen years for career level III.

5) The system is not consistent for administrators. There are only two levels for administrators -- Career levels II and III. If an administrator doesn't make level II he or she is no longer an administrator.

6) What to do about "cross-overs" -- what happens to a teacher's level when he or she becomes an administrator?

7) The need for an appeal system. There were 600 appeals over the first year's implementation process. The consistency of evaluators and the evaluations was the area of greatest complaint. In addition, those who are reviewing appeals need to know the law.

The Tennessee experience underscores the importance of training evaluators; providing a handbook for the evaluators; keeping good records on evaluator reliability and re-training to correct any "drift." Funding and paper-work are major problems, and Tennessee's experience with "fast-tracking" -- selecting and moving teachers into the career levels rapidly -- suggests that this is not a wise procedure. If a poor teacher makes it onto the "fast track," it reduces the credibility of the system.

Starting in the fall of 1986, the law requires that teachers be scored on student achievement. This problem has not been resolved, but test scores are not necessarily the criterion that will be used. Other methods of evaluating student achievement are being examined.

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Texas Career Ladder

Implementation of The Career Ladder Established by House Bill 72

House Bill 72 was developed and passed by the Texas legislature in special session between June 4 and July 3, 1984. The process of bargaining and compromise over specific provisions of the bill was hurried and complex. The bill that emerged represents the accommodation of many demands -- to equalize funding, to improve the quality of teaching, to increase teachers' salaries, and to appease those groups threatened by reform.

H.B. 72 was a highly centralized "top-down" reform. It was directed by the state's political leadership and those influential members of the Select Committee on Public Education. The changes in Texas took place with relatively little consultation with local educators and almost no participation by parents and other interested citizens, outside of a separate series of highly publicized hearings in 1983 conducted by the Select Committee on Public Education chaired by Ross Perot.

H.B. 72 established a career ladder for teachers that consists of four levels. All teachers and administrators who have completed a probationary year start at level I. Progression up the ladder to levels II, III, and IV is based on criteria that include classroom performance, degrees achieved, professional development courses, and years of experience. The legislation does not require job differentiation at the various career levels, nor does it suggest district development of such job differentiation. Lacking such a provision, the Texas "career ladder" could more properly be described as a "merit pay" program.

For its first year of implementation, the bill provided up to $2,000 as a salary supplement for a proportion of teachers selected on the basis of merit within each district. If state funding was insufficient, the districts could reduce supplements to $1,500 in order to promote a greater proportion of the teachers in the district or could add local funds in order to promote additional personnel.

The Performance Appraisal Requirements

The most controversial requirements in implementing the career ladder in 1984-85 were those related to performance assessment. The bill called for a process to evaluate the performance of teachers and administrators on a five-point scale -- unsatisfactory, below expectations, satisfactory, exceeding expectations, and clearly outstanding. However, since no state assessment instruments had been developed for the 1984-85 school year, many of the decisions about promotion on the career ladder to level II were made based on the criteria previously established by a district or based on evaluation processes newly developed by a district. The districts received few guidelines and little advice from the state and, therefore, had considerable freedom in regard to the methods used to evaluate the teachers. As a result, the criteria used to determine promotion to level II of the ladder varied considerably from district to district.

Development of the Performance Assessment Instrument

The performance-evaluation instrument to be used to assess teachers' classroom performance was developed by the Texas Education Agency and was pilot tested in six Texas school districts during the first part of the 1985-86 school year. Five domains were included in the pilot instrument: Instructional Strategies, Classroom Management and Organization, Presentation of Subject Matter, Learning Environment, and Professional Characteristics. The law calls for a minimum of two evaluators -- one the principal or supervisor and one approved by the board of trustees.

Reports from the pilot sites indicated that the appraisal instrument did not differentiate between superior and inferior teaching performance. The instrument called for judgment by the evaluators on each of the indicators as to whether or not the observed behavior was present and met or exceeded the stated expectations. There was no attempt to rate the behavior on a scale.

Reactions From Professional Education Associations

As might be expected, proposals for modifying the processes and proposals concerning the state-developed performance assessment were presented to both the State Board of Education and the Texas Education Agency. Among the groups that submitted their views was a coalition of the Texas Association of School Administrators, Texas Association of School Boards, Texas Association of Community Schools, Texas Association of Suburban Schools, and the Texas Association of School Personnel Administrators.

The coalition's recommendations included proposals to weight the teacher performance appraisals so that the building principal's appraisal carried at least a 60% weight and the second appraiser's no more than 40%. In addition, they recommended that data accumulated by the principal or supervisor (not just the classroom observation data) should be available for use in the appraisal process.

The coalition recommended that the appraisal instrument be revised to include ratings for how well the teacher performs the observable classroom behaviors, rather than just document their presence or absence. Also, because the assessment of the total performance of the teacher's job assignment and professional role is appropriate for placement on the career ladder, the "professional characteristics" domain should remain on the appraisal.

Several suggestions were made for reducing the complexity of the appraisal process and the amount of time involved. The pre-observation conference should be changed to an orientation meeting held by the principal for all teachers under his or her supervision with teachers given the option to request an individual or small group pre-observation conference. They suggested that the requirement for a post-observation conference -- the formative conference designed to develop the professional growth plans -- should be optional for teachers rated higher than "satisfactory" on all of the domains. And only one appraiser should be required to conduct the conference. The principal/supervisor should be the one responsible, in cooperation with the teacher, for developing the professional growth plan. If the second appraiser identifies an area of weakness, that appraiser should communicate the findings to the principal/supervisor prior to the time that the professional growth plan is developed.

The Texas Federation of Teachers (TFT) and the Texas State Teachers Association (TSTA), not unexpectedly, had somewhat different views on the teacher appraisal system. The TFT believed that all teacher performance criteria should be reviewed by the five categories identified in the law.

Both organizations expressed concern about the professional characteristics domain of the instrument which contained four of the fourteen criteria in the instrument -- more than any other single domain. The teachers' associations believed that any category in the appraisal that is seen as a "screen" by teachers will undermine their trust in the evaluation instrument. The criteria and indicators to which both groups objected were not observable classroom or job-related behaviors.

The TFT recommended that teachers in the six pilot districts be surveyed to solicit their perceptions of how the evaluation instrument and procedures could be improved. Another suggestion was that when the appraisal of the two evaluators differs significantly, that a third evaluation, possibly by a peer, be instituted. Both associations believe the assigning of unequal weight to different evaluators defeats the purpose of the law -- to diminish the "single evaluator fear."

The use of "cumulative data" gathered by the teacher's supervisor was also seen as a potential problem as long as there is no specific definition of what can be used and what weight can be assigned to it as part of the final score from the supervisor-evaluator. The associations viewed the pre-observation conference as the "ounce of prevention" that is worth a pound of cure. The pre-evaluation conference was seen as useful in two ways: to review "the rules of the game," and to allow the teacher the opportunity for self-evaluation. The post-observation conference is considered essential. In order for the evaluation to provide feedback to teachers for improving classroom instruction and for further professional growth, the findings of the evaluation should be in writing in a growth document specific enough to provide meaningful specific guidance and resources to the teachers affected. Another major concern was that the appeals process allows for appeals on procedure but not on the substance of an evaluation.

State Board of Education Decisions

At its May meeting, the State Board of Education adopted a teacher appraisal instrument (see pages 97-99). The rules adopted concerning the state-wide appraisal system included the following:

- The appraisal instrument will consist of the first four of the domains listed above and a fifth domain, Growth and Responsibilities, replacing Professional Characteristics. Local districts may insert specific district policy statements in those indicators where appropriate (i.e., where it says "according to district policies").

- At the beginning of the school year, teachers will receive an orientation manual that includes the appraisal instrument and explanation statements, a history of the development process, the scoring procedures, the teacher self-appraisal instrument, and the professional growth plan document.

- The appraiser will use a three-point scale to mark each indicator. The scale consists of (1) absent/below standard, (2) standard expectation, and (3) exceptional quality.

- Each teacher will be appraised by at least two appraisers, including the immediate supervisor. The second appraiser must be certified to teach, approved by the local board, and have at least two years of classroom experience.

- A minimum of two formal observations will be conducted by each of the two appraisers -- making a total of four appraisals, each a minimum of 45 consecutive minutes in length, for each teacher. The first formal appraisal by the appraiser who is not the teacher's supervisor must be a scheduled one.

- A post-observation conference must be scheduled following each formal observation if the performance is judged less than satisfactory in one or more domains and is recommended after all observations.

- A professional growth plan is to be developed for teachers receiving less than satisfactory on at least one domain during an appraisal, or satisfactory or less on a domain at the end of the second appraisal. (A minimum of two formal observations, one by each appraiser, comprise one appraisal.)

- As part of the teacher self appraisal process, each teacher will be required to establish goals for student progress. The end-of-the-year results will form a part of each teacher's self-assessment of success in reaching individual goals.

- An "observation record" is to be filled out after each observation by the teacher's supervisor. The second appraiser will fill out an "evaluation record" after each observation. At the end of the appraisal period an Appraisal Record will be completed. The results obtained by the teacher's supervisor is given a 60% weight, the results of the second appraiser, a 40% weight.

- All school districts will use the state appraisal system.

- All appraisers must be certified by the state as having proficiency in the use of the state system. A training program will be provided during the summer of 1986 for more than 15,000 appraisers.

- Districts will adopt a written policy for appeal to the Commissioner of Education.

TEXAS TEACHER APPRAISAL INSTRUMENT

DOMAIN I: INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES

Criterion 1: Provides opportunities for students to participate actively and successfully

Indicator
a. appropriately varies activities
b. interacts with students in group formats as appropriate
c. solicits student participation
d. extends students' responses/contributions
e. provides ample time for students to respond to teacher questions/solicitations and to consider content as it is presented
f. implements instruction at an appropriate level of difficulty

Criterion 2: Evaluates and provides feedback on student progress during instruction

Indicator
a. communicates learning expectations
b. monitors student performances as they engage-in learning activities
c. solicits responses or demonstrations from specific students for assessment purposes
d. reinforces correct responses
e. provides corrective feedback, or none needed
f. reteaches, or none needed

DOMAIN II: CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Criterion 3: Organizes materials and students

Indicator
a. secures student attention, or students are attending
b. uses administrative procedures and routines which facilitate instruction
c. gives clear administrative directions for classroom procedures or routines, or none needed
d. maintains seating arrangements/grouping appropriate for the activity and the environment
e. has materials, aids, and facilities ready for use

Criterion 4: Maximizes amount of time available for instruction

Indicator
a. begins promptly/avoids wasting time at the end of the instructional period
b. implements appropriate sequence of activities
c. maintains appropriate pace
d. maintains focus
e. keeps students engaged

Criterion 5: Manages student behavior

Indicator
a. specifies expectations for class behavior, or none needed
b. uses techniques to prevent off-task behavior, or none needed
c. uses techniques to redirect off-task behavior, or none needed
d. uses techniques to stop inappropriate behavior, or none needed
e. uses techniques to stop disruptive behavior, or none needed

f. applies rules consistently and fairly
g. reinforces appropriate behavior when appropriate

DOMAIN III: PRESENTATION OF SUBJECT MATTER

Criterion 6: Teaches for cognitive, affective, and/or psychomotor learning and transfer

Indicator a. begins instruction/activity with an appropriate introduction
b. presents information in an appropriate sequence
c. relates lesson content to prior or future learning
d. provides for definition of concepts and description of skills and/or attitudes and interests
e. provides for elaboration of critical attributes of concepts, psychomotor skills, and/or attitudes and interests
f. stresses generalization, principle, or rules as a relationship between or among concepts, skills, and/or attitudes/interests
g. provides opportunities for transfer
h. closes instruction appropriately

Criterion 7: Presents information accurately and clearly

Indicator a. makes no significant errors
b. uses vocabulary appropriate to students
c. explains content and/or learning tasks daily
d. stresses important points and dimensions of content
e. clarifies student misunderstanding, or none needed

Criterion 8: Uses acceptable communication skills

Indicator a. uses correct grammar
b. pronounces words correctly and clearly
c. uses accurate language
d. demonstrates skill in written communication

DOMAIN IV: LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

Criterion 9: Uses strategies to motivate students for learning

Indicator a. relates content to student interests/experiences
b. emphasizes the value/importance of the activity or content
c. reinforces learning efforts of students
d. challenges students

Criterion 10: Maintains supportive environment

Indicator a. avoids sarcasm and negative criticism
b. establishes climate of courtesy and respect
c. encourages slow and reluctant students
d. provides praise for specific performance
e. establishes and maintains positive rapport with students

DOMAIN V: GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Criterion 11: Plans for and engages in professional development

Indicator a. shows progress in completing professional growth requirements as agreed upon with appraiser(s), or none needed
b. stays current in content taught
c. stays current in instructional methodology

Criterion 12: Interacts and communicates effectively with parents

Indicator a. initiates communications with parents about student performance and/or behavior when appropriate
b. conducts parent-teacher conferences in accordance with local district policy
c. reports student progress to parents in accordance with local district policy
d. maintains confidentiality unless disclosure is required by law

Criterion 13: Complies with policies, operating procedures, and requirements

Indicator a. follows statutory and Texas Education Agency regulations
b. follows district and campus policies and procedures
c. performs assigned professional duties
d. follows district promotion/retention policy and procedures

Criterion 14: Promotes and evaluates student growth

Indicator a. participates in campus goal-setting for student progress
b. plans instruction in accordance with district requirements
c. documents student progress
d. maintains accurate records
e. reports student progress at appropriate intervals

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The teacher appraisal system will go into effect during the 1986-87 school year. However, results from the observations in the fall appraisal period will not be used for career-ladder placement for the 1986-87 year. The Board set preliminary scoring standards for evaluating teacher performance under the new system and it is anticipated the final standards will be established during the 1986-87 school year.

Public school teachers, administrators, and regional education service center staff members participated in a series of one-week inservice sessions for state trainers. The state trainers conducted a series of intensive one-week training sessions for school district appraisers throughout Texas from mid-June to mid-August, 1986. The training focused on appraisal procedures, increasing each appraiser's ability to recognize the different behaviors included in the system, and the skills necessary to evaluate cumulative information. The training also provided guidance for appraisal observations and diagnostic and prescriptive information.

Problems With Planning and Implementation

According to William Bednar, Austin attorney, everyone would have benefited if the Texas legislature had employed some sort of preventive law analysis before deciding to set local communities adrift without adequate funds or uniform, objective standards. While career ladders are a legitimate state authority and constitutional on the face, local district implementation can be subject to litigation depending on how the program is modified and how it is put into effect.

Kelly Frels suggested there are eight problems that might arise in implementing any career-ladder program, some of which are being experienced in Texas.

1. Legislatures often mandate the implementation of the career ladder too fast. In Texas, there should have been a phase-in procedure and period.
2. Evaluation systems should be in place when the law is enacted to implement the career ladder. Inadequate selection procedures increase the chances for disenchantment.-
3. Adequate funding should be provided. Without it teacher morale is lowered.
4. Inconsistent rules and leadership will cause problems.
5. Ineffective communication at all levels, state and local, will hinder the process.
6. Requirements for advanced training should be clear.
7. Wide variations between past and present evaluations, and between individuals on the subject of what constitutes good teaching, will lead to problems.
8. Ranking systems irritate teachers and lead to problems for districts.

A spokesperson for the Texas Association of School Boards pointed out several problems with the implementation in Texas. The intent and purpose of the pay plan was not well thought out. There is little sense in providing incentives to attract and retain teachers when the base salary is inadequate. There is also a contradiction between the professed intent of the "career ladder" -- to reward teachers for outstanding classroom performance -- and a base-pay scale that is based on seniority.

A second problem is that the legislature did not draw upon the expertise of trained compensation specialists in designing the plan. It is difficult to determine what kinds of cost-control mechanisms, if any, are in place that predict the funding requirements of the plan. The "Career Ladder" was designed to be "open-ended"; all who qualify were to receive career ladder assignment. In fact, the availability of funds sets a limit on the number of teachers who actually receive increases.

A third problem results from the legislature's view that nothing will happen unless it forces change by legislative mandate. That this is partially true -- state incentives are often needed to spur change at the district level -- obscures the fact that it is inappropriate for state legislatures to mandate "details" that are not appropriate for all districts within the state. General guidelines and incentives do initiate change; too many bureaucratic requirements stifle it.

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Utah Incentive Program

In 1984 the Utah legislature passed House Bill 110 providing for a career ladder program that proposed major changes in both the compensation and job responsibilities of teachers. The program is a district-option, entitlement-financed program. The bill provided funding for public school districts, on a voluntary basis, to develop teacher career ladders based on State Board of Education guidelines and subject to Board approval. The legislation required local programs to be developed through joint efforts of teachers, parents, administrators, and school-board members. All of the 40 eligible districts chose to participate and submitted plans to the State Department of Education. However, many districts completely revised their plans in the second year because the first plans had been developed within a two-month span of time.

Teachers receiving career-ladder promotions are expected to take on responsibilities or projects beyond normal classroom duties. These may include developing curriculum, evaluating novice teachers, serving as mentors for new teachers, and developing and presenting inservice programs. Districts may extend teachers' work-year by adding non-teaching days to their contracts for specific purposes. Districts are required to use a comprehensive, fair evaluation system for awarding teachers additional pay associated with outstanding work performance and for placement on the career ladder. The evaluation systems employ multiple lines of evidence to build a composite teacher performance profile. Beginning in 1985, 10% of the entitlement was used for rewarding teachers who were evaluated as meritorious. No more than half could be used for extended-year contracts, and at least half was to be used for the advancement of teachers on the career ladder.

The new funds provided to support the changes amount to about 13% of the annual teacher-wage bill, or about $3,200 per teacher. The program was funded at $17.7 million the first year and $35.6 million the second. Twenty-six percent of Utah's career-ladder funds for 1985 were spent on adding days to each teacher's contract year. That provision alone provided almost 100,000 extra people-days for additional inservice training, curriculum development, and other activities. In this way, almost everyone was able to receive some benefit from some part of the program. For the third year, state officials asked for an additional $19.8 million. However, because the state is anticipating a revenue shortfall and a rapid growth in the student population, the Governor has asked for only half that amount.

A preliminary study conducted by the Career Ladder Research Group at the University of Utah and the School/Community Development Section of the Utah State Office of Education, reported the following impact:

1) Teacher evaluation is improving as the result of the career ladders.

The majority of school districts (85%) proposed to change their evaluation practices in order to accommodate the career-ladder system. Some districts (18%) initiated new practices for career-ladder teachers while retaining existing practices for teachers who do not elect to participate. Most districts (67%) have a new evaluation system for all teachers.

In the past, administrators commonly were the only ones evaluating teachers. More than half the districts (53%) are using an evaluation committee composed of peers, administrators, and others, either alone or in addition to administrator evaluation.

There has been a significant increase in the number of sources of information used in evaluation. Explicit evidence of student achievement (e.g., pre- and post- tests) is a provision of 53% of the school districts. This is leading to an improvement in the techniques used to assess student progress.

Peer review is a feature of 31% of the plans. Other newer lines of evidence in some of the plans included parent surveys, attention to professional development, and documentation of human relations.

2) The role of the administrator is changing.

The administrators are spending more time in the classrooms. A greater emphasis is being placed on instructional leadership.

3) There is more teacher involvement in the development and implementation of curriculum.

4) The quality of classroom instruction is improving.

5) The School Board has become more involved.

6) Teachers support the continuation of the program.

A teacher opinion survey conducted by the research group found that:

- 69% of the teachers approve of providing a multi-level compensation system
- 64% agree that the plans encourage teachers to remain in classroom teaching
- 73% believe that the plans have a positive influence on student achievement
- 84% indicated a positive impact on teacher morale
- 95% believed the extended year provisions had a positive impact
- 65% were in favor of continuing the program

7) There are drawbacks to a district-by-district approach.

The study found some drawbacks to allowing a district-by-district approach in developing career ladder plans.

- There was resistance in some districts to any change in the traditional approach.
- There was a lack of creativity in the approaches of many of the districts.

- There was a lack of knowledge about what other states/districts had done and the options available.

- Districts tended to maintain their old patterns of administrative processes. If teachers were not normally included in the decision-making structure of the district under the former policies, they were not likely to be included under the new.

- The resources of smaller districts limited their ability in both the development and implementation of a plan.

Sources:

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Virginia Pay for Performance Pilot Projects

In a desire to attract and retain highly qualified teachers for its public schools, Virginia has initiated pay-for-performance pilot projects in six school districts. Efforts are being directed toward the establishment of financial incentives that will enhance interest in the teaching profession and provide opportunities for teachers once employed to receive continued recognition for outstanding performance.

Governor Robb appointed a Special Advisory Committee on Quality Education that approved funding for the six pilot projects. In addition, a plan for a Master Teacher Career Ladder has been developed and guidelines have been set. The guidelines for master-teacher provisions that every plan should have are:

- a review and assessment of the performance evaluation system for teachers;

- clear procedures for carrying out the master teacher plan;

- total commitment to the plan on the part of the administration and the community;

- recognition and anticipation of changes that will result from the master teacher plan;
- ways to promote teacher acceptance of the master teacher plan;
- ways to promote increased student learning by means of the master teacher plan;
- availability of incentives for all who qualify; and
- evidence of how superior performance is evaluated;

The Governor's Task Force on Master Teacher/Pay-for-Performance determined that the following factors should be part of successful incentive-pay plans. The plan should include these Success Factors:

Success Factor # 1: Foster cooperation above individual competition even though group and individual performance are to be rewarded.

Success Factor # 2: Limit initial awards to an average of $1,000 per eligible employee.

Success Factor # 3: Have the potential to increase job satisfaction.

Success Factor # 4: Be available to all who apply and qualify.

Success Factor # 5: Include a measurable definition of superior performance.

Success Factor # 6: Safeguard from deterioration or neglect programs and instruction not targeted in the plan.

Success Factor # 7: Complement the existing evaluation process.

Success Factor # 8: Include peer assessment for any individual awards given.

Success Factor # 9: Have the potential to expand to areas other than elementary basic skills one target goals in that area have been reached.

Success Factor # 10: Be workable administratively.

Success Factor # 11: Provide for a project evaluation process that will include adequate controls to validate the model.

Sources:

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The Status of Performance-Based Incentive Pay Plans in the States Served by SEDL

The states served by SEDL have been investigating the possibilities of career-ladder and merit-pay plans for several years. Revenue short-falls and/or political changes in the states have resulted in either curtailment, reduction, or postponement of original plans. Texas, the only state in the region with a mandated state plan in the process of being implemented, has been discussed beginning on page 93 in the previous section. The remaining four states are discussed below.

Arkansas

In 1985, after the legislature created a teacher career-development pilot project and appropriated $500,000 for the projects, Governor Clinton appointed a seven-member Teacher Career Development Commission to set guidelines to establish the pilot program in up to six school districts in 1986-87. The Commission met and established guidelines for the pilot projects. A request for proposals was sent out January 27, 1986, and the school districts were given until May 15, 1986 to submit proposals for a variety of programs -- to be funded for the 1986-87 school year. The Commission met in May 1986, reviewed the proposals, and recommended five of them for funding. The State Board of Education met in June to approve the recommendations. The Commission will monitor the effectiveness of the pilot plans and make recommendations to the legislature in 1987.

The pilot-project legislation stipulated that each school district that paid its teaching personnel above the Arkansas average salary for teachers for the 1984-85 school year was eligible to submit a proposed Teacher Career Development Program. However, the districts were required to determine the interest of their teachers in participating in the Career Development Program. Districts were not eligible to submit a proposal for a pilot program if less than 30% of the teachers indicated an interest in participating in the program. In districts engaged in professional negotiations with their teachers, the proposals were to be developed through the negotiation process. All districts were to solicit the participation of teachers and parents in the district in developing the proposal. The proposals are to be sent to the Commission for review. Awards were to be made by July 1, 1986.

According to state legislator Jodie Mahony, some of the problems in establishing a career-ladder program in Arkansas have resulted from a lack of commitment from the key actors; superintendents are overloaded with other reform legislation, local boards are not involved, and teachers will not support merit pay or career ladders in Arkansas at this time. In addition, if there is to be career development as part of an overall effort to improve the quality of teachers, there needs to be an evaluation system that is effective and fair. The evaluation system and career development program need to be in concert with the overall reform movement, not separate from it.

Mahony asserted that until the base pay is strengthened, Arkansas cannot successfully implement a career ladder. Just paying for the new reform legislation is difficult. What Arkansas needs is to have the base pay of all teachers raised in order to attract better new teachers to the schools.

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Louisiana

Louisiana, as yet, has no clear direction in the areas of career development, merit pay, or career ladders. In 1984, the legislature passed Act 759 that set up a board to study how a career-ladder system could be put into effect. The board's study report noted that there couldn't be a career-ladder program without a uniform method of assessment; that any career-ladder program needed to be coordinated with any new assessment system and with a teacher-intern program; and that time would be needed to first train administrators in using a uniform assessment system. However, no recommendations were made to the legislature.

In the 1985 session, the Career Ladder Commission was abolished. House Bill 1868, which was not passed in the 1985 session, included a Quality Assurance Assessment Program charged with developing a uniform assessment document for 1987. What did pass was SB 887 that included a teacher incentive-pay model program. The State Department of Education was to invite districts to apply with their own incentive pay plans. The state planned to fund ten in the first year. However, the plan was not funded.

A group representing 19 organizations, including a number of deans of Louisiana Colleges of Education, have formed the Committee United for Education (CUE). The Committee has met to prepare recommendations to present to the legislature on such issues as teacher performance evaluation, continuing certification, and a salary schedule based on performance assessment and differentiated staffing. Because there were several unresolved issues, the committee did not submit recommendations to the 1986 legislative session, but will continue working on the problems and submit their recommendations at a later date.

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New Mexico

During the 1984 session, the New Mexico legislature addressed the issue of performance-based pay in two ways. First, the State Department of Education was requested to conduct a study of performance-based pay systems and solicit the advice of teachers, administrators, local boards of education, and institutions of higher education concerning the issue. In addition, the legislature directed school districts to submit their plans, or report on their progress toward this effort to the State Board of Education for review by January 1, 1985.

None of the three bills concerning merit-pay or career-ladder programs that were introduced into the 1986 legislative session were passed. All called for pilot studies. However, the State Board of Education's revision of the teacher certification regulations will provide New Mexico teachers with a basic career ladder. This revision includes three levels of certification. Level I is for provisional teachers and provides both a first-year support system and opportunities for staff development for beginning teachers. Level I teachers have three years to gain the competencies required for professional certification at Level II. Teachers may choose to remain at Level II. Those outstanding teachers who wish to assume responsibilities in addition to their classroom duties may be considered for Level III. Movement from one level to the next will be based, in part, on classroom performance. Following State Department of Education guidelines, districts have already developed Staff Accountability Plans that include performance assessment and staff development components.

Since the 88 districts in New Mexico set their own pay schedules, each district will have the option to adjust teacher base pay in relation to the level of certification. Any state requirement for a pay increase in the form of incentive pay might alter the proportion of state revenues going to higher education -- a situation that would require careful consideration, according to Maurice Hobson, state legislator.

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John Mitchell, New Mexico Federation of Teachers, June 10, 1986.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma has a master-teacher program that is being funded by the state on a pilot basis in three school districts. This program was developed during the 1983-84 school year and later became part of the general Career Ladder Program that was introduced in the Oklahoma legislature last session, but which did not pass.

Source:

Dr. Judy Leach, Associate Superintendent, Oklahoma State Department of Education.

Gerald Hoeltzel, Superintendent of Schools, Watonga Public Schools.

Texas

Please see the discussion of the Texas Career Ladder beginning on page 93.

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